{"product_id":"fast-boat-to-china-isbn-9781400095544","title":"Fast Boat to China","description":"Most Americans today are aware that jobs are being outsourced to China, India, and other nations at an alarming rate. From factory jobs to white-collar, high-tech positions, the exporting of labor is one of the most controversial issues in America.Yet few people know much about the other end — about the people who are actually working these jobs and how their own lives have been throw into tumult by these new economic forces. Andrew Ross spent a year in China, interviewing local employees and their managers in Taiwan, Shanghai, and the far western provinces. In this engaging and informative book, he shows how the Chinese workforce has inherited many of the same worries as American workers, such as job instability, long hours, and awareness of their own expendability. He reports on the daily reality of corporate free trade and explores the growing competition between China and India. This is an eye-opening exploration of an unseen side of our globalized world.“Highly readable. . . . With his clear ideas about fair trade and internationalized labor rights, [Ross] lays out concrete alternatives to the common wisdom that globalization is unstoppable.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003eTime Out New York\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“A fresh look at exactly what we should be making of . . . the increasing number of U.S. and European companies that are relocating their factories and work force in China.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003eThe Asian Review of Books\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“A skeptical take on pro-China boosterism, gained through the same participant-observer techniques the author brought to his \u003ci\u003eCelebration Chronicles\u003c\/i\u003e.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003eThe Atlantic Monthly\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Engaging. . . . A compelling ground-level perspective.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003eThe Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cb\u003eAndrew Ross is Professor of American Studies at New York University. He is the author of seven books, including \u003ci\u003eNo-Collar: The Humane Workplace and its Hidden Costs\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Celebration Chronicles: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Property Value in Disney's New Town\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eLow Pay\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eHigh Profile: The Global Push for Fair Labor\u003c\/i\u003e. He has also edited six books, including \u003ci\u003eNo Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade, and the Rights of Garment Workers\u003c\/i\u003e, and, most recently, \u003ci\u003eAnti-Americanism\u003c\/i\u003e. \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cb\u003e    The Shanghai Squeeze\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Corporations have been moving jobs and capital out of countries like   the United States since the late 1960s. But in the public mind it is   only recently that China has become the most likely destination. Almost   overnight, it seems, the given wisdom is that if China’s breakneck   growth continues, its inexhaustible labor pool, its burgeoning   high-tech skills, and its investment opportunities could effortlessly   absorb the livelihoods of workers and professionals in every corner of   the world. Worries are also mounting about how the world’s resources   are being drained to service this growth, but they do not yet compare   to the widespread anxiety about the flight of industry and capital: in   Mexico, whose NAFTA-based manufacturing sector has been hemhorraging   jobs to Asia; in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, where leading technology   industries have come to depend on manufacturing on the mainland; in the   United States and Western Europe, where offshore job transfer is   sprinting up the value chain into the realm of professional services;   in the offshore sites of Eastern Europe and North Africa that are   increasingly less profitable than Asian locations; and even\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    in countries like Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, and India, whose   low labor costs are now undercut by the comparative advantages of   producing in the heartlands of the jumbo China market.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Workers everywhere tend to perceive the mercurial growth of China’s   economy as a threat. Most owners of mobile capital, by contrast, see   only an investors’ bonanza. This discrepancy is not surprising, but it   is rare to come across a stark divide on such a scale and with so many   far-flung consequences. One of the general aims of this book is to   explain how these contrasting perceptions came about, whether they are   justified, and what conditions are likely to change them. Is China’s   growth a timely outcome that will help to stabilize the world economy,   or is it a textbook illustration of the lopsided benefits conferred by   corporate globalization? How do offshore employees—among the presumed   beneficiaries—fit into this equation, and how can their onshore   counterparts—among the presumed losers—join with them to help remedy   any imbalance? In the plunder-happy world of free trade, what are the   responsibilities of governments, either in the West or in key cities   like Beijing and Shanghai, to try to equalize the distribution of gains   and offset the environmental damage?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    My inquiry into these questions took me to the factories and offices of   Shanghai’s booming metropolis, neighboring cities in the Yangtze River   Delta and other parts of China, and, ultimately, to Taiwan and India,   but it begins here with a brief historical account of how the   commercial traffic between the United States and China evolved.