{"product_id":"macarthurs-victory-isbn-9780345463869","title":"MacArthur's Victory","description":"\u003cb\u003eA GREAT WARRIOR AT THE PEAK OF HIS POWERS\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn March 1942, General Douglas MacArthur faced an enemy who, in the space of a few months, captured Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and, from their base at Raubaul in New Britain, threaten Australia. Upon his retreat to Australia, MacArthur hoped to find enough men and matériel\u003cb\u003e \u003c\/b\u003efor a quick offensive against the Japanese. Instead, he had available to him only a small and shattered air force, inadequate naval support, and an army made up almost entirely of untried reservists. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHere is one of history’s most controversial commanders battling his own superiors for enough supplies, since President Roosevelt favored the European Theater; butting heads with the Navy, which opposed his initiatives; and on his way to making good his promise of liberating the Philippines.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn the battles for Buna, Lae, and Port Moresby, the capture of Finschhafen, and other major actions, he would prove his critics wrong and burnish an image of greatness that would last through the Korean War. This was the “other” Pacific War: the one MacArthur fought in New Guinea and, against all odds and most predictions, decisively won.\u003cb\u003eHarry A. Gailey\u003c\/b\u003e was a professor emeritus of military history at San Jose State University. He authored 20 books, including\u003ci\u003e MacArthur Strikes Back\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe War in the Pacific\u003c\/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eThe Liberation of Guam\u003c\/i\u003e. He died in 2004.OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGeneral Douglas MacArthur and his U.S. and Australian staffs could  congratulate themselves in early January 1943 on having wrested the  initiative from the Japanese. In conjunction with the naval and ground  forces in the eastern Solomon Islands, the threat to Australia, once so  feared, had been removed. Allied air forces, particularly the Fifth Air  Force, dominated the skies over Papua New Guinea, and made systematic  regular raids on the Japanese strongholds at Rabaul on New Britain. The  Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby by crossing the Owen Stanley  Mountains along the Kokoda Trail had been halted within sight of the  objective. In a bloody six-month advance, the Australians had reversed  the situation and driven the Japanese back along the trail toward the  north coast of Papua. Another attempt to take Port Moresby was foiled  in August by the Australians at Milne Bay. MacArthur committed the  green troops of the 32nd Division in an attempt to quickly capture the  Japanese stronghold of Buna. Without adequate artillery or naval  support, the U.S. troops, augmented by Australians, fought a bloody and  at times seemingly fruitless campaign against fanatical Japanese  resistance in the swamps around Buna. Ultimately they would succeed.  The last major defensive position in the Buna region fell on January  22.1\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAt the same time, the Australians drove the remnants of the Kokoda  invasion force into enclaves at Sanananda and Gona. These were  systematically reduced, with massive losses to the Japanese. In total  the Japanese lost approximately 12,000 men from an original 18,000  committed to the invasion. The victory was also costly for the Allies.  The Australians had suffered 2,037 killed and 3,533 wounded. The U.S.  losses amounted to 847 killed and 1,918 wounded.2 These figures are  misleading since tropical disease took such a toll that a large  percentage of Allied troops engaged were rendered unfit for immediate  duty. Nevertheless, despite tactical mistakes, MacArthur was in  possession of valuable bases on the north coast. Oro Bay would become a  major area for mounting later operations. The airfields, particularly  that at Dobodura, would be invaluable to the Allies’ continued  dominance of the air. However, MacArthur was still plagued by many of  the problems he had wrestled with since assuming command of the  Southwest Pacific Theater in April 1942.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe first and most pressing problem continued to be the need to  increase the number of troops available for future operations.  Secondarily, he needed to be assured of the requisite supplies,  particularly landing craft, if he were to launch any amphibious  operations against Japanese positions at Lae, Salamaua, Wewak, and  Hollandia. In late August, MacArthur returned to the question of the  need for more troops and ships. He wrote Army Chief of Staff George C.  Marshall that without additional naval and ground forces, there would  arise “a situation similar to those that have successfully overwhelmed  our forces in the Pacific since the beginning of the war.”3 The  continuing pleas of Australian Prime Minister John Curtin and MacArthur  for more troops were silenced on September 16 by President Franklin D.  Roosevelt, who in a communication to MacArthur agreed with the Combined  Chiefs of Staff that his present armed forces were “sufficient to  defeat the present Japanese force in New Guinea and to provide the  security of Australia against an invasion.”4 The Southwest Pacific  Theater would remain subordinate to all others.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMuch to MacArthur’s chagrin, the Southwest Pacific Theater was from the  first viewed by Washington and the Joint Chiefs as tertiary to the  European and South Pacific Theaters. MacArthur had imagined before his  arrival in Australia in March 1942 that a large number of combat troops  would be waiting for him and that reinforcements and supplies that  would enable him to immediately take the offensive would be quickly  forthcoming. He discovered that not only did he not have any prospects  for an immediate substantive augmentation to his forces, but also that  his appointment as supreme commander was being held up by opposition  from Admiral Ernest King, chief of naval operations, who maintained  that command should go to a naval officer. This would set the tone for  the difficult relations with the Navy that would persist throughout the  war.