{"product_id":"the-constitutional-convention-isbn-9780812975178","title":"The Constitutional Convention","description":"In 1787, the American union was in disarray. The incompatible demands of the separate states threatened its existence; some states were even in danger of turning into the kind of tyranny they had so recently deposed. A truly national government was needed, one that could raise money, regulate commerce, and defend the states against foreign threats–without becoming as overbearing as England. So thirty-six-year-old James Madison believed. That summer, the Virginian was instrumental in organizing the Constitutional Convention, in which one of the world’s greatest documents would be debated, created, and signed. Inspired by a sense of history in the making, he kept the most extensive notes of any attendee.Now two esteemed scholars have made these minutes accessible to everyone. Presented with modern punctuation and spelling, judicious cuts, and helpful notes–plus fascinating background information on every delegate and an overview of the tumultuous times–here is the great drama of how the Constitution came to be, from the opening statements to the final votes. This Modern Library Paperback Classic also includes an Introduction and appendices from the authors.Edward J. Larson is Russell Professor of History and Talmadge Professor of Law at the University of Georgia. He received the 1998 Pulitzer Prize for his book Summer for the Gods. His most recent book is Evolution: The Remarkable History of the Scientific Theory, published by Modern Library.\u003cbr\u003eMichael Winship, a specialist in early American history, is professor of history at the University of Georgia. He is the author of numerous books and articles.Tuesday, May 29.    [in convention]    On May 29, the aristocratic thirty-five-year-old governor of Virginia,  Edmund Randolph, took the floor to attack the Articles of Confederation  and introduce a series of resolutions for a new Constitution. The mandate  of the Convention was only to revise and amend the Articles, but  Randolph’s resolutions, known collectively as the Virginia Plan (see  Appendix A), would scrap them and substitute   a strong national government with final authority over what had been semi-  independent states. The government would consist of a national  legislature, judiciary, and executive—each with the ability to check the  others’ power. The   legislature would have two houses, or “branches,” with the larger one (the  “first branch”) elected by the people and the smaller one (the “second  branch”) elected   by the larger one. The national legislature could veto state laws it  deemed to violate the national Constitution, and it would choose the chief  executive, who could veto the legislature’s laws with the aid of a Council  of Revision.        Mr. Randolph then opened the main business. . . . He expressed his regret  that it should fall to him, rather than those who were of longer standing  in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their  mission. But as the Convention had originated from Virginia and his  colleagues supposed that some proposition was expected from them, they had  imposed this task on him. He then commented on the difficulty of the  crisis and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of  the American downfall.    He observed that in revising the federal system we ought to inquire (1)  into the properties which such a government ought to possess; (2) the  defects of the confederation; (3) the danger of our situation; and (4) the  remedy.    The character of such a government ought to secure (1) against foreign  invasion; (2) against dissensions between members of the Union or  seditions in particular states; (3) to procure to the several states  various blessings of which an isolated situation was incapable; (4) to be  able to defend itself against encroachment; and (5) to be paramount to the  state constitutions.    In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high  respect for its authors and considered them as having done all that  patriots could do in the then-infancy of the science of constitutions and  of confederacies. . . . He then proceeded to enumerate the  [confederation’s] defects:    (1) that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion,  Congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their  own authority. Of this, he cited many examples. . . .    (2) that the federal government could not check the quarrels between  states nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means  to interpose according to the exigency.    (3) that there were many advantages which the United States might acquire,  which were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive  impost [i.e., a tax on imports]—counteraction of the commercial  regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum [at  pleasure]—etc., etc.    (4) that the federal government could not defend itself against the  encroachments from the states.    (5) that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions ratified, as  it was, in many of the states.    He next reviewed the danger of our situation, appealed to the sense of the  best friends of the United States, the prospect of anarchy from the laxity  of government everywhere, and to other considerations. He then proceeded  to the remedy, the basis of which, he said, must be the republican  principle. . . .    [After formally offering fifteen enumerated propositions or resolutions  comprising the Virginia Plan,] he concluded with an exhortation not to  suffer the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony,  happiness, and liberty in the United States to pass away unimproved.*        It was then resolved “that the house will tomorrow resolve itself into a  Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the Ameri-    *Another of the note takers at the Convention, Robert Yates, recorded that  Randolph concluded his remarks by stating that he intended “a strong  consolidated union, in which the idea of states should be nearly  annihilated.”    can Union,” and that the propositions moved by Mr. Randolph be referred to  the said committee.    . . .    Wednesday, May 30.    [in committee of the whole]    The delegates, when meeting in Convention, were bound to follow  established rules of parliamentary procedure and decision-making much like  those that still govern formal legislative assemblies in the United  States. To facilitate their deliberations on the Virginia Plan, the  delegates decided to sit initially as a committee composed of all the  members (or “Committee of the Whole”) rather than in Convention.  Legislative committees typically utilize procedures that permit freer  discussion and more flexible decision-making than those imposed on full  legislative bodies, and this is true for committees of the whole as well  as smaller committees. Like the recommendation of any committee, however,  recommendations of a committee of the whole must still go before the  formal legislative body for final consideration and approval. Utilizing  this procedure for the proposed Constitution gave delegates the  opportunity to consider each element of it at least twice—once in the  Committee of the Whole and then in Convention—and allowed for them to  experiment with new ideas, especially at the committee stage. Both in the  Committee of the Whole and in Convention, state delegations voted by  majority rule as a single unit either for or against a proposition, with  one vote per state. If the delegates from a state split evenly on a  proposition, that state’s vote would be “divided.”    On this day Gouverneur Morris explained the difference between a federal  government, as the term was then understood, and the national government  that he and his allies wished to create. The Convention proceeded to vote  that the United States needed a national government, which the Articles of  Confederation did not provide. With that decision, the Convention  committed itself to plunging into the uncharted waters of designing a  viable large-scale republic.        