{"product_id":"the-theory-of-monetary-institutions-isbn-9780631212140","title":"The Theory of Monetary Institutions","description":"\u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Monetary Institutions\u003c\/i\u003e covers free banking monetary thought and a theoretical account of the evolution of monetary institutions.  List of Figures and Tables. \u003cp\u003ePreface.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart 1: The Evolution of Market Monetary Institutions:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Mystery of Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMenger's Theory Restated.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSome Implications of the Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom Simple Commodity Money to Coins.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank-Issued Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegular Par Acceptance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClearing Arrangements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Path to Fiat Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpontaneous Separation Between the Media of Redemption and Account?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Commodity Money:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDetermining the Price Level.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Simple Stock-Flow Analytics of Gold Supply and Demand.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Historical Sources of Gold Supply Disturbances.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Benefits of a Gold Standard.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Resource Costs of a Gold Standard.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs a Gold Standard Worth the Resource Cost?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: Money Issue by Unrestricted Banks:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Purchasing Power of Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank Optimization and the Equilibrium Quantity of Bank-Issued Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorrecting Over-Issue by an Individual Bank.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorrecting Over-Issue by the System as a Whole.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponding to Shifts in Demand.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShifts Between Deposits and Currency.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: The Evolution and Rationales of Central Banking:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCentral Banking Roles and Clearinghouse Associations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Origins of Government Central Banks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHistorical Cases.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart V: Should Government Play a Role in Money?\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Some Aspect of Money a Public Good?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre There Relevant External Benefits in the Choice of Which Money to Use?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre There Relevant External Benefits to the Choice of How Much Money to Hold?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eiv. Is the Supply of Base Money a Natural Monopoly?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VI: Should Government Play a Role in Banking?\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Bank Runs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInherent Vulnerability in Theory: The Diamond-Dybvig Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Fragility of the Diamond-Dybvig Bank: A Numerical Example.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeposit Insurance in the Diamond-Dybvig Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticism of the Diamond-Dybvig Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre Deposit Contracts Inherently Fragile?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHistorical Evidence on Inherent Vulnerability.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs There a Natural Monopoly in Bank-Issued Money?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VII: Seigniorage:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Sources of Seigniorage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaximizing the Take from Seigniorage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReserve Requirements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Legal Restrictions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Dynamics of Hyperinflation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Transition Between Steady States: Is Honesty a Government's Best Policy?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Well Does Seigniorage Explain Actual Governments' Behavior?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VIII: Central Bank as Bureaucracy:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBureaucratic Explanation of the Fed's Operating Procedures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBureaucracy and \"inflationary bias\".\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IX: Political Business Cycle Hypotheses:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Nordhaus-MacRae Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Rational Expectations Critique.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Alternative Formulation: Wagner's Political Seigniorage Cycle.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe \"Partisan\" Political Business Cycle Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart X: Discretion and Dynamic Inconsistency:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Kydland-Prescott Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive Implications: Using the Model to Explain Changes in Inflation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicy Implications Under Discretion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRules Versus Discretion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubsequent Literature.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart XI: Monetary Rules:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenefits and Burdens of Counter-Cyclical Policy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndependence for the Central Bank.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Rules.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFriedman's Proposals.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMcCallum's Case for a Feedback Rule.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimple Versus Complicated Rules.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart XII: Competitive Supply of Fiat-Type Money:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ei. Klein's Model with Perfect Foresight.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eii. Klein's Model with \"Imperfect Foresight\".\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs the Equilibrium Rate of Inflation Bounded under Imperfect Foresight?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart XIII: Cashless Competitive Payments and Legal Restrictions:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Greenfield-Yeager Proposal.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Bundles-Worth Redemption Workable?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Concerns About the GY Proposal.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Legal Restrictions Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHistorical Evidence on the Non-Coexistence Prediction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e  \"\u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Monetary Institutions\u003c\/i\u003e is a thorough and insightful treatment of the emergence and evolution of money and banking regimes. Professor White's brilliant exposition of alternative regimes is innovative and sheds a great deal of light upon the crucial features of contemporary money and banking institutions. This tour-de-force is a 'must-read'.\" \u003ci\u003eSteve H. Hanke, The John Hopkins University\u003c\/i\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"Larry White's \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Monetary Institutions\u003c\/i\u003e provides a very clear, extremely readable and up-to-date overview of monetary theory. White provides a uniquely insightful perspective into a difficult and controversial area, and his arguments and analysis are unbeatable. All monetary economists should read it.\" \u003ci\u003eKevin Dowd, University of Sheffield\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"White has written an academically rigorous text covering the theory of money, banking, and monetary policy. The text stands out from others in the way it describes the evolution of economists' thinking about monetary institutions. White excels in combining the historic with the contemporary, the abstract with the tangible, and the theoretical with the practical. The chapters on alternative monetary regimes will no doubt challenge many widely-held views about the proper role of government within an economy's monetary system.\" \u003ci\u003eJames A. Overdahl\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"Lawrence H. White has emerged as one of the most thoughtful monetary economists of his generation, and \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Monetary Institutions\u003c\/i\u003e fills an important lacuna in the literature. The book is mature and balanced; its encyclopedic knowledge of the literature covers a far broader range of material than conventional texts. I am aware of no other book that does such a superb job of placing institutional arrangements in theoretical and historical perspective.\" \u003ci\u003eHugh Rockoff, Rutgers University\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003eLawrence H. White\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri - St. Louis. He has published articles in several journals, including the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Money, Credit, and Banking;\u003c\/i\u003e the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Economic Literature; Business History Review;\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eAmerican Economic Review.\u003c\/i\u003e He is the author of \u003ci\u003eFree Banking in Britain\u003c\/i\u003e (Second Edition), and \u003ci\u003eCompetition and Currency.\u003c\/i\u003e Dr. White holds an AB in Economics from Harvard University and a PhD in Economics from University of California, Los Angeles. His principal fields of study and lecture are monetary theory, banking history, the history of economic thought, and the future of money.  \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Monetary Institutions\u003c\/i\u003e analyzes the often overlooked - but fundamental - questions about monetary policy regimes: \u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli style=\"list-style: none\"\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eHow and why have monetary institutions evolved into their present forms?\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWhat are the leading arguments for and against government involvement in money and banking?\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWhat models do we have for explaining how monetary authorities choose to behave in a discretionary fiat money regime, and how well do they fit?\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWhat alternatives to the current regime are available, and how would they work?\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990353232101,"sku":"NP9780631212140","price":80.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780631212140.jpg?v=1761787478","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/the-theory-of-monetary-institutions-isbn-9780631212140","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}