{"product_id":"the-roads-to-modernity-isbn-9781400077229","title":"The Roads to Modernity","description":"\u003cp\u003eIn an elegant, eminently readable work, one of our most distinguished intellectual  historians gives us a brilliant revisionist history. \u003cb\u003eThe Roads to Modernity\u003c\/b\u003e reclaims  the Enlightenment–an extraordinary time bursting with new ideas about human nature,  politics, society, and religion--from historians who have downgraded its importance  and from scholars who have given preeminence to the Enlightenment in France over  concurrent movements in England and America.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eContrasting the Enlightenments in the  three nations, Himmelfarb demonstrates the primacy and wisdom of the British, exemplified  in such thinkers as Adam Smith, David Hume, and Edmund Burke, as well as the unique  and enduring contributions of the American Founders.  It is their Enlightenments,  she argues, that created a social ethic–humane, compassionate, and realistic–that  still resonates strongly today, in America perhaps even more than in Europe.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe  Roads to Modernity\u003c\/b\u003e is a remarkable and illuminating contribution to the history of  ideas.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003ci\u003ePreface \u003cbr\u003ePrologue \u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe British Enlightenment: The Sociology of Virtue \u003cbr\u003e1. “Social Affections” and Religious Dispositions\u003cbr\u003e2. Political Economy and Moral Sentiments \u003cbr\u003e3. Edmund Burke’s Enlightenment \u003cbr\u003e4. Radical Dissenters \u003cbr\u003e5. Methodism: “A Social Religion” \u003cbr\u003e6. “The Age of Benevolence” \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe French Enlightenment: The Ideology of Reason \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe American Enlightenment: The Politics of Liberty \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eEpilogue \u003cbr\u003eNotes \u003cbr\u003eIndex \u003c\/i\u003e“Support[ed] with great passion and wide-ranging scholarship. . . . Himmelfarb has written a keenly argued and thought-provoking intellectual history of the 18th century.” –\u003ci\u003eSan Francisco Chronicle \u003c\/i\u003e“Exciting intellectual pugilism É Himmelfarb mounts a vigorous argument that the British [Enlightenment] was reformist rather than subversive, respectful of the past and present even while looking forward to a more egalitarian future.” –\u003ci\u003eThe New York Times Book Review\u003c\/i\u003e“[Himmelfarb’s] writing . . . has a verve and sharpness. . . . It is a pleasure to read.” –\u003ci\u003eThe New York Review of Books\u003c\/i\u003e“Exceptionally well written and clever.”–\u003ci\u003eThe Washington Post Book World\u003c\/i\u003e“Himmelfarb has one of the keenest intellects of our time.” –\u003ci\u003eThe Houston Chronicle\u003c\/i\u003eGertrude Himmelfarb taught for twenty-three years at Brooklyn College and the Graduate  School of the City University of New York, where she was named Distinguished Professor  of History in 1978. Now Professor Emeritus, she lives with her husband, Irving Kristol,  in Washington, D.C. Her previous books include: \u003ci\u003eThe De-Moralization of Society: From  Victorian Virtues to Modern Values; On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts  on Culture and Society; Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late  Victorians; The New History and the Old; Marriage and Morals Among the Victorians;  The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age; On Liberty and Liberalism:  The Case of John Stuart Mill; Victorian Minds \u003c\/i\u003e(nominated for a National Book Award)\u003ci\u003e;  Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution; and Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics.\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. \"Social Affections\" and Religious Dispositions\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe British did not have \"philosophes.\" They had \"moral  philosophers,\" a very different breed. Those historians who belittle  or dismiss the idea of a British Enlightenment do so because they do  not recognize the features of the philosophes in the moral  philosophers--and with good reason: the physiognomy is quite  different.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIt is ironic that the French should have paid tribute to John Locke  and Isaac Newton as the guiding spirits of their own Enlightenment,  while the British, although respectful of both, had a more ambiguous  relationship with them. Newton was eulogized by David Hume as \"the  greatest and rarest genius that ever rose for the ornament and  instruction of the species,\"[1] and by Alexander Pope in the much  quoted epitaph: \"Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;\/God said,  Let Newton be! and all was light.