Justice, Equality and Constructivism

This collection critically engages with a number of recurrent themes from the work of G.A. Cohen, and most especially with arguments and positions advanced in his Rescuing Justice and Equality.

• A critical discussion of the work of the contemporary political theorist G.A. Cohen, an egalitarian and a critic of John Rawls
• Offers a critical perspective on his significant work on equality and constructivism, including his eagerly anticipated new book Rescuing Justice and Equality
• The contributors to this volume are noted for their own work on these topics
• Challenges Cohen’s view of the centrality of equality to justice, of the scope for free choice of occupation and economic incentives, as well as his view that fundamental principles of justice are insensitive to facts

1. Introduction: Brian Feltham (University of Reading).

2. Justice is not Equality: Richard J. Arneson (University of California).

3. Inequality, Injustice and Levelling Down: Thomas Christiano (University of Arizona) and Will Braynen (University of Arizona).

4. Inequality, Incentives and the Interpersonal Test: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (University of Copenhagen).

5. Freedom of Occupational Choice: Michael Otsuka (University College London).

6. Cohen to the Rescue!: Thomas Pogge (Yale University).

7. Justice, Incentives and Constructivism: Andrew Williams (University of Warwick).

Index

Brian Feltham was educated at University College London and Oxford, and now lectures at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading. Prior to this he helped orchestrate a major three-year research project into ‘Impartiality and Partiality in Ethics’ at the Philosophy Department at Reading. He has published papers in ethics and political philosophy. G.A. Cohen has made a major contribution to contemporary political theory as an egalitarian and a critic of John Rawls. In his recent book Rescuing Justice and Equality he defended two central theses, that egalitarianism is central to our concept of justice and that fundamental principles of justice are not dependent on contingent facts about society or human nature. The contributors to this volume are noted for their own work on these topics, and here offer explorations of Cohen’s themes and detailed criticism of his arguments. They variously challenge Cohen’s view of the centrality of equality to justice, of the scope for free choice of occupation and economic incentives, as well as his view that fundamental principles of justice are insensitive to facts. This volume will be of great value to students and professionals working in political theory and moral philosophy.