{"product_id":"semper-fi-vietnam-isbn-9780891418245","title":"Semper Fi: Vietnam","description":"From their early days in 1965 when the order of the day was to drive the insurgent Viet Cong from the villages around Da Nang to the final, dramatic evacuation of Saigon ten years later, \u003ci\u003eSemper Fi—Vietnam\u003c\/i\u003e relates the whole gutsy, glorious saga of the Marines in Vietnam in stark, riveting detail.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAcclimating to their strange new surroundings occupied the Marines’ first few weeks in South Vietnam. . . . Throughout the day, peasants dressed in pajama-like clothing and sporting conical hats worked the paddies behind the heaving water buffalo. . . .\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIf daytime scenes appeared bucolic, the arrival of sunset quickly changed that perception. Gunfire and explosions erupted at dusk. Marines nervously watched bright tracers cut colorful swaths across the night sky. From distant bamboo thickets, mortar shells flew skyward to crash in the paddies. The Marines were learning that the war in South Vietnam was unlike anything for which they’d been trained.\u003cb\u003e“A RICH BLEND OF COMMAND STRATEGY AND HEROIC INDIVIDUAL EXPLOITS . . . An interesting and highly readable account of Marine Corps infantry operations in South Vietnam [that] perfectly captures the spirit of the gallant men who fought the battles and took the casualties.”\u003cbr\u003e—GEN RAYMOND G. DAVIS, USMC (Ret.)\u003cbr\u003e   Former commanding general\u003cbr\u003e   of the 3d Marine Division in Vietnam (1968-69)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eFrom their early days in 1965 when the order of the day was to drive the insurgent Viet Cong from the villages around Da Nang to the final, dramatic evacuation of Saigon ten years later, \u003ci\u003eSemper Fi—Vietnam\u003c\/i\u003e relates the whole gutsy, glorious saga of the Marines in Vietnam in stark, riveting detail.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e“A compelling and in-depth history of the Marine Corps ground campaigns in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1975. This dramatic account of the principle USMA combat engagements in that long and bitter struggle provides a vivid look at the campaigns that is written primarily from the perspective of the troops who fought them. . . .  Covers the campaigns and engagements . . . in considerable and meticulous detail.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSea Power\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cb\u003eEdward F. Murphy\u003c\/b\u003e is a U.S. Army veteran of the Vietnam War. He is the author of a three-volume series on Medal of Honor recipients: \u003ci\u003eHeroes of WWII\u003c\/i\u003e,\u003ci\u003e Korean War Heroes\u003c\/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eVietnam Medal of Honor Heroes\u003c\/i\u003e, as well two Vietnam War histories: \u003ci\u003eDak To\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eThe Hill Fights\u003c\/i\u003e. He livesFrom their early days in 1965 when the order of the day was to drive the insurgent Viet Cong from the villages around Da Nang to the final, dramatic evacuation of Saigon ten years later, \u003ci\u003eSemper Fi—Vietnam\u003c\/i\u003e relates the whole gutsy, glorious saga of the Marines in Vietnam in stark, riveting detail.\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003eChapter One\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1965\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAt 0545 on 8 March 1965, the four ships of the U.S. Navy's Amphibious  Task Force 76, the Mount McKinley, Henrico, Union, and Vancouver,  steamed into the harbor of Da Nang, South Vietnam. Slicing through  four-foot-high waves, the vessels moved into position three thousand  meters offshore. A raspy, clanging sound challenged the morning air  as four heavy anchors pulled thick chain links to the bay's bottom.  The eyes of hundreds of anxious U.S. Marines crowding the ships'  railings peered through the haze of a light drizzle, furtively  searching for a glimpse of the distant shoreline.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eRear Admiral Don W. Wulzen, the task force commander aboard the Mount  McKinley, ordered at 0600, \"Land the landing force!\" H hour was 0800.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe well-armed Marines moved into position to begin the ship-to-shore  movement. As they clambered down rope nets slung over the ship's  steel sides, the weather suddenly worsened. The waiting landing craft  bounced dangerously on the building waves. Mooring lines snapped  under the strain. Soon the harbor's surface teemed with white-capped  swells stretching to ten feet in height.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAt 0730 Admiral Wulzen ordered the landing postponed one hour so that  larger, heavier, more stable landing craft could be brought into  position. Once they were lashed securely alongside the transports,  the troops resumed climbing down the treacherous nets. The loaded  vessels moved into position for the run to the beaches.