\" But Pope's An Essay on Man sent  quite a different message: \"The proper study of mankind is man\"  implied that materialism and science could penetrate into the  mysteries of nature but not of man. In an earlier essay, the allusion  to Newton was more obvious; it was human nature, not astronomy, Pope  said, that was \"the most useful object of humane reason,\" and it was  \"of more consequence to adjust the true nature and measures of right  and wrong, than to settle the distance of the planets and compute the  times of their circumvolutions.\"[2] While Newton received the  adulation of his countrymen (he was master of the Royal Mint and  president of the Royal Society, was knighted, and given a state  funeral), and his scientific methodology was much praised, he had  little substantive influence on the moral philosophers or on the  issues that dominated the British Enlightenment. (His Opticks, on the  other hand, was an inspiration for poets, who were entranced by the  images and metaphors of light.)[3]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eJohn Locke, too, was a formidable presence in eighteenth-century  Britain, a best-selling author and a revered figure. But among the  moral philosophers he was admired more for his politics than for his  metaphysics. Indeed, the basic tenets of their philosophy implied a  repudiation of his. What made them \"moral philosophers\" rather than  \"philosophers\" tout court was their belief in a \"moral sense\" that  was presumed to be if not innate in the human mind (as Francis  Hutcheson thought), then so entrenched in the human sensibility, in  the form of sympathy or \"fellow-feeling\" (as Adam Smith and David  Hume had it), as to have the same compelling force as innate ideas.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eLocke himself could not have been more explicit in rejecting innate  ideas, whether moral or metaphysical. The mind, as he understood it,  so far from being inhabited by innate ideas, was a tabula rasa, to be  filled by sensations and experiences, and by the reflections rising  from those sensations and experiences. The title of the first chapter  of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding was \"No Innate  Speculative Principles\" (that is, epistemological principles); the  second, \"No Innate Practical Principles\" (moral principles). Even the  golden rule, that \"most unshaken rule of morality and foundation of  all social virtue,\" would have been meaningless to one who had never  heard that maxim and who might well ask for a reason justifying it,  which \"plainly shows it not to be innate.\" If virtue was generally  approved, it was not because it was innate, but because it was  \"profitable,\" conducive to one's self-interest and happiness, the  promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Thus, things could  be judged good or evil only by reference to pleasure or pain, which  were themselves the product of sensation.[4]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eLocke's Essay was published in 1690. Nine years later, the Earl of  Shaftesbury wrote an essay that was, in effect, a refutation of  Locke. This, too, had its ironies, for this Shaftesbury, the third  earl, was brought up in the household of his grandfather, the first  earl, who was a devotee of Locke and had employed him to supervise  the education of his grandchildren. It was this experience that had  inspired Locke's Thoughts Concerning Education--and inspired as well,  perhaps, the pupil's rejection of his master's teachings.[5]  Shaftesbury's essay, \"An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit,\" was  published (without his permission but to great acclaim) in 1699 and  reprinted in 1711 in somewhat revised form in his Characteristics of  Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. That three-volume work, reissued  posthumously three years later and in ten more editions in the course  of the century, rivalled Locke's Second Treatise (a political, not  metaphysical tract) as the most frequently reprinted work of the  time. The hundred-page essay on virtue was the centerpiece of those  volumes.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eVirtue, according to Shaftesbury, derived not from religion,  self-interest, sensation, or reason. All of these were instrumental  in supporting or hindering virtue, but were not the immediate or  primary source of it. What was \"antecedent\" to these was the \"moral  sense,\" the \"sense of right and wrong.\"[6] [Shaftesbury's \"moral  sense\" was very different from John Rawls's recent use of that term.  For Shaftesbury it was an innate sense of right and wrong; for Rawls  it is an intuitive conviction of the rightness of freedom and  equality.] It was this sense that was \"predominant...inwardly joined  to us, and implanted in our nature,\" \"a first principle in our  constitution and make,\" as natural as \"natural affection itself.