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eEven after his command had been approved, MacArthur encountered  continuous opposition in Washington to his requests for more troops.  After a series of communications with Marshall over a period of months,  he was bluntly informed that few troops could be spared from the  European buildup. His and Curtin’s requests for a return of all  Australian divisions then in Europe and North Africa were met at first  with excuses. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill feared that the  removal of Australian units from North Africa would seriously damage an  already weakened front.5 Ultimately most of the Australian divisions  were released, but at first only the 7th Division and one brigade of  the 6th were returned. As a belated recognition to Australia’s  vulnerability, two U.S. Army divisions were sent. The 41st and 32nd  Divisions, ill prepared for warfare in New Guinea, had arrived by May.  The protracted battle for Buna reduced the effectiveness of the 32nd so  much that in January 1943 it was ordered back to Australia, where the  bulk of reinforcements received in early 1943 would be used to replace  those lost. The 41st Division, although having suffered during the  latter stages of the Buna campaign, was kept in the vicinity of Buna.  Elements of this division were used to pursue the remnants of the  Japanese garrisons up the coastline. Two Australian divisions that had  been used on the Kokoda Trail were also available in the Sanananda  region and at Milne Bay. They, too, had suffered heavy battle  casualties, and a large portion of these troops also suffered from  malaria. There was also a small contingent of Australians, the Kanga  Force, based at Wau in the interior from Lae. Most of the other  Australian units then in training would not be immediately available  for offensive action since the Australian government insisted on  retaining a large defensive force in Australia.6\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn March 1943, at the time of the Pacific Military Conference in  Washington, D.C., which was attempting to devise a Pacific strategy,  MacArthur’s force had been augmented by the 1st Marine Division, which  was refitting after its bloody battle in Guadalcanal. However, he was  informed that this unit would not be permanently assigned and was  needed for the contemplated island campaigns in the central Pacific. Of  the total of 374,000 U.S. troops in the Pacific, more than half were on  garrison duty and were to be utilized in the planned-for campaigns in  the central Solomons. The answer from Marshall, brought back by Major  General Richard Sutherland, MacArthur’s representative to the  Washington conference, was that, given the situation elsewhere,  MacArthur would simply have to make do.7\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMacArthur’s problems with the Navy existed at a number of different  levels. At the highest was the opposition of Admiral King to  MacArthur’s appointment. (Later, King would be the most active opponent  to MacArthur’s strategy of liberating the Philippines.) As chief of  naval operations, King was committed to building the big blue-water  Navy based on Hawaii under Admiral Chester A. Nimitz’s command. The  goal of this fleet would be to defeat the Japanese navy and support the  seizure of island stepping-stones in the central Pacific. This strategy  was in dramatic opposition to MacArthur’s plans.8 Thus it was obvious  that the Navy would not approve the transfer of any significant number  of capital ships from Nimitz’s command to MacArthur’s. Even when it  became necessary for major fleet units to support actions in the  southwest Pacific, these were only loaned and were never totally  assigned to MacArthur.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMacArthur had real as well as imagined problems with the U.S. naval  commanders. When he arrived in Australia, he inherited commanders not  of his choosing. One of these was Vice Admiral Herbert Leary, who had  only token forces made up of a few submarines, smaller U.S. craft, and  the tiny Australian fleet. It was obvious that MacArthur did not  appreciate Leary’s problems, which were compounded by King’s insistence  that he communicate directly with Nimitz without immediate reference to  MacArthur. The situation was not improved when Leary was replaced in  September 1942 by Vice Admiral Arthur Carpender, who suffered from the  same problems of lack of ships and a divided command structure.  Personalities obviously played a part in the tension between MacArthur  and Carpender, but there were significant differences in the way they  felt the small naval force should be used. For the Navy in the latter  months of 1942, the most important campaign was Guadalcanal, and  MacArthur was ordered to share his meager air and naval units with Vice  Admiral Robert Ghormley. MacArthur’s main naval contingent, the  Australian cruisers Australia, Canberra, and Hobart, were shifted to  the Solomons and took part in a series of important naval operations  there, including the disastrous battle of Savo Island, in which the  Australia was sunk. Nimitz even wanted the submarines based in  Australia placed under his control for the Guadalcanal campaign.  MacArthur protested vehemently to the Joint Chiefs but to no avail. The  submarines were transferred.9 The main elements of “MacArthur’s navy”  were not returned to his command until after the major actions on  Guadalcanal had been completed.