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMany of the young men crouching nervously in the bobbing craft had  fathers and uncles who had made landings on Pacific Ocean islands  during World War II, just two decades earlier. These assaults had  been deadly affairs. Enemy artillery shells had crashed among the  assault waves, spreading brutal death. Casualties during these  landings had been horrendous. Fortunately, the only casualties the  Marines of this generation were apt to experience this day would be  from seasickness. The rolling surf heaved the boats up and down as  they neared the beach.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCorporal Garry Powers jumped from his amphibious tractor into  knee-deep water at 0903 and splashed his way ashore. This first  Marine would soon be followed by tens of thousands more as the United  States commenced a controversial ten-year effort to keep South  Vietnam from falling to the Communists. The journey to the beaches of  Da Nang had begun ten years earlier.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Geneva Accords of 1954 ended France's colonial role in what was  then known as French Indochina. The accords divided the new country  into a Communist-supported government north of the seventeenth  parallel and an anti-Communist regime to the south. Despite the  accords Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam's leader, launched a subversive  effort to overthrow the government of South Vietnam and reunite the  country.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe United States enthusiastically supported South Vietnam's desire  to remain free of Communist domination. To help the fledgling  country, in 1954 it established a Military Assistance Advisory Group  (MAAG) in the capital of Saigon to train the newly created South  Vietnamese Armed Forces. As the insurgents' terrorism escalated in  the early 1960s the United States took significant steps to  strengthen its ally. By the end of 1962 more than twelve thousand  American military personnel were in South Vietnam. Among them were  eighteen U.S. Marines serving as advisers to the infant South  Vietnamese Marine Corps and a Marine Corps helicopter squadron.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWith this major expansion in commitment, the United States abolished  the MAAG in February 1962. It was replaced by the Military Assistance  Command, Vietnam, a more comprehensive structure, headed by U.S. Army  General Paul D. Harkins.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDespite this massive infusion of American aid, the fragile South  Vietnamese government was continually torn by internal dissidence. A  series of violent clashes between Buddhist monks and President Ngo  Dinh Diem's national police resulted in the arrest of the insurgent  Buddhist leaders in August 1963. The crisis continued, culminating in  the assassination of Diem in November. The turbulent period of  political instability that followed witnessed numerous coups and  countercoups. South Vietnam's leaders changed so rapidly during this  time that it was often difficult for the Americans to know who was in  charge of the country on any given day.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis continued instability was not lost on Saigon's enemies, the  North Vietnamese-supported Viet Cong (VC). Taking full advantage of  the situation, the VC struck again and again. After repeatedly  thrashing the much vaunted Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN),  the VC next turned to terrorist tactics designed to demoralize the  civilian population. Among the targets were U.S. military personnel  and installations.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn retaliation, in late July and early August 1964, U.S.-trained  South Vietnamese naval commandos aboard fast-moving torpedo boats  attacked two islands north of the demilitarized zone dividing the two  countries. Though they did little physical damage, the attacks  infuriated the North Vietnamese. They struck back, attacking the U.S.  Navy destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin with their own torpedo  boats on 2 August. A second attack against the Maddox and the  recently arrived Turner Joy came two days later. President Lyndon B.  Johnson responded by sending naval aircraft on bombing missions  against targets in North Vietnam.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe next major event came on 31 October when Viet Cong sappers hit  the U.S. Air Force base at Bien Hoa, northeast of Saigon. Four  Americans died and five U.S. planes were destroyed in the attack. On  Christmas Eve, a VC terrorist bomb exploded in the downtown Saigon  Brink Hotel, which served as an American bachelor officers' billet.  One American naval officer died and fifty-eight more suffered  injuries in the massive blast.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eRelative quiet reigned over the country for the next few weeks. Then,  in the early morning hours of 7 February 1965, Viet Cong infantry  attacked two U.S. Army installations near Pleiku, in South Vietnam's  mountainous Central Highlands. The fifteen-minute ground assault left  8 Americans dead and more than 125 wounded.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eElevated to the presidency after the assassination of John F. Kennedy  in November 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson fought a bitter campaign during  the summer and fall of 1964 to be elected in his own right. Regarding  the building crisis in South Vietnam, he frequently stated his  objections to sending \"American boys to do what Asian boys should be  doing . . .