\"[7]  This \"natural affection,\" moreover, was \"social affection,\" an  affection for \"society and the public,\" which, so far from being at  odds with one's private interest, or \"self-affection,\" actually  contributed to one's personal pleasure and happiness.[8] A person  whose actions were motivated entirely or even largely by  self-affection--by self-love, self-interest, or self-good--was not  virtuous. Indeed, he was \"in himself still vicious,\" for the virtuous  man was motivated by nothing other than \"a natural affection for his  kind.\"[9]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis was not a Rousseauean idealization of human nature, of man  before being corrupted by society. Nor was it a Pollyannaish  expectation that all or even most men would behave virtuously all or  most of the time. The moral sense attested to the sense of right and  wrong in all men, the knowledge of right and wrong even when they  chose to do wrong. Indeed, a good part of Shaftesbury's essay dealt  with the variety of \"hateful passions\"--envy, malice, cruelty,  lust--that beset mankind. Even virtue, Shaftesbury warned, could  become vice when it was pursued to excess; an immoderate degree of  \"tenderness,\" for example, destroyed the \"effect of love,\" and  excessive \"pity\" rendered a man \"incapable of giving succour.\"[10]  The conclusion of the essay was a stirring testament of an ethic  that, by its very nature--the \"common nature\" of man--was a social  ethic: \"Thus the wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in  nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good  of everyone to work towards the general good; which if a creature  ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself and  ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare.... And, thus, Virtue  is the good, and Vice the ill of everyone.\"[11]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe contrast, not only with Thomas Hobbes but with Locke as well,  could not be more obvious.[12] Neither was explicitly named by  Shaftesbury, perhaps out of respect for Locke, who was still alive  when the essay was written (although he had died by the time it was  reissued). But no knowledgeable reader could have mistaken  Shaftesbury's intention. In 1709 he wrote to one of his young  proteges that Locke, even more than Hobbes, was the villain of the  piece, for Hobbes's character and base slavish principles of  government \"took off the poison of his philosophy,\" whereas Locke's  character and commendable principles of government made his  philosophy even more reprehensible.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e 'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and  virtue out of the world.... Virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no  other measure, law, or rule, than fashion and custom: morality,  justice, equity, depend only on law and will.... And thus neither  right nor wrong, virtue nor vice are any thing in themselves; nor is  there any trace or idea of them naturally imprinted on human minds.  Experience and our catechism teach us all![13]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e As Shaftesbury did not mention Locke in the Inquiry, so Bernard  Mandeville did not mention Shaftesbury in The Fable of the Bees--at  least not in the first edition, published in 1714. But appearing just  then, a year after Shaftesbury's death and at the same time as the  second edition of the Characteristics, Mandeville's readers might  well take it as a rebuttal to Shaftesbury's work. The subtitle,  Private Vices, Public Benefits, reads like a manifesto contra  Shaftesbury.[14]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe original version of the Fable, published in 1705 as a sixpenny  pamphlet (and pirated, Mandeville complained, in a halfpenny sheet),  consisted of some thirty verses depicting a society, a hive of bees,  where everyone was a knave, and where knavery served a valuable  purpose. Every vice had its concomitant virtue: avarice contributed  to prodigality, luxury to industry, folly to ingenuity. The result  was a \"grumbling\" but productive hive, where \"...every part was full  of Vice,\/ Yet the whole mass a Paradise.\" A well-intentioned attempt  to rid the hive of vice had the effect of ridding it of its virtues  as well, resulting in the destruction of the hive itself, as all the  bees, \"blest with content and honesty,\" abandoned industry and took  refuge in a hollow tree.[15]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eLest the moral escape his readers, Mandeville reissued the poem in  1714 with a prefatory essay, \"The Origin of Moral Virtue,\" and a  score of lengthy \"Remarks\" amplifying lines of the poem; the editions  of 1723 and 1724 added still other essays and remarks. In the  enlarged version (now a full-length book), Mandeville elaborated upon  his thesis. Self-love, which was reducible to pain and pleasure, was  the primary motivation of all men, and what was generally called  \"pity\" or \"compassion\"--the \"fellow-feeling and condolence for the  misfortunes and calamities of others\"--was an entirely spurious  passion, which unfortunately afflicted the weakest minds the  most.