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Buna campaign was fought almost entirely without naval support. The  ostensible reasons were the lack of good charts showing the reefs and  the proximity of Japanese airpower. The supply of men and matériel to  the Buna-Gona region was provided mainly by small craft run by a Dutch  maritime company. General Sir Thomas Blamey, commander of the Allied  ground forces, requested a number of times that the Navy dispatch at  least a destroyer whose guns could support the infantry attacks. His  dissatisfaction with the Navy mirrored MacArthur’s when he pointed to  the dire situation facing the ground troops in November 1942. He noted,  “The attitude of the Navy in regard to the destroyers appears to avoid  risk at a time when all services should give a maximum of cooperation  to defeat the enemy.”10 After considerable delay Carpender reported to  MacArthur that his naval experts had vetoed sending any capital ships  into the area until more was known of the reefs. Thus the men of the  32nd Division had to attack the entrenched Japanese without artillery  or naval gun support. A contrast in commanders can be seen in the  actions of Vice Admiral William Halsey, Ghormley’s successor, who  concluded that his major task at Guadalcanal was to support the ground  troops and committed all his resources to that end. One observer later  reported that if only a token naval force had been available for the  assaults at Buna, the Japanese could have been driven out within a few  weeks instead of months.11\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMacArthur’s navy was not improved by the designation of this small  naval force as the Seventh Fleet on March 15, 1943. The mainstay of the  fleet was the two remaining Australian cruisers and one U.S. light  cruiser. By contrast, Halsey’s Third Fleet consisted of five carriers,  six battleships, and thirteen cruisers.12 An example of the thinness of  MacArthur’s forces in early 1943 was the condition of the amphibious  force. The overall strategy was developed by General Marshall and  Admiral King and issued as a directive on July 2, 1942. The major goal  was to isolate and later capture Rabaul. The strategy was divided into  three tasks. The first called for Admiral Ghormley’s troops in the  South Pacific to seize the Santa Cruz Islands and Tulagi.  Implementation of this would lead to the Guadalcanal venture begun in  August. The other two would be MacArthur’s responsibility. Task two  envisioned the capture of Lae and Salamaua, and the last the invasion  of eastern New Britain with the objective of capturing Rabaul. In order  to provide air cover and a supply base closer to Lae, the decision was  made to take Buna. However, the slowness of the occupation of Buna  allowed the Japanese to occupy the area from Sanananda to Buna. The  need to drive them out resulted in a costly campaign, which was not  completed until January 1943.13\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe planning for these operations was grouped under an overall plan  called Elkton. Although the major objectives were not changed, the  Elkton plan was revised and ultimately issued as Elkton III on April  26, 1943, after a meeting of MacArthur’s staff members with Nimitz at  Pearl Harbor the previous month. The operation as a group was  code-named Cartwheel. The first phase of the plan was the occupation of  Woodlark and Kirwina Islands and New Georgia. Two months after the  start of the offensive, MacArthur would launch the second phase with  the capture of Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen. Phase three would  involve the capture of the Shortland Islands and Bougainville in the  South Pacific. In December MacArthur would then send troops to seize  Cape Gloucester in western New Britain. Shortly thereafter, Rabaul  would be captured.14 The Cartwheel plan called for thirteen amphibious  operations in six months. There were no serious problems in providing  ships and landing craft in Nimitz’s area. However, at the beginning of  the year MacArthur had practically no amphibious equipment or experts  in these kinds of operations. The only units available then were the  Army’s Engineering Special Boat Brigade, which operated a few small  craft.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe man who would be responsible for the amphibious assaults during  much of the coming campaigns was Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. On January  10, 1943, he took command of the forces that would later be designated  the 7th Amphibious Force. Barbey immediately established good relations  with MacArthur, who eventually came to trust him as much as he did his  air force commander, General George Kenney. However, Barbey had little  to work with. There were no amphibious training facilities available,  and therefore he immediately established bases at Toobul Bay, near the  mouth of the Brisbane River, and Point Stephens. It was necessary for  his permanent party personnel to build their own facilities at each  station.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eEquipment that was readily available in other theaters was at a  premium. As early as mid-1942, MacArthur had requested more small craft  and transports, but because of European and central Pacific priorities,  little had been done to build up the amphibious capabilities of his  command. Even as U.S. and Australian troops arrived, Barbey’s officers  had to improvise. MacArthur wanted the troops trained in debarking from  larger ships down cargo nets to smaller landing craft. However, Barbey  did not have an attack transport (APA), which was a key vessel for this  kind of operation. A partial solution was to rig the nets from cliffs.  The first LSTs and LCTs did not arrive until mid-January, and it was  not until Easter Sunday that thirteen LCIs were delivered; this gave  little time before the first operations to train crews how to use  them.15 One should not be surprised that the first operation, mounted  in late June against Kirwana and Woodlark Islands and the Huon Gulf,  showed a number of serious deficiencies. By then the 7th Amphibious  Force had grown to four old destroyers converted as troop carriers, six  LSTs, and thirty assorted landing craft. Barbey had received an APA  transferred from the South Pacific, and the Australian government had  promised him almost all the small metal boats then under  construction.16 With these additional landing craft and more  experienced personnel, many of the problems were solved before the  September landing of the Australian 9th Division at Lae.Author of The War in the Pacific","brand":"Presidio Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46304308789477,"sku":"NP9780345463869","price":14.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780345463869.jpg?v=1767732006","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/macarthurs-victory-isbn-9780345463869","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}