\" Once elected and safely in office, Johnson wasted no  time in committing U.S. forces to the war. Less than twelve hours  after the Pleiku attack, U.S. naval fighter-bomber aircraft from the  carriers Ranger, Hancock, and Coral Sea hit military targets near  Dong Hoi, North Vietnam. The next day, in the second stage of  Operation Flaming Dart, land-based U.S. Air Force F-100 Supersaber  jet fighters launched from the Da Nang air base. They struck  guerrilla staging and communications centers near Vinh Linh and Chap  Le, just across the demilitarized zone.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn a televised speech that same evening, President Johnson announced  the air raids to the American public, saying: \"We have no choice but  to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued  determination to back South Vietnam.\" The president further stated  that he had ordered dependents of American servicemen stationed in  South Vietnam to return home. He then declared, \"I have ordered the  deployment to South Vietnam of a HAWK air defense battalion. Other  reinforcements, in units and individuals, may follow.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThough the logic of sending a surface-to-air guided missile weapons  system to South Vietnam, which had never been threatened with air  attacks, and never would, escaped many, nevertheless the orders went  out. On Okinawa the Marines' 1st Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM)  Battalion got the nod.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBattery A, 1st LAAM flew into Da Nang on the night of 8-9 February.  The rest of the battalion, traveling by ship, arrived over the next  week. By 16 February the five-hundred-plus Marines of the 1st LAAM  occupied positions surrounding the Da Nang air base. America's  leaders were convinced that this show of force would persuade North  Vietnam's leaders to curtail terrorist attacks.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThey were wrong.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOn 10 February, the Viet Cong attacked a U.S. Army enlisted men's  barracks at coastal Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province. Twenty-three  American soldiers died; another twenty-two were wounded. President  Johnson immediately ordered another round of air strikes. Naval  warplanes from the carriers and ground-based aircraft from Da Nang  headed north on 12 February under Operation Flaming Dart II.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSignificantly, President Johnson referred to these raids not as  reprisals but as \"air operations\" provoked by \"continued aggression.\"  The next day, heeding the recommendations of his key military  advisers-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs  of Staff-Johnson opted to begin a program of \"measured and limited  air action jointly with South Vietnam against selected military  targets in North Vietnam . . .\" The air attacks would be regularly  scheduled several times per week with two or three major targets on  each operation. The new campaign was called Rolling Thunder.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThough the first strikes had been scheduled for 20 February, renewed  South Vietnamese political instability put Operation Rolling Thunder  on hold. The day before, a military coup aimed at the current  premier, Gen. Nguyen Khanh, failed. However, after a subsequent vote  of no confidence from the Armed Forces Council, Khanh departed the  country. The leadership of South Vietnam was again in doubt.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eConfronted with an unstable political situation just as a massive air  campaign was commencing, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the new  commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), had  grave reservations about the ability of the ARVN forces to protect  the U.S. air base at Da Nang and the HAWK battalion. He ordered his  deputy, Lt. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, to determine what level of  U.S. ground forces would be needed for adequate security.  Throckmorton responded within twenty-four hours. He recommended two  battalions of Marines be deployed to guard the Da Nang complex.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGeneral Westmoreland concurred. He sent the request to his immediate  superior, Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr., commander in chief,  Pacific, on 22 February. Admiral Sharp forwarded his positive  endorsement of Westmoreland's request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHowever, in a separate, private, back-channel cable to President  Johnson, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, retired U.S. Army  general Maxwell Taylor, expressed strong reservations about  committing U.S. ground troops to South Vietnam. After the first  contingent of American forces arrived, Taylor said, \"It will be very  difficult to hold the line\" on further force commitments. Without a  doubt, Taylor predicted, ARVN commanders would soon relinquish other  \"ground force tasks\" to the Americans. These tasks were sure to  escalate, the ambassador asserted, leading to his chief worry: \"The  white-faced soldier, armed, equipped, and trained as he is, is not a  suitable guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and jungles. The French  tried to adapt their forces to this mission and failed. I doubt that  U.S. forces could do much better.