[16] Moralists and philosophers, he conceded, generally took the  opposite view, agreeing with the \"noble writer\" Lord Shaftesbury that  \"as man is made for society, so he ought to be born with a kind  affection to the whole of which he is a part, and a propensity to  seek the welfare of it.\"[17]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMaudeville's conclusion was sharp and uncompromising:\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAfter this I flatter my self to have demonstrated that neither the  friendly qualities and kind affections that are natural to man, nor  the real virtues he is capable of acquiring by reason and self-denial  are the foundation of society; but that what we call evil in this  world, moral as well as natural, is the grand principle that makes us  sociable creatures, the solid basis, the life and support of all  trades and employments without exception; that there we must look for  the true origin of all arts and sciences, and that the moment evil  ceases, the society must be spoiled if not totally dissolved.[18]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Fable of the Bees profoundly shocked contemporaries, provoking a  frenzy of attacks culminating in a ruling handed down by the grand  jury of Middlesex condemning it as a \"public nuisance.\" Joining in  the near-universal condemnation were most of the eighteenth-century  greats--Bishop Berkeley, Francis Hutcheson, Edward Gibbon, Adam  Smith. Smith expressed the general sentiment in pronouncing  Mandeville's theory \"licentious\" and \"wholly pernicious.\"[19] [Smith  was offended not only by Mandeville's amoralism, his refusal to  distinguish between vice and virtue, but also by his mercantilist  views, which were a by-product of that philosophy. Because there was  no natural moral sense and thus no natural harmony among men,  Mandeville assumed that the government had to intervene to convert  \"private vices\" into \"public benefits.\" Mandeville is sometimes taken  to be an apologist for capitalism; but it was mercantilism that was  the logical deduction from his philosophy.]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMandeville's was a spirited but futile attempt to abort the social  ethic that was the distinctive feature of the British Enlightenment.  That ethic derived neither from self-interest nor from reason  (although both were congruent with it) but from a \"moral sense\" that  inspired sympathy, benevolence, and compassion for others. Thus,  where Locke, denying any innate principles, looked to education to  inculcate in children the sentiment of \"humanity,\" \"benignity,\" or  \"compassion,\"[20] Shaftesbury rooted that sentiment in nature and  instinct rather than education or reason. \"To compassionate,\" he  wrote, \"i.e., to join with in passion.... To commiserate, i.e., to  join with in misery.... This in one order of life is right and good;  nothing more harmonious; and to be without this, or not to feel this,  is unnatural, horrid, immane [monstrous].\"[21]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eTwo years after the publication of the expanded version of the Fable,  Francis Hutcheson entered the debate with An Inquiry Concerning the  Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, reissued the following  year with Virtue or Moral Good replacing Beauty and Virtue. The  subtitle of the original edition gave its provenance: In Which the  Principles of the Late Earl of Shaftesbury Are Explained and  Defended, Against the Author of the Fable of the Bees. It was here  that Hutcheson first enunciated the principle, \"The greatest  happiness for the greatest numbers.\"[22] Unlike Helvetius and Jeremy  Bentham, who are often credited with this principle and who rooted it  in the rational calculations of utility, Hutcheson deduced it from  morality itself--the \"moral sense, viz. benevolence.\"[23] [* Bentham  himself variously attributed this principle to Montesquieu,  Barrington, Beccaria, and Helvetius, \"but most of all Helvetius.\"  Smith mistakenly attributed the origin of the \"moral sense\" to  Hutcheson rather than Shaftesbury.[24]] These words, \"moral sense\"  and \"benevolence,\" appear as a refrain throughout the book. The moral  sense, Hutcheson repeatedly explained, was \"antecedent\" to interest  because it was universal in all men. \"Fellow-feeling\" could not be a  product of self-interest because it involved associating oneself with  such painful experiences as the suffering and distress of others. So,  too, the \"disposition to compassion\" was essentially disinterested, a  concern with \"the interest of others, without any views of private  advantage.