{"product_id":"strategies-and-games-second-edition-isbn-9780262046527","title":"Strategies and Games, second edition","description":"\u003cb\u003eThe new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of \u003ci\u003eStrategies and Games\u003c\/i\u003e not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eThe book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.Preface xxiii\u003cbr\u003ePart One Introductions 1\u003cbr\u003eChapter 1 A First Look at the Applications 3\u003cbr\u003eChapter 2 A First Look at the Theory 21\u003cbr\u003ePart Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 39\u003cbr\u003eChapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 41\u003cbr\u003eChapter 4 Dominance Solvability 57\u003cbr\u003eChapter 5 Nash Equilibrium 75\u003cbr\u003eChapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 89\u003cbr\u003eChapter 7 Voting and Elections 107\u003cbr\u003eChapter 8 An Application: The Commons Problem 125\u003cbr\u003eChapter 9 Mixed Strategies 139\u003cbr\u003eChapter 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 161\u003cbr\u003eChapter 11 Zero-Sum Games 179\u003cbr\u003ePart Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 199\u003cbr\u003eChapter 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 201\u003cbr\u003eChapter 13 An Application: Research and Development 225\u003cbr\u003eChapter 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 239\u003cbr\u003eChapter 15 Fintely Repeated Games 257\u003cbr\u003eChapter 16 Infinitely Repeated Games 277\u003cbr\u003eChapter 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 295\u003cbr\u003eChapter 18 An Application OPEC 309\u003cbr\u003eChapter 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending 329\u003cbr\u003eChapter 20 An Application: Trade Agreements 345\u003cbr\u003eChapter 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming 363\u003cbr\u003eChapter 22 Strategic Bargaining 385\u003cbr\u003ePart Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 403\u003cbr\u003eChapter 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 405\u003cbr\u003eChapter 24 Games with Incomplete Information 423\u003cbr\u003eChapter 25 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 447\u003cbr\u003eChapter 26 An Application: Auctions 465\u003cbr\u003eChapter 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty 481\u003cbr\u003eChapter 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 501\u003cbr\u003eChapter 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation 521\u003cbr\u003ePart Five Cooperative Games and Matching 541\u003cbr\u003eChapter 30 Cooperative Games 543\u003cbr\u003eChapter 31 Matching Problems 567\u003cbr\u003ePart Six Foundations 593\u003cbr\u003eChapter 32 Calculus and Optimization 595\u003cbr\u003eChapter 33 Probability and Expectation 613\u003cbr\u003eChapter 34 Utility and Expected Utility 625\u003cbr\u003eChapter 35 Existence of Nash Equilbria 641\u003cbr\u003eIndex 655Prajit K. Dutta is Professor in the Department of Economics at Columbia University. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWouter Vergote is Associate Professor of Economics at the ESCP Business School, Madrid Campus.","brand":"The MIT Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46304491307237,"sku":"NP9780262046527","price":125.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780262046527.jpg?v=1767737421","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/strategies-and-games-second-edition-isbn-9780262046527","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}