{"product_id":"the-new-financial-deal-isbn-9780470942758","title":"The New Financial Deal","description":"\u003cb\u003eThe good, the bad, and the scary of Washington's attempt to reform Wall Street\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is Washington's response to America's call for a new regulatory framework for the twenty-first century.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eThe New Financial Deal\u003c\/i\u003e, author David Skeel offers an in-depth look at the new financial reforms and questions whether they will bring more effective regulation of contemporary finance or simply cement the partnership between government and the largest banks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eDetails the goals of the legislation, and reveals that how they are handled could dangerously distort American finance, making it more politically charged, less vibrant, and further removed from basic rule of law principles\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eProvides an inside account of the legislative process\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOutlines the key components of the new law\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo understand what American financial life is likely to look like in five, ten, or twenty years, and how regulators will respond to the next crisis, we need to understand Dodd-Frank. The New Financial Deal provides that understanding, breaking down both what Dodd-Frank says and what it all means.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeword ix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction xi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Few Major Characters xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 1 The Corporatist Turn in American Regulation 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Path to Enactment 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Two Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief Tour of Other Reforms 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Themes That Emerge 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFannie Mae Effect 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCovering Their Tracks 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs There Anything to Like? 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I Relearning the Financial Crisis\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 2 The Lehman Myth 19\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Stock Narrative 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehman in Context 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehman’s Road to Bankruptcy 26\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehman in Bankruptcy 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBear Stearns Counterfactual 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRoad to Chrysler 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChrysler Bankruptcy 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Motors “Sale” 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom Myths to Legislative Reality 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II The 2010 Financial Reforms\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 3 Geithner, Dodd, Frank, and the Legislative Grinder 43\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Players 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTARP and the Housing Crisis 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRoad to an East Room Signing 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanneling Brandeis: The Volcker Rule 54\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Goldman Moment 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 4 Derivatives Reform: Clearinghouses and the Plain-Vanilla Derivative 59\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Framework 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDerivatives and the New Finance 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Stout Alternative 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Clearinghouses and Exchanges 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory Dilemmas of Clearinghouses 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDisclosure and Data Collection 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaking It Work? 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 5 Banking Reform: Breaking Up Was Too Hard to Do 77\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Framework 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Designator and Designatees 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWill the New Capital Standards Work? 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContingent Capital Alternative 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVolcker Rule 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Do the Brandeisian Concessions Mean? 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOffice of Minority and Women Inclusion 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutionalizing the Government-Bank Partnership 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Happier Story? 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRepo Land Mine 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 6 Unsafe at Any Rate 99\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Framework 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho is Elizabeth Warren? 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eToasters and Credit Cards 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe New Consumer Bureau 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMortgage Broker and Securitization Rules 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConsequences: What to Expect from the New Bureau 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat It Means for the Government-Bank Partnership 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 7 Banking on the FDIC (Resolution Authority I) 117\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoes the FDIC Play the Same Role in Both Regimes? 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow (and How Well) Does FDIC Resolution Work? 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoving Beyond the FDIC Analogy 126\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 8 Bailouts, Bankruptcy, or Better? (Resolution Authority II) 129\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Framework 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Trouble with Bailouts 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Will Invoke Dodd-Frank Resolution, and When? 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTriggering the New Framework 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eControlling Systemic Risk 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird Objective: Haircuts 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll Liquidation, All the Time? 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III The Future\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 9 Essential Fixes and the New Financial Order 155\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Works and What Doesn’t 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStaying Derivatives in Bankruptcy 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eISDA and Its Discontent 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Bankruptcy Reforms for Financial Institutions 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlugging the Chrysler Hole in Bankruptcy 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBankruptcy to the Rescue 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 10 An International Solution? 175\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Framework 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of Cross-Border Cases 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eScholarly Silver Bullets 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDodd-Frank’s Contribution to Cross-Border Issues 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Living Wills 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Simple Treaty Might Do 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk of a Clearinghouse Crisis 188\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReinvigorating the Rule of Law 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 191\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbout the Author 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 213\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDAVID SKEEL\u003c\/b\u003e is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He is author of \u003ci\u003eIcarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America\u003c\/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eand\u003c\/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eWhere They Came From\u003c\/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eDebt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America\u003c\/i\u003e; and numerous articles on bankruptcy, corporate law, and other topics. His commentary has appeared in the \u003ci\u003eNew York Times, Wall Street Journal, Weekly Standard, Books \u0026amp; Culture,\u003c\/i\u003e and elsewhere.   \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter watching the government bail out Bear Stearns and AIG in 2008, and pump well over one hundred billion dollars into Citigroup, Bank of America, and the other largest banks the same year, Americans realized that the existing regulatory framework did not work. The Dodd-Frank Act, which President Obama signed into law in July 2010, was Washington's answer. The legislation created an entirely new set of rules for both the instruments and the institutions of contemporary finance. Although the reforms were desperately needed, they were drafted by the same people who designed the bailouts of 2008, and it shows.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences, David Skeel explains where the legislation came from, tracing its assumptions back to the 2008 crisis and offering an inside account of the key moments in the legislative process. He analyzes each of the main components of the Dodd-Frank Act, explaining how they will work and showing that the new regulatory framework depends on precisely the qualities that Americans found so offensive about the bailouts of 2008: special treatment of the largest financial institutions and ad hoc intervention in the event of trouble. Skeel's assessment is not entirely pessimistic, however. He argues that a few features of the Dodd-Frank Act are genuine improvements, such as its regulation of financial derivatives, and he outlines several simple bankruptcy reforms that would curb the worst excesses of the new partnership between the government and the largest financial institutions.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe New Financial Dea\u003c\/b\u003el\u003cbr\u003e UNDERSTANDING THE \u003cb\u003eDODD-FRANK ACT\u003c\/b\u003e AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter watching the government bail out Bear Stearns and AIG in 2008, and pump well over one hundred billion dollars into Citigroup, Bank of America, and the other largest banks the same year, Americans realized that the existing regulatory framework did not work. The Dodd-Frank Act, which President Obama signed into law in July 2010, was Washington's answer. The legislation created an entirely new set of rules for both the instruments and the institutions of contemporary finance. Although the reforms were desperately needed, they were drafted by the same people who designed the bailouts of 2008, and it shows. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eThe New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences\u003c\/i\u003e, David Skeel explains where the legislation came from, tracing its assumptions back to the 2008 crisis and offering an inside account of the key moments in the legislative process. He analyzes each of the main components of the Dodd-Frank Act, explaining how they will work and showing that the new regulatory framework depends on precisely the qualities that Americans found so offensive about the bailouts of 2008: special treatment of the largest financial institutions and ad hoc intervention in the event of trouble. Skeel's assessment is not entirely pessimistic, however. He argues that a few features of the Dodd-Frank Act are genuine improvements, such as its regulation of financial derivatives, and he outlines several simple bankruptcy reforms that would curb the worst excesses of the new partnership between the government and the largest financial institutions.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990296772837,"sku":"NP9780470942758","price":34.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470942758.jpg?v=1761787248","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/the-new-financial-deal-isbn-9780470942758","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}