\"[25] It was also antecedent to reason or instruction. Like  Burke later, Hutcheson warned of the frailty of reason:  \"Notwithstanding the mighty reason we boast of above other animals,  its processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to  serve us in every exigency, either for our own preservation, without  the external senses, or to direct our actions for the good of the  whole, without this moral sense.\"[26] Elsewhere he explained that  reason was \"only a subservient power,\" capable of determining the  means of promoting the good but not the end itself, the innate  impulse to good.[27]\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Benevolence,\" compassion,\" \"sympathy,\" \"fellow-feeling,\" a \"natural  affection for others\"--under one label or another, this moral sense  (or sentiment, as Smith preferred) was the basis of the social ethic  that informed British philosophical and moral discourse for the whole  of the eighteenth century. The generation of philosophers that  followed Shaftesbury qualified his teachings in one respect or  another, differing among themselves about the precise nature and  function of the moral sense. But they all agreed that it (or  something very like it) was the natural, necessary, and universal  attribute of man, of rich and poor alike, the educated and  uneducated, the enlightened and unenlightened. They also agreed that  it was a corollary of reason and interest, but prior to and  independent of both.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e ENDNOTES\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1. David Hume, The History of England: From the Invasion of Julius  Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1828 [1st  ed., 1754-62]), IV, 434. Some commentators on Adam Smith find in his  work a Newtonian mode of analysis. One claims that Smith  \"self-consciously\" set out to apply Newtonian principles by the use  of mechanical analogies and metaphors (Alan Macfarlane, The Riddle of  the Modern World: Of Liberty, Wealth and Equality [New York, 2000],  p. 82; see also Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith [Oxford,  1995], p. 179). Yet there is only one passing reference to Newton in  the Theory of Moral Sentiments (on the initial public neglect of  him), and none in Wealth of Nations.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2. See A. R. Humphreys, The Augustan World: Society, Thought, and  Letters in Eighteenth-Century England (New York, 1963), p. 207.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e3. On the aesthetic influence of Newton, see the elegant and powerful  little book by Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Newton Demands the Muse:  Newton's Opticks and the Eighteenth Century Poets (Hamden, Conn.,  1963 [1st ed., 1946]).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e4. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago, 1952  [1st ed., 1690]), pp. 95, 103, 105 (bk. I, chs. 1 and 2); p. 176 (bk.  II, ch. 20).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e5. Lawrence E. Klein suggests that Shaftesbury's personal  relationship with Locke accounts for the \"emotional intensity\" of his  search for his own \"philosophical identity\" and thus his attack on  the Lockean principles (Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness:  Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century  England [Cambridge, 1994], p. 15).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e6. Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics  of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 3 vols. (Indianapolis, 2001 [1711;  reprint of 6th ed., 1737-38]), II. 27 (bk. I, pt. 3, sect. 2); p. 18  (bk. I, pt. 2, sect. 3, and passim). \"Moral sense\" appears only once  in the text of the essay (p. 27), but it is clearly meant to be  synonymous with \"the sense of right and wrong,\" which appears  repeatedly. In the 1714 edition, \"moral sense\" also appears in the  marginal notations and in the index. (Here, and throughout this book,  I have modernized the capitalization, punctuation, and spelling of  these eighteenth-century writers. To retain the original is  distracting and, in the case of the capitalization of common nouns,  deceptive because it gives an unintended emphasis to the words.)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e7. Ibid., p. 80 (bk. II, pt. 2, sect. 1); p. 25 (bk. I, pt. 3, sect. 1).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e8. Ibid., p. 45 (bk. II, pt. 1, sect. 1); p. 57 (bk. II, pt. 1, sect. 1).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e9. Ibid., p. 14 (bk. I, pt. 2, sect. 2).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e10. Ibid., p. 16 (bk. I, pt. 2, sect. 2).