{"product_id":"the-prince-isbn-9780143105862","title":"The Prince","description":"\u003cb\u003eA new translation of the infamous Renaissance classic, in a striking deluxe edition\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The original blueprint for realpolitik, \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c\/i\u003e shocked sixteenth-century Europe with its advocacy of ruthless tactics for gaining absolute power and its abandonment of conventional morality. For this treatise on statecraft, Machiavelli drew upon his own experience of office under the turbulent Florentine republic, rejecting traditional values of political theory and recognizing the complicated, transient nature of political life. Concerned not with lofty ideals, but with a regime that would last, this seminal work of modern political thought retains its power to alarm and to instruct.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFor more than seventy years, Penguin has been the leading publisher of classic literature in the English-speaking world. With more than 1,700 titles, Penguin Classics represents a global bookshelf of the best works throughout history and across genres and disciplines. Readers trust the series to provide authoritative texts enhanced by introductions and notes by distinguished scholars and contemporary authors, as well as up-to-date translations by award-winning translators.“[Machiavelli] can still engage our attention with remarkable immediacy, and this cannot be explained solely by the appeal of his ironic observations on human behaviour. Perhaps the most important thing is the way he can compel us to reflect on our own priorities and the reasoning behind them; it is this intrusion into our own defenses that makes reading him an intriguing experience. As a scientific exponent of the political art Machiavelli may have had few followers; it is as a provocative rhetorician that he has had his real impact on history.”  –from the Introduction by Dominic Baker-Smith\u003cb\u003eNiccolò Machiavelli \u003c\/b\u003e(1469-1527) was a Florentine statesman who was later forced out of public life. He then devoted himself to studying and writing political philosophy, history, fiction, and drama.\u003cb\u003eNiccolò Machiavelli to His Magnificence Lorenzo de’ Medici\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Those who wish to win  the favor of a prince will generally approach him with gifts of what they value most  or what they believe will most delight him. Hence we see princes being offered horses,  arms, vestments of gold, precious stones, and similar accoutrements worthy of their  grandeur. Wishing to present myself to Your Magnificence with a token of my deepest  respect, I have found among my possessions nothing that I value or esteem higher  than my knowledge of the deeds of great men. I have acquired this knowledge through  my long experience of modern affairs and a lifelong study of ancient times, all of  which I have weighed and examined with great diligence and brought together into  this small volume, which I am now offering to Your Magnificence. Though I deem this  work unworthy of being in Your illustrious presence, my confidence in Your benevolence  persuades me that it will be accepted, and that Your Magnificence will recognize  that I cannot offer You a greater gift than the prospect of Your understanding in  the shortest period all that I have experienced and learned over so many years and  with so much danger and hardship. I have not filled this volume with pompous rhetoric,  with bombast and magnificent words, or with the unnecessary artifice with which so  many writers gild their work. I wanted nothing extraneous to ornament my writing,  for it has been my purpose that only the range of material and the gravity of the  subject should make it pleasing. Nor do I wish it to be thought presumptuous that  a man of low and humble condition like myself should presume to map out and direct  the government of princes. But just as a cartographer will descend into the plains  in order to study the nature of the mountains, and will then climb the highest peaks  in order to study the low-lying land, so, too, only an exalted prince can grasp the  nature of the people, and only a lesser man can perceive the nature of a prince.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e I hope therefore that Your Magnificence will accept this humble gift in the spirit  in which it is offered. Should You condescend to read and consider it carefully,  You will perceive in its pages my profound desire that Your Magnificence will rise  to the greatness that Fortune and Your qualities promise. And should Your Magnificence  deign to look down from the lofty summit of Your eminence to these lowly depths,  You will see how I have suffered undeservedly Fortune’s great and continuing malignity.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Chapter One\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eOf the kinds of principalities that exist, and how they can be acquired\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e All states, all dominions that rule or have ruled over men, are or have been either  republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, with a long-established  bloodline, or new. And the new principalities are either entirely new, as Milan was  to Francesco Sforza, or are like limbs added to the hereditary state of the prince  who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples was to the King of Spain. States obtained  in this way are accustomed either to living under a prince, or to being free. They  are acquired either with the arms of others, or with one’s own, either by chance  or by skill.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Chapter Two\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eOf hereditary principalities\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e I will  not discuss republics, as I have already done so at some length elsewhere. I shall  only concentrate on principalities, and shall weave together the threads I have already  laid out. I will show how these principalities can be governed and main- tained.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e First, states that are hereditary and tied to the bloodline of their prince are  easier to maintain than new ones. It is enough not to diverge from the practices  of one’s forebears, and to handle unforeseen issues as they arise. If such a prince  is of at least average ability he can retain his posi- tion of power, so long as  no extraordinary or excessive force deprive him of it. If this prince is deprived  of his state, he will find he can reacquire it if any misfortune befalls the usurper.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e In Italy we have the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who resisted the assaults of  the Venetians in 1484 and of Pope Julius II in 1510, for the simple reason that he  had inherited an ancient principality. A hereditary prince has less cause to mistreat  his subjects, and so is more loved by them. If unusual vices do not make him hated,  it is to be expected that he will be loved by his people.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The long continuum of  the dominion obliterates the memories and issues that make men yearn for innovation,  for one change will inevitably forge a link to another. