{"product_id":"goldman-and-his-critics-isbn-9780470673850","title":"Goldman and His Critics","description":"\u003ci\u003eGoldman and His Critics\u003c\/i\u003e presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eCritiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eFeatures contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eCovers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and metaphysics\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003ePays special attention to Goldman’s writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Contributors vii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeword ix\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAlvin I. Goldman\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface x\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael Williams\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Michael Williams\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 Goldman against Internalism 22\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eLaurence BonJour\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to BonJour\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eThomas Kelly\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Kelly\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMatthew McGrath\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to McGrath\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5 Unreliable Testimony 88\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eElizabeth Fricker\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Fricker\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eErnest Sosa\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Sosa\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJack C. Lyons\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Lyons\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eErik J. Olsson\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Olsson\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDuncan Pritchard\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Pritchard\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter-Specific Truth 219\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eChristian List and Kai Spiekermann\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to List and Spiekermann\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11 Knowledge and Reliability 237\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJennifer Nagel\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Nagel\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eChristopher S. Hill\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Hill\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eFrédérique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Vignemont and Mercier\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eVittorio Gallese\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Gallese\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eChaz Firestone\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Firestone\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJonathan Schaffer\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Schaffer\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: Alvin Goldman’s Publications 369\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 379\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHilary Kornblith\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. He is the author of \u003ci\u003eInductive Inference and its Natural Ground\u003c\/i\u003e (1993); \u003ci\u003eKnowledge and its Place in Nature \u003c\/i\u003e(2002); \u003ci\u003eOn Reflection\u003c\/i\u003e (2012); and \u003ci\u003eA Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers\u003c\/i\u003e (2014).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBrian P. McLaughlin\u003c\/b\u003e is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He has published numerous articles on topics relating to the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989303541989,"sku":"NP9780470673850","price":53.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470673850.jpg?v=1761783589","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/goldman-and-his-critics-isbn-9780470673850","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}