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e11. Ibid., p. 100 (bk. II, pt. 2, sect. 3). On \"common nature,\" see  pp. 45-46 (bk. II, pt. 1, sect. 1).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e12. Other historians dispute this interpretation of the relation of  Locke and the moral philosophers. Frank Balog, for example, argues  for the \"pivotal position of Locke\" in the Scottish Enlightenment. He  quotes the first English work on the subject, James McCosh's Scottish  Philosophy from Hutchinson to Hamilton (1875): \"The Scottish  metaphysicians largely imbibed the spirit of Locke, all of them speak  of him with profound respect; and they never differ from him without  expressing a regret or offering an apology.\" But Balog admits that  the Scottish philosophers differed with Locke on \"one fundamental  issue, the nature of conscience and morality\"--for moral  philosophers, a fundamental issue, indeed. And he cites Hume as  criticizing Locke for being \"unhistorical and subversive\"(Balog, \"The  Scottish Enlightenment and the Liberal Political Tradition,\" in  Confronting the Constitution, ed. Allan Bloom [Washington, D.C.,  1990], pp. 193, 207, 205).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e13. Quoted in Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, p. 65.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e14. One editor of the Fable says that Mandeville had not read  Shaftesbury when he published the first edition of the book in 1714  (The Fable of the Bees, ed. Philip Harth [London, 1970 (reprint of  1723 ed.)], p. 32). But the book has so many echoes of  Shaftesbury--in reverse--that this seems improbable. It is unlikely  that Mandeville would have failed to read a book published three  years earlier that was so much discussed and praised. The editor also  suggests that the Fable may be understood as a satire, \"an  outstanding ornament of the greatest age of English satire\" (p. 43).  But this is to take the book far less seriously than contemporaries  did.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e15. Ibid., pp. 67, 75.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e16. Ibid., pp. 158, 165, 264.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e17. Ibid., p. 329.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e18. Ibid., p. 370.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e19. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and  A. L. Macfie (Oxford, 1976 [reprint of 6th ed., 1790]), pp. 306, 308  (pt. VII, sect. 2, ch. 4). Many years later, Gibbon commended William  Law for attacking \"the licentious doctrine\" that private vices are  public benefits (see Harth, introduction to the Fable, p. 14).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e20. See Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), especially  the discussion of why children should be taught not to be cruel to  animals.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e21. The Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of  Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. Benjamin Rand (London, 1900), p.  158.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e22. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our  Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good (2nd ed., 1726), reprinted in British  Moralists, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1897), I, 107.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e23. Ibid., p. 118. See also Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral  Philosophy in Three Books (5th ed., Philadelphia, 1788 [1st ed.,  1747]), pp. 12-13, 21-22. The theme reappears in his Observations on  the Fable of the Bees (1726) and in An Essay on the Nature and  Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the  Moral Sense (1728).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e24. The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, ed. Timothy L. S. Sprigge  (London, 1968), I, 134n., and II, 99 (letter to John Forster,  April-May 1778); Smith, Moral Sentiments, p. 321 (pt. VII, sect. 3,  ch. 3).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e25. Hutcheson, Inquiry, pp. 86, 93, 140-43; Short Introduction, pp. 9, 12.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e26. Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 156.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e27. Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (London, 1755), I, 69-70. --  Dave Cramer Manager, XML and Prepress Stratford Publishing Services 70 Landmark Hill Drive Brattleboro, VT 05301 802.254.6073 x127 davec@stratfordpublishing.com","brand":"Vintage","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46305215545573,"sku":"NP9781400077229","price":19.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781400077229.jpg?v=1767741266","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/the-roads-to-modernity-isbn-9781400077229","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}