The propositions of Mr. Randolph which had been referred to the committee  being taken up. . . . It was agreed on motion of Mr. Butler, seconded by  Mr. Randolph, to pass on to the third [“That a national government ought  to be established consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and  judiciary”], which underwent a discussion, less however on its general  merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms “national” and  “supreme.”    Mr. Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Randolph whether he meant to abolish  the state governments altogether. Mr. Randolph replied that he meant by  these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which  explained the outlines of the system he had in view.    Mr. Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject and was open to  the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general  observations, he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of  powers to [the Confederation] Congress heretofore because the whole power  was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the powers into two  different bodies changed the case and would induce him to go great lengths.    Gen. Pinckney expressed a doubt whether the act of [the Confederation]  Congress recommending the Convention, or the commissions of the deputies  to it, could authorize a discussion of a system founded on different  principles from the federal constitution.    Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt.    Mr. G. Morris explained the distinction between a federal and national,  supreme government, the former being a mere compact resting on the good  faith of the parties, the latter having a complete and compulsive  operation. He contended that in all communities there must be one supreme  power, and one only.    Mr. Mason observed that the present confederation was not only deficient  in not providing for coercion and punishment against delinquent states,  but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature of things  be executed on the states collectively, and therefore that such a  government was necessary as could directly operate on individuals and  would punish those only whose guilt required it.    Mr. Sherman, who took his seat today, admitted that the confederation had  not given sufficient power to Congress and that additional powers were  necessary, particularly that of raising money, which, he said, would  involve many other powers. He admitted also that the general and  particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed,  however, not [to] be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing  system, intimating as one reason that it would be wrong to lose every  amendment by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the states.    . . .    On the question as moved by Mr. Butler . . . it was resolved in Committee  of the Whole that a national government ought to be established,  consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary: Mass., Pa.,  Del., Va., N.C., S.C., aye 6; Conn., no 1; N.Y., divided [meaning that the  voting delegates from the state were evenly split so that the state’s vote  did not count].        . . .    Thursday, May 31.    [in committee of the whole]    Following the vote on Wednesday, May 30, to draft a national government,  delegates started discussing the details of the Virginia Plan. Another  Georgia delegate arrived on this day, allowing the Georgia delegation to  vote and bringing the total number of states represented to ten. The  delegates easily agreed that the national legislature should have two  branches. The first major controversial issue was deciding how to elect  members to what the Virginia Plan termed “the first branch,” which would  become the House of Representatives. A number of delegates doubted that  the people themselves could be trusted to elect members of Congress, while  others insisted that it was critical that the people do so. More Americans  were voting than had done so before. A number of states had lowered  property requirements for the franchise, and only South Carolina still had  a religious test. Up to 80 percent of adult white males could vote;  similarly qualified free black males could vote in a few states; and women  could vote in New Jersey.        Resolution 4, first clause, “that the members of the first branch of the  national legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several  states,” being taken up.    Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to  be by the state legislatures. The people, he said, immediately should have  as little to do as may be about the government. They lack information and  are constantly liable to be misled.    Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The  people do not [lack] virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In  Massachusetts, it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are  daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false  reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can  refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those  employed in the administration of government. It would seem to be a maxim  of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular  clamor in Massachusetts for the reduction of salaries and the attack made  on that of the governor, though secured by the spirit of the constitution  itself. He had, he said, been too republican heretofore; he was still,  however, republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the  leveling spirit.    Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch   by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic  principle of the government. It was, so to speak, to be our House of  Commons. It ought to know and sympathize with every part of the community;  and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole  republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it,  which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different  interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, etc.,  etc. He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we should  incautiously run into the opposite extreme. . . .    Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of  the legislature immediately from the people. . . . No government could  long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican  government, this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it  wrong to increase the weight of the state legislatures by making them the  electors of the national legislature. . . . On examination it would be  found that the opposition of states to federal measures had proceeded much  more from the officers of the states than from the people at large.    Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the national  legislature as essential to every plan of free government. . . .   He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable  and durable if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people  themselves than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the  legislatures.    Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people. . . . Experience, he  said, had shown that the state legislatures drawn immediately from the  people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection,  however, to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of  honor and character might not be unwilling to be joined in the  appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain  number out of which the state legislatures should be bound to choose.    Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.    On the question for an election of the first branch of the national  legislature by the people: Mass., N.Y., Pa., Va., N.C., Ga., aye 6; N.J.,  S.C., no 2; Conn., Del., divided.    . . .Includes the drafts and approved text of the American Constitution","brand":"Modern Library","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46302327111909,"sku":"NP9780812975178","price":22.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780812975178.jpg?v=1767738824","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/the-constitutional-convention-isbn-9780812975178","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}