{"product_id":"this-is-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9781119718888","title":"This Is Philosophy of Mind","description":"Discover fascinating and illuminating contributions to historical and contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind In the newly revised second edition of This Is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, accomplished philosopher Pete Mandik delivers an accessible primer on the core issues animating contemporary and historical discussions in the philosophy of mind.  The book is part of the This is Philosophy series that introduces undergraduate students to key concepts and methods in the study of philosophy. This particular edition walks readers through perennial issues like the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, free will, and the nature of consciousness.  This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction also provides complimentary access to valuable supplemental online resources. \u003cp\u003eHow to Use This Book xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments xvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbout the Companion Website xix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Meet Your Mind 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAspects of Mind 1\u003cbr\u003e Thought and experience 1\u003cbr\u003e Conscious and unconscious 2\u003cbr\u003e Qualia 3\u003cbr\u003e Sensory perception 3\u003cbr\u003e Emotion 4\u003cbr\u003e Imagery 4\u003cbr\u003e Will and action 5\u003cbr\u003e Self 5\u003cbr\u003e Propositional attitudes 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhilosophical Problems 6\u003cbr\u003e Mind–body problem 6\u003cbr\u003e Other problems 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Substance Dualism 15\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Substance Dualism 15\u003cbr\u003e Leibniz’s law arguments 16\u003cbr\u003e Criticism of Leibniz’s law arguments: Intensional fallacy 19\u003cbr\u003e Explanatory gap arguments 20\u003cbr\u003e Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments 21\u003cbr\u003e Modal arguments 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism 24\u003cbr\u003e Princess Elisabeth’s objection 25\u003cbr\u003e The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism 26\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Property Dualism 29\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Inverted Spectrum 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAttack of the Zombies 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Knowledge Argument 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Explanatory Gap Argument 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoes Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism? 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Do You Know You’re Not a Zombie? 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism 44\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSolipsism: Is It Just Me? 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIdealism: It’s All in the Mind 49\u003cbr\u003e Berkeley’s argument from pain 50\u003cbr\u003e Berkeley’s argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley’s bucket 51\u003cbr\u003e Berkeley’s “Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea” 51\u003cbr\u003e Berkeley’s master argument 52\u003cbr\u003e Why Berkeley is not a solipsist 52\u003cbr\u003e Arguing against idealism 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePanpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere 53\u003cbr\u003e The analogy argument 54\u003cbr\u003e The nothing from nothing argument 55\u003cbr\u003e The evolutionary argument 56\u003cbr\u003e Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Behaviorism and Other Minds 59\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBehaviorism: Introduction and Overview 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe History of Behaviorism 61\u003cbr\u003e Ludwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument 62\u003cbr\u003e Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to Behaviorism 65\u003cbr\u003e The qualia objection 65\u003cbr\u003e Sellars’s objection 66\u003cbr\u003e The Geach–Chisholm objection 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Philosophical Problem of Other Minds 68\u003cbr\u003e The rise and fall of the argument from analogy 69\u003cbr\u003e Denying the asymmetry between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 72\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Mind as Brain 74\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Mind–Brain Identity Theory 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of Mind–Brain Identity Theory 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience 76\u003cbr\u003e Major parts and functions of the nervous system 77\u003cbr\u003e Major parts and functions of the brain 77\u003cbr\u003e Neurons, neural activations, and brain states 78\u003cbr\u003e Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology 78\u003cbr\u003e Localism and holism 78\u003cbr\u003e Learning and synaptic plasticity 79\u003cbr\u003e Computational neuroscience and connectionism 79\u003cbr\u003e Neural correlates of consciousness 80\u003cbr\u003e On pain and c- fibers 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSome General Remarks about Identity 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Mind–Brain Identity Theory 83\u003cbr\u003e The zombie argument 83\u003cbr\u003e The multiple realizability argument 84\u003cbr\u003e Max Black’s “distinct property” argument 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 87\u003cbr\u003e Annotated Bibliography 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Thinking Machines 89\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCan a Machine Think? 