{"product_id":"public-choice-isbn-9780631138396","title":"Public Choice","description":"The 1968 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to one of the founders of public choice theory, James Buchanan, yet many people have only the vaguest idea what public choice is. The book offers and unusually clear and accessible introduction to an important subject. McLean examines the workings of public choice from two related perspectives - collective action and the aggregation of individual preferences into social consensus.  \u003cp\u003eThe book highlights the paradox at the heart of collective action- that self-interest in the public domain is frequently counterproductive. National defense and clean air are things we all benefit from - they are public goods - but we tend to resist contributing to them. The first part of this book examines how government choice in such areas is shaped, and by whom- political entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, interest groups and ordinary citizens. McLean uses the idea of a public market in which politicians sell what they hope voters will buy, and further considers how and when people (and animals) co-operate to produce public goods even without government coercion. In the second part of the book the author examines the consequences of combining individual preferences, arguing that there is no straightforward way of adding them up to form a 'social ordering' and assesing the implications of this both for electoral reform and for the status of 'the will of the people'.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003ePart 1: Introduction to Public Choice Theory\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 1: What is Public Choice?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe core principles of public choice\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDistinguishing public choice from traditional political science\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe economic model of political behavior\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 2: Individual Choice and Voting Behavior\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRational choice theory and voter decision-making\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe median voter theorem\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVoter turnout and rational ignorance\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart 2: Voting Systems and Political Competition\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 3: Voting Mechanisms\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimple majority rule\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlurality voting\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCondorcet's paradox and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 4: Political Parties and Spatial Voting\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe spatial model of political competition\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParty platforms and electoral strategies\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of ideology in voting behavior\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart 3: Collective Action and Interest Groups\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 5: Collective Action Problems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe free-rider problem\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe logic of collective action\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOvercoming collective action challenges\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 6: Interest Groups and Lobbying\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of interest groups in the political process\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLobbying strategies and political influence\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRent-seeking behavior and its economic consequences\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart 4: Government Institutions and Bureaucracy\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 7: Bureaucracy and Principal-Agent Problems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe nature of bureaucracy\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBureaucratic incentives and inefficiency\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory capture and its implications\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 8: Public Spending and Budgetary Processes\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe political economy of public spending\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBudgetary cycles and pork barrel politics\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of fiscal institutions\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart 5: Applications and Criticisms of Public Choice\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 9: Public Choice in Practice\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApplications to environmental policy\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublic choice analysis of healthcare systems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe political economy of trade policy\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChapter 10: Criticisms and Debates in Public Choice\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe limitations of the rational choice assumption\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of altruism and social norms\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublic choice and the concept of \"the public interest\"\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003eIAIN MCLEAN is Professor of Politics at Oxford University and a Fellow of Nuffield College, UK. He has worked on British politics and public policy for over 30 years. He has been a front bench councillor twice.   The 1968 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to one of the founders of public choice theory, James Buchanan, yet many people have only the vaguest idea what public choice is. The book offers and unusually clear and accessible introduction to an important subject. McLean examines the workings of public choice from two related perspectives - collective action and the aggregation of individual preferences into social consensus.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe book highlights the paradox at the heart of collective action- that self-interest in the public domain is frequently counterproductive. National defense and clean air are things we all benefit from - they are public goods - but we tend to resist contributing to them. The first part of this book examines how government choice in such areas is shaped, and by whom- political entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, interest groups and ordinary citizens. McLean uses the idea of a public market in which politicians sell what they hope voters will buy, and further considers how and when people (and animals) co-operate to produce public goods even without government coercion. In the second part of the book the author examines the consequences of combining individual preferences, arguing that there is no straightforward way of adding them up to form a 'social ordering' and assesing the implications of this both for electoral reform and for the status of 'the will of the people'.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989887762661,"sku":"NP9780631138396","price":40.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780631138396.jpg?v=1761785798","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/public-choice-isbn-9780631138396","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}