{"product_id":"this-is-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9780470674475","title":"This is Philosophy of Mind","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThis is Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e presents students of philosophy with an accessible introduction to the core issues related to the philosophy of mind.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eIncludes issues related to the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, free will, the nature of consciousness, and more\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWritten to be accessible to philosophy students early in their studies\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eFeatures supplemental online resources on \u003ca href=\"https:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/thisisphilosophy\/thisisphilosophyofmindanintroduction\"\u003ehttps:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/thisisphilosophy\/thisisphilosophyofmindanintroduction\u003c\/a\u003e and a frequently updated companion blog, at http:\/\/tipom.blogspot.com\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e  \u003cp\u003eHow to Use This Book xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments xvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Meet Your Mind 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAspects of Mind 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThought and experience 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConscious and unconscious 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSensory perception 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotion 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImagery 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWill and action 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSelf 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePropositional attitudes 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhilosophical Problems 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–body problem 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther problems 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Substance Dualism 15\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Substance Dualism 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s law arguments 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticism of Leibniz’s law arguments: Intensional fallacy 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExplanatory gap arguments 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticisms of explanatory gap arguments 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eModal arguments 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability eally entail possibility? 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrincess Elisabeth’s objection 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism 26\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Property Dualism 29\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Inverted Spectrum 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAttack of the Zombies 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Knowledge Argument 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Explanatory Gap Argument 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoes Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism? 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Do You Know You’re Not a Zombie? 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism 45\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSolipsism: Is It Just Me? 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIdealism: It’s All in the Mind 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s argument from pain 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley’s bucket 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s “Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea” 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s master argument 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Berkeley is not a solipsist 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguing against idealism 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePanpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere 54\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analogy argument 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe nothing from nothing argument 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolutionary argument 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguing against panpsychism: The combination problem 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Behaviorism and Other Minds 61\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBehaviorism: Introduction and Overview 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe History of Behaviorism 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to Behaviorism 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe qualia objection 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSellars’s objection 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Geach–Chisholm objection 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Philosophical Problem of Other Minds 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe rise and fall of the argument from analogy 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDenying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds 72\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Mind as Brain 77\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Mind–Brain Identity Theory 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of Mind–Brain Identity Theory 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMajor parts and functions of the nervous system 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMajor parts and functions of the brain 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeurons, neural activations, and brain states 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLesions, imaging, and electrophysiology 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLocalism and holism 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLearning and synaptic plasticity 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComputational neuroscience and connectionism 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeural correlates of consciousness 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOn pain and c-fi bers 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSome General Remarks about Identity 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Mind–Brain Identity Theory 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe zombie argument 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe multiple realizability argument 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMax Black’s “distinct property” argument 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Thinking Machines 93\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCan a Machine Think? 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlan Turing 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTuring machines 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Turing test 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSearle’s Chinese Room Argument 97\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to the Chinese Room Argument 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Silicon Chip Replacement Thought Experiment 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSymbolicism versus Connectionism 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Functionalism 109\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Gist of Functionalism 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief History of Functionalism 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Functionalism 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe causal argument 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe multiple realization argument 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Varieties of Functionalism 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTuring machine functionalism 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalytic functionalism versus empirical functionalism 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Functionalism 119\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdapting the zombie argument to be against functionalism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdapting the Chinese room argument to be against functionalism 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Mental Causation 123\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Mental Causation 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe causal closure of the physical 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem for substance dualists 126\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem for property dualists 126\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Views of Interaction 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInteractionism 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParallelism 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEpiphenomenalism 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReductionism 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia and Epiphenomenalism 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhether qualia-based epiphenomenalism conflicts with phenomenal self-knowledge 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDennett’s zimboes 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnomalous Monism 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Explanatory Exclusion Argument 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Eliminative Materialism 139\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction and Overview 139\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Ingredients of