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDespite Taylor's prescient view, Washington cabled him on 27 February  that the Marines would land. Taylor was to so inform the South  Vietnamese government. On 1 March, the minister of the South  Vietnamese Armed Forces, Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, and the Vietnamese  chairman of the Joint General Staff, Gen. Tran Van Minh, approved the  landing. Fearing opposition by some segments of the South Vietnamese  population, Thieu and Minh requested that the landing of the Marines  be accomplished as \"inconspicuously as possible.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eTwo battalions from the 3d Marine Division's 9th Marine Expeditionary  Brigade (MEB) had been aboard ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet sailing  off South Vietnam's coast since January. Several times the shipboard  Marines had been within hours of hitting the beaches. Each time a  cooling off of the crisis alleviated the landing. Now, however, word  for the Marines to go ashore had come directly from Washington. There  would be no last minute reversal of these orders.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBrigadier General Frederick J. Karch, a dapper-looking,  mustache-sporting veteran of two bloody World War II island  campaigns, had taken command of the 9th MEB on 22 January 1965. As  the assistant division commander, Karch had made several visits to  the country over the previous year. He did not like what he saw. In  his opinion the ARVN were so weak that if Marines were to land in  Vietnam he felt they should \"make it North Vietnam, not South. If we  go into Da Nang, we'll disappear into the countryside and never be  heard from again.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNonetheless, when Karch got his orders he went to work. Spread aboard  the four ships of naval amphibious Task Force 76 were the 2d and 3d  Battalions, 9th Marines. (The Marine Corps does not use the  traditional identifier \"Infantry Regiment\" or \"Artillery Regiment\" in  referring to its units. Instead, it simply refers to a regiment with  its numerical designator followed by \"Marines.\" Thus, the 1st Marines  is actually the 1st Marine Infantry Regiment.) The 2d and 3d  Battalions served as the battalion landing teams (BLT). (The BLT is  the basic Marine unit in an assault landing. The team's core is an  infantry battalion reinforced by other mission-necessary combat and  service units.) Karch selected BLT 3\/9 to make an amphibious landing  at Da Nang. The Marines would go ashore at Red Beach 2, north and  west of the city. Once ashore, they would be carried by trucks to  defensive positions at the air base. As a reserve, BLT 2\/9 would  remain aboard ship.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe second of the two battalions would come directly from 3d Marine  Division units on Okinawa. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines would be  airlifted directly to Da Nang soon after the arrival of BLT 3\/9.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAfter completing a flurry of activities ashore related to getting his  units ready for the actual landing, General Karch returned to his  command ship, the Mount McKinley, on the evening of 6 March. Late the  next day Admiral Wulzen handed Karch a dispatch. \"Close Da Nang. Land  the landing force,\" the message read.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eKarch turned to Wulzen. \"Don, do you think in Washington they know  what time it is in Da Nang? This means a night landing if we close Da  Nang at this point.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBesides that, the task force was experiencing the worst weather it  had yet encountered while traveling around the South China Sea. Waves  were cresting at four feet in a strong wind. Visibility was limited  to two hundred meters. Karch contacted his headquarters. The orders  were modified; the landing would commence the next day.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNo enemy action awaited Corporal Powers. Instead, when he reached the  top of the beach a South Vietnamese beauty queen placed a fragrant  lei over his helmeted head. A short distance away a stone-faced,  lei-draped General Karch watched as the four rifle companies of BLT  3\/9 crossed the wet sand. Within thirty minutes Company L had boarded  trucks and started for the airfield. It was soon followed by  Companies I and K; Company M remained behind to provide security for  the unloading of the battalion's equipment.","brand":"Presidio Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46300469592293,"sku":"NP9780891418245","price":7.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780891418245.jpg?v=1767736338","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/semper-fi-vietnam-isbn-9780891418245","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}