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test 90\u003cbr\u003e Alan Turing 91\u003cbr\u003e Turing machines 91\u003cbr\u003e The Turing test 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSearle’s Chinese Room Argument 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to the Chinese Room Argument 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Silicon Chip Replacement Thought Experiment 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSymbolicism versus Connectionism 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 101\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Functionalism 104\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Gist of Functionalism 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief History of Functionalism 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Functionalism 107\u003cbr\u003e The causal argument 107\u003cbr\u003e The multiple realization argument 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Varieties of Functionalism 111\u003cbr\u003e Turing machine functionalism 112\u003cbr\u003e Analytical functionalism versus empirical functionalism 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Functionalism 114\u003cbr\u003e Adapting the zombie argument to be against functionalism 114\u003cbr\u003e Adapting the Chinese room argument to be against functionalism 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Mental Causation 118\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Mental Causation 118\u003cbr\u003e The causal closure of the physical 119\u003cbr\u003e The problem for substance dualists 121\u003cbr\u003e The problem for property dualists 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Views of Interaction 122\u003cbr\u003e Interactionism 122\u003cbr\u003e Parallelism 123\u003cbr\u003e Epiphenomenalism 124\u003cbr\u003e Reductionism 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia and Epiphenomenalism 125\u003cbr\u003e Whether qualia- based epiphenomenalism conflicts with phenomenal self- knowledge 126\u003cbr\u003e Dennett’s zimboes 126\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnomalous Monism 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Explanatory Exclusion Argument 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Eliminative Materialism 134\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction and Overview 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Ingredients of Contemporary Eliminative Materialism 135\u003cbr\u003e Folk psychology as a theory 136\u003cbr\u003e The contrast between reduction and elimination 137\u003cbr\u003e Putting the ingredients together 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism 138\u003cbr\u003e Folk psychology is a stagnant research program 139\u003cbr\u003e Folk psychology is committed to propositional attitudes having a sentential structure that is unsupported by neuroscientific research 139\u003cbr\u003e Folk psychology makes commitments to features of mental states that lead to an unacceptable epiphenomenalism 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism 140\u003cbr\u003e Eliminative materialism is self- refuting 140\u003cbr\u003e The “theory” theory is false 141\u003cbr\u003e Folk psychology is indispensable 142\u003cbr\u003e Introspection reveals the existence of propositional attitudes 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia Eliminative Materialism: “Quining” Qualia 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Perception, Mental Imagery, and Emotion 149\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerception 149\u003cbr\u003e Direct realism and the argument from illusion 149\u003cbr\u003e Philosophical theories of perception 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMental Imagery 155\u003cbr\u003e How similar are mental images to other mental states? 156\u003cbr\u003e Is mental imagery the basis for mental states such as thoughts? 157\u003cbr\u003e To what degree, if any, is mental imagery genuinely imagistic or picture-like? 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotion 159\u003cbr\u003e What distinguishes emotions from other mental states? 160\u003cbr\u003e What distinguishes different emotions from each other? 160\u003cbr\u003e The difficulties in giving a unified account of the emotions 161\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 The Will: Willpower and Freedom 164\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Free Will and Determinism 164\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSources of Determinism 166\u003cbr\u003e General remarks 166\u003cbr\u003e Physical determinism 167\u003cbr\u003e Theological determinism 168\u003cbr\u003e Logical determinism 168\u003cbr\u003e Ethical determinism 169\u003cbr\u003e Psychological determinism 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompatibilism 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncompatibilism 171\u003cbr\u003e The origination or causal chain argument 172\u003cbr\u003e The consequence argument 172\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Might Free Will Be, If There Were Any Such Thing? 173\u003cbr\u003e Freedom aside for the moment, what is the will? 173\u003cbr\u003e What might the freedom of the will consist in? 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Intentionality and Mental Representation 179\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Intentionality 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Inconsistent Triad of Intentionality 180\u003cbr\u003e Defending each individual proposition 181\u003cbr\u003e Spelling out the inconsistency 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternalism versus Externalism 182\u003cbr\u003e For externalism: The Twin Earth thought experiment 184\u003cbr\u003e Against externalism: Swampman and the brain in the vat 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheories of Content Determination 186\u003cbr\u003e Resemblance theory 186\u003cbr\u003e Interpretational semantics 187\u003cbr\u003e Conceptual role semantics 188\u003cbr\u003e Causal or informational theory 190\u003cbr\u003e Teleological evolutionary theory 191\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Consciousness and Qualia 194\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimism about Explaining Consciousness 194\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocusing on Several Different Uses of the Word “Conscious” 195\u003cbr\u003e Creature consciousness 195\u003cbr\u003e Transitive consciousness 195\u003cbr\u003e State consciousness 196\u003cbr\u003e Phenomenal consciousness 