Contemporary Eliminative Materialism 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology as a theory 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe contrast between reduction and elimination 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePutting the ingredients together 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology is a stagnant research program 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology is committed to propositional attitudes having a sentential structure that is unsupported by neuroscientific research 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology makes commitments to features of mental states that lead to an unacceptable epiphenomenalism 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEliminative materialism is self-refuting 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “theory” theory is false 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology is indispensable 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntrospection reveals the existence of propositional attitudes 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia Eliminative Materialism: “Quining” Qualia 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Perception, Mental Imagery, and Emotion 155\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerception 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirect realism and the argument from illusion 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhilosophical theories of perception 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMental Imagery 161\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow similar are mental images to other mental states? 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs mental imagery the basis for mental states such as thoughts? 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what degree, if any, is mental imagery genuinely imagistic or picture-like? 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotion 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat distinguishes emotions from other mental states? 166\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat distinguishes different emotions from each other? 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe difficulties in giving a unifi ed account of the emotions 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 The Will: Willpower and Freedom 171\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Free Will and Determinism 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSources of Determinism 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral remarks 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhysical determinism 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheological determinism 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLogical determinism 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEthical determinism 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePsychological determinism 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompatibilism 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncompatibilism 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe origination or causal chain argument 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe consequence argument 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Might Free Will Be, If There Were Any Such Thing? 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFreedom aside for the moment, what is the will? 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat might the freedom of the will consist in? 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Intentionality and Mental Representation 187\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Intentionality 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Inconsistent Triad of Intentionality 188\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefending each individual proposition 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpelling out the inconsistency 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternalism versus Externalism 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor externalism: The Twin Earth thought experiment 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgainst externalism: Swampman and the brain in the vat 193\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheories of Content Determination 194\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResemblance theory 194\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterpretational semantics 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConceptual role semantics 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCausal or informational theory 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeleological evolutionary theory 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Consciousness and Qualia 203\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimism about Explaining Consciousness 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocusing on Several Different Uses of the Word “Conscious” 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCreature consciousness 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTransitive consciousness 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eState consciousness 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhenomenal consciousness 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRosenthal’s Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness 206\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn objection to the HOT theory: Introspectively implausible 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnother objection to the HOT theory: Too intellectual 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst Order Representation Theories of Consciousness 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe transparency argument for first order representationalism 213\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “Spot” argument for fi rst order representationalism 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Is This the End? Personal Identity, the Self, and Life after Death 217\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of Personal Identity 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Persistence 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApproaches to the Problem of Persistence 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe psychological approach 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe fission problem for the psychological approach 221\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe somatic or bodily approach 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTemporal parts theory aka perdurantism aka four-dimensionalism 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe no-self view 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLife after Death 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubstance dualism and the afterlife 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–brain identity theory and the afterlife 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFunctionalism and the afterlife 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTemporal parts and the afterlife 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo-self and the afterlife 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003ePete Mandik\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophy at William Paterson University, New Jersey. He is the author of \u003ci\u003eKey Terms in Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e (2010), co-author of \u003ci\u003eCognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain\u003c\/i\u003e (2006), and co-editor of \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader\u003c\/i\u003e (2001). The nature of the human mind and its relationship with the body and the outside world has long been a central concern of western philosophy, and the last few decades have seen great strides on explanations of consciousness, brain function, explications of the nature of perception and emotion, and many other issues. \u003ci\u003eThis is Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e presents a lively and accessible introduction to our current understanding of the core issues related to the philosophy of mind, including the mind-body conundrum, artificial intelligence, the nature of consciousness, and many more. While several chapters focus on the traditional positions on the mind-body problem, others offer insights on such contemporary topics as the problems of mental causation and free will, as well as theories of consciousness and intentionality. Specifically written for students of philosophy without a great deal of background, \u003ci\u003eThis is Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e helps to unravel some of the deep mysteries surrounding the nature of the human mind.  \u003cp\u003e“This is the most encompassing and up-to-date introduction to the philosophy of mind available today. Mandik has a gift for making technical debates accessible, and his engaging tour travels from the classic to the cutting edge.”\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e—Jesse Prinz, The Graduate Center, CUNY\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Is it possible to write a clear, even-handed, comprehensive, concise, and \u003ci\u003eengaging\u003c\/i\u003e guide to contemporary philosophy of mind—in less than 250 pages? I would not have thought so either. THANK YOU, Pete Mandik.”\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e—Kathleen Akins, Simon Fraser University\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990388228325,"sku":"NP9780470674475","price":93.5,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470674475.jpg?v=1761787625","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/this-is-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9780470674475","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}