{"product_id":"readings-in-industrial-organization-isbn-9780631216179","title":"Readings in Industrial Organization","description":"In \u003ci\u003eReadings in Industrial Organization,\u003c\/i\u003e Luis Cabral has assembled and placed into context the most important contributions to the literature of industrial organizations (IO) since the 1980s.  Preface. \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I: Static Oligopoly Theory:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Capacity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes: David M. Kreps (Stanford University) and Jose A. Sheinkman (University of Chicago).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean Hungry Look: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Jean Tirole (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Repeated Games and Oligopoly Theory:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information: Edward J. Green (University of Minnesota) and Robert H. Porter (Northwestern University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms: Julio J. Rotemberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Garth Saloner (Stanford University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5. Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behaviour: B. Douglas Bernheim (Stanford University) and Michael D. Whinston (Northwestern University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: Product Differentiation:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6. On Hotelling's \u003ci\u003eStability of Competition\u003c\/i\u003e: Claude d'Aspremont, J. Jaskkold Gabszewicz and Jacques-Francois Thisse (all at Universite Catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7. Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation: Avner Shaked (University of Bonn) and John Sutton (London School of Economics).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Avinash K. Dixit (Princeton University) and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Stanford University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: Empirical Analysis of Oligopoly:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9. The Oligopoly Solution is Identified: Timothy F. Bresnahan (Stanford University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10. A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886: Robert H. Porter (Northwestern University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11. Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium: Steven Berry (Yale University), James Levinsohn (University of Michigan), and Ariel Pakes (Harvard University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart V: Entry:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12. The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence: Avinash Dixit (Princeton University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13. Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Philippe Aghion (Harvard University) and Patrick Bolton (Princeton University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14. Free Entry and Social Inefficiency: N. Gregory Mankiw (Harvard University) and Michael D. Whinston (Northwestern University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15. Selection and Evolution of Industry: Boyan Jovanovic (New York University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VI: Technology and Dynamics:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly Power: Richard J. Gilbert (University of California-Berkeley) and David M. G. Newberry (Cambridge University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Jennifer F. Reinganum (Vanderbilt University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18. The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing: Luis M. B. Cabral (London Business School) and Michael H. Riordan (Boston University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19. Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Jean Tirole (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VII: Asymmetric Information:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20. Reputation and Imperfect Information: David M. Kreps (Stanford University) and Robert Wilson (Stanford University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e21. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: Paul Milgrom (Stanford University) and John Roberts (Stanford University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e22. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality: Paul Milgrom (Stanford University) and John Roberts (Stanford University).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003eLuis M. B. Cabral\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Economics at London Business School. A Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Cabral's research interests focus on industry dynamics as well as on regulation and competition policy. He is General Editor of the\u003ci\u003e Journal of Industrial Economics\u003c\/i\u003e and has been published in leading journals such as the\u003ci\u003e Journal of Economic Theory\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eEconometrica\u003c\/i\u003e. A Stanford PhD, he has taught various levels of economics at Stanford University, the University of Lisbon, and the London School of Economics.  In Readings in Industrial Organization, Luis Cabral has assembled and placed into context the most important contributions to the literature of industrial organizations (IO) since the 1980s. For students, this collection rises above and beyond a coursepack; for researchers, it is an essential reference. The readings also provide a useful point of entry to IO literature for economists for whom IO is not the main field of research. These readings cover core areas of IO and reflect the mostly theoretical nature of the latest work in the field:\u003cbr\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eStatic Oligopoly Theory\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eEntry\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eRepeated Games and Oligopoly Theory\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eTechnology and Dynamics\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eProduct Differentiation\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAsymmetric Information\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eEmpirical Analysis of Oligopoly.\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989919482085,"sku":"NP9780631216179","price":61.5,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780631216179.jpg?v=1761785909","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/readings-in-industrial-organization-isbn-9780631216179","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}