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Chapter Three\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eOf mixed principalities\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e It is in the new principality  that the difficulties lie. First, if the principality is not completely new, but  is like a limb or extension added to another principality (in which case we could  almost call the whole state a mixed principality), its volatility stems mainly from  a difficulty inherent in all new principalities. This is that men will willingly  change their ruler in the hope that they will fare better, a hope that leads them  to take up arms against their old ruler. But in this they are deceived, because,  as they invariably discover, their lot under a new ruler is inevitably worse. This  is the result of another natural and basic inevitability: that you cannot avoid offending  those whose new ruler you are, both with your armed soldiers and with innumerable  other provocations that come in the wake of a conquest. You end up making enemies  of all those you have offended during your conquest of the principality, and you  find that you cannot keep the friendship of those who helped you to power, since  you cannot satisfy them in the way they had envisioned. Furthermore, you cannot take  strong measures against them, as you are indebted to them. Even with the most powerful  army, if you want to invade a state, you need the support of the people. It was for  these reasons that King Louis XII of France was quick to occupy Milan, and just as  quick to lose it. Duke Ludovico’s own forces were enough to win Milan back the first  time, because the same masses that had opened the gates for Louis, finding themselves  misled in their hopes for a better future, could not endure the new prince’s offenses.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e It is a fact that once a prince acquires a rebellious state for the second time,  it also proves harder to lose that state a second time. This is because the prince  who seizes the opportunity of the rebellion has fewer scruples about securing his  position by punishing offenders, flushing out suspects, and strengthening all the  places where he is weakest. In this sense, it was enough for a Duke Ludovico to make  a little noise along the borders for Louis XII to lose Milan the first time. But  for him to lose Milan a second time the whole world had to unite against him, defeat  his army, and chase it out of Italy. This followed from the causes I have already  laid out. Nonetheless, both the first and second time, Milan was taken from him.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The general reasons for the first loss have been discussed. It now remains to discuss  the second, and to see what recourse someone in Louis’s position could have taken  to maintain himself more securely in his new acquisition. I must stress that the  states a prince acquires and adds to his own are either of the same country and language,  or are not. If they are it is much easier to retain them, particularly if they are  not used to freedom. To hold them securely, it is enough to extinguish the line of  the previous prince who ruled them. As for the rest, if the new acquisition’s former  state of affairs is kept and there is no difference in customs, men will live quite  peacefully, as we have seen in Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which for  a long time now have all belonged to France. Although there is some difference in  language, their customs are similar, and their people get along with one another  quite easily. He who acquires such states and wishes to retain them has to make sure  of two things: that the bloodline of their former princes is extinguished, and that  their laws and taxes remain the same. This way, the prince’s new state merges with  the old, quickly becoming a single body.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e But difficulties arise when you acquire  states in a land with differing languages, customs, and laws. To keep these states,  you need good fortune and much diligence. One of the best and quickest solutions  is for the new prince to go and live in his new state. This makes the possession  more durable and secure. The Turk did this in Greece. With all the other measures  he took to keep Greece in his possession, had he not gone to live there he would  not have succeeded, because once the prince is established within his new state he  is able to see problems as they arise and can remedy them. If he is not there, problems  become obvious only once they are dire and can no longer be remedied. Furthermore,  if he is present, his new state will not be looted by his officials, and his new  subjects can enjoy immediate access to their prince. This will give them more reason  to love him if they are on his side, and to fear him if they are not, and foreign  powers wishing to attack his state will respect him more. Hence, if the prince lives  in his new state, it is difficult for him to lose it.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Another efficient remedy is  to set up colonies in one or two places that will act as the shackles of your new  state. If you do not set up colonies, you will have to send a great number of troops  to secure it, while a colony can be established and maintained at negligible cost.  The only subjects who will be affronted are those whose fields and houses will be  confiscated to be given to the new colonists. But these dispossessed subjects make  up only a small part of the state and will end up poor and dispersed, and so can  do no harm. The rest of your new subjects will not be affronted (and hence will be  acquiescent), but will also be frightened of transgressing, worried that they too  might be dispossessed. I conclude that colonies do not cost much, are loyal, and  will cause less trouble. And as I have already mentioned, those you dispossess cannot  harm you, as they will be poor and dispersed. In short, men must either be flattered  or eliminated, because a man will readily avenge a slight grievance, but not one  that is truly severe. Hence, the offense done a man must be of the kind that cannot  incur vengeance.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e If you choose armed forces instead of colonies, you will spend  more and will have to squander all the income from the new state in order to pay  the army. This will turn the acquisition into a loss, and all your new subjects will  end up offended, since an army, constantly on the move and constantly requartered,  hurts the whole state. Everyone feels the pain, and everyone becomes your enemy.  And these are enemies who can harm you, because though they have been defeated, they  remain on their own ground. So in every sense, using armed forces is as useless as  setting up colonies is useful.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e It is also important when a prince has conquered  a foreign state that he become the protector of the surrounding weaker powers, and  do all he can to weaken the stronger ones. He must take precautions so that no foreigner  equal in power manages to enter his new state. If he should enter, it will be because  he was brought in by discontented factions driven by ambition or fear. We saw this  in the case of the Aetolians who introduced the Romans into Greece; and in every  other province in which the Romans set foot, it was with the help of some of the  inhabitants. The order of things is that the moment a powerful invader takes over  a state, all the weaker factions within it join forces with him, spurred on by their  envy of the ruler who had wielded power over them before. In other words, the new  prince has no trouble winning the weaker factions over, because they will willingly  become part of his new state. He has only to see to it that they do not gain too  much power and authority. With his forces and their favor, he can easily bring down  those who are powerful so that he will remain the only arbiter in the land. He who  does not follow this course will quickly lose all he has gained, and will be plagued  by infinite difficulties while he holds power.","brand":"Penguin Classics","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46305401766117,"sku":"NP9780143105862","price":17.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780143105862.jpg?v=1767741067","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/the-prince-isbn-9780143105862","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}