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRosenthal’s Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness 197\u003cbr\u003e An objection to the HOT theory: Introspectively implausible 200\u003cbr\u003e Another objection to the HOT theory: Too intellectual 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst Order Representation Theories of Consciousness 202\u003cbr\u003e The transparency argument for first order representationalism 204\u003cbr\u003e The “Spot” argument for first order representationalism 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 206\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Is This the End?: Personal Identity, the Self, and Life after Death 207\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of Personal Identity 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Persistence 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApproaches to the Problem of Persistence 209\u003cbr\u003e The psychological approach 210\u003cbr\u003e The fission problem for the psychological approach 211\u003cbr\u003e The somatic or bodily approach 212\u003cbr\u003e Temporal parts theory aka perdurantism aka four- dimensionalism 214\u003cbr\u003e The no- self view 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLife after Death 217\u003cbr\u003e Substance dualism and the afterlife 218\u003cbr\u003e Mind–brain identity theory and the afterlife 218\u003cbr\u003e Functionalism and the afterlife 219\u003cbr\u003e Temporal parts and the afterlife 219\u003cbr\u003e No- self and the afterlife 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e16 The 4E Approach 222\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Dimensions of Difference 223\u003cbr\u003e The spatial dimension: From in here to out there 223\u003cbr\u003e The causation- constitution dimension: Important to the mind vs. part of the mind 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe First E: Mind as Embodied 225\u003cbr\u003e Embodiment and thinking 225\u003cbr\u003e Embodiment and memory 226\u003cbr\u003e Embodiment and conscious experience 227\u003cbr\u003e Embodiment and the plasticity of sensory systems 228\u003cbr\u003e Spatial concepts and bodily orientation 229\u003cbr\u003e The coupling- constitution fallacy 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Second E: Enactive 230\u003cbr\u003e You’ve got to move 231\u003cbr\u003e Sensorimotor contingencies 232\u003cbr\u003e Enactivism and anti- representationalism 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn a World: The Third and Fourth Es 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e17 Futuristic Directions 237\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSuper AI and the Technological Singularity 238\u003cbr\u003e Chalmers’ singularity argument 240\u003cbr\u003e The gist of Chalmers argument is 240\u003cbr\u003e The quest for friendly AI 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnhanced Humans and Posthumans 243\u003cbr\u003e Cyborgization and bioengineering 244\u003cbr\u003e Technology and the extended mind 245\u003cbr\u003e Posthumans versus natural- born cyborgs 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind Uploading 247\u003cbr\u003e Arguing for uploading 248\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 250\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 252\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePETE MANDIK \u003c\/b\u003eis a Full Professor in the Department of Philosophy at William Paterson University of New Jersey. He is the author of \u003ci\u003eKey Terms in Philosophy of Mind \u003c\/i\u003eand\u003ci\u003e Physicalist Theories of Consciousness\u003c\/i\u003e, the co-author of \u003ci\u003eCognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain\u003c\/i\u003e, and the co-editor of \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader\u003c\/i\u003e. He writes and illustrates the comic \u003ci\u003eMind Chunks\u003c\/i\u003e, which appears monthly at DailyNous.com.   \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlthough scientific advances have deepened our understanding of how the human brain functions, many mysteries remain about the nature of the mind. Philosophers of mind investigate mental phenomena and their relationship to the physical body, exploring fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness, emotion, and thought. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eThis Is Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e, author Pete Mandik guides students of philosophy through the fundamental philosophical theories, questions, and debates concerning the nature of the mind. Assuming no previous background in the subject, this easily accessible textbook describes abstract and complex philosophical concepts in a reader-friendly narrative style. Concise chapters address topics ranging from traditional approaches to the mind-body problem to contemporary theories of consciousness and intentionality. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis second edition remains the most comprehensive and up–to–date introduction to philosophy of mind available, featuring two entirely new chapters covering embodied approaches to cognition and emerging and future directions in the study of the mind. Updated examples, references, and annotated bibliographies are complemented by an enhanced companion website with further readings, videos, visual aids, links to relevant scientific work, and definitions of key terms. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePart of the acclaimed \u003ci\u003eThis Is Philosophy\u003c\/i\u003e series, the second edition of \u003ci\u003eThis Is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction\u003c\/i\u003e is the ideal textbook for upper-level undergraduates taking typical semester-long Philosophy of Mind courses, as well as students and general readers looking to tackle the subject on their own.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990388359397,"sku":"NP9781119718888","price":27.5,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781119718888.jpg?v=1761787627","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/this-is-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9781119718888","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}