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    How Outsourcing Became a Way of Life\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Before the early 1990s, the bulk of job and capital flight to China was   obscured by the maze of contracting chains that snaked all over East   Asia. When export-processing zones were first established in the 1980s   in South China, most of the suppliers to U.S. and European   manufacturers and retailers were Taiwan-, Macao-, or Hong Kong–owned   factories (registered in the Cayman or Virgin Islands) that operated   with a low profile and with equally low operating capital. In most   cases the only contact with the onshore firm was through a Hong Kong   agent, and the identity of the parent manufacturer was generally not   disclosed. Indeed, the system was designed to be nontransparent, making   it difficult to trace the connections between the head and the tail of   the chain. Because the U.S. apparel industry was the first to see the   offshoring of labor-intensive operations, garment unions had the   longest record of tracking the flight to Asia, dating back to the   1960s. Labor advocates in the industry also had the longest experience   of protesting substandard conditions in the factories—first in Japan,   and then in Hong Kong and Taiwan—that supplied the apparel majors.   Consequently, the concept of the Asian sweatshop producing for Western   consumers was established early in the public imagination. The reality   took on a more ominous profile when low-end assembly operations swept   onto mainland China itself, all but concealing the factories and shops   from international scrutiny.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    The initial surge of job traffic to the export zones slowed after the   1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square. International sanctions took their   toll on most trade relations with China. Bill Clinton subsequently   campaigned on a promise to take a firm stand against the “butchers of   Beijing,” and initially he tied the approval of China’s Most Favored   Nation (MFN) trading status to the improvement of Beijing’s human   rights record. But his fighting words soon dissolved in the face of   pressure from the powerful U.S.-China trade lobby. His first   administration approved Beijing’s MFN status in 1994 over and above a   barrage of complaints about appeasement.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Offshoring corporations developed a tight understanding with the   governing class that each would press for the global liberalization of   trade and investment. This entente among financial and political elites   was part of the Washington Consensus, and its advocates promoted the   doctrine that free-trade policies would bring wealth to all   participants. Benefits flowed to those who profited from trade   deregulation and privatization, but the more numerous “losers of   globalization” were hard-pressed to see the silver lining. Rising   inequality appeared in every poor country that lifted trade and   investment barriers. Domestic protests surfaced wherever corporate-led   free trade left its uneven footprint. Toward the end of the 1990s, a   far-flung protest network—the global justice movement—was advocating a   bottom-up vision of globalization, geared to human needs and   sustainable development, rather than to short-term corporate profits.   With its scant domestic freedoms, and limited international exchange   (though not for businesspeople), China emerged as the weakest link in   the network, and the largest single obstacle to global cooperation on   labor and environmental standards.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Partly as a result of this stepped-up global opposition to free-trade   policies, a much fiercer fight over worker and human rights preceded   congressional approval of China’s Permanent Normal Trading Relations   (PNTR) status in 2000.  The granting of PNTR, which was the prelude to   China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, opened the door wide for   production shifts from the United States to the mainland. The exodus   began in earnest. In the years that followed, the majority of China’s   ballooning exports were produced with foreign investment, and most of   the goods were destined for the American market. Consequently the U.S.   trade deficit with China soared (by 30 percent in 2004 alone, to top   $162 billion), along with anxiety about the loss of livelihoods in the   United States.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    After PNTR was approved in 2000, Congress established a bipartisan   commission (the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission) to   assess the economic and security implications of the worsening trade   deficit with China. The first study to be commissioned on domestic   employment impact reported a sharp escalation in production transfers   out of the United States in the six months after the granting of PNTR.   In this short period, more than eighty corporations announced plans to   shift production to China. According to the survey, these were large,   well-known, and highly profitable companies, and the majority of them   were not producing for the China market. Moreover, the pattern of their   investment in China showed a clear move away from low-skill light   manufacturing toward more complex, value-adding industries like   electronics, chemicals, machinery, metals, and financial services. The   lost onshore jobs in these industries were more likely to have been   unionized with higher wage and benefit packages than in labor-intensive   sectors.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Each sizable plant closure, the commission’s report continued, had a   “ripple effect on the wages of every worker in that industry and that   community, through lowering wage demands, restraining union organizing   and bargaining power, reducing the tax base, and reducing or   eliminating hundreds of jobs in the related contracting,   transportation, wholesale trade, professional and service sector   employment in companies and business.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    The authors of study estimated that in the eight years since 1992,   760,000 jobs had been lost due to U.S.-China trade, and predicted a   rapid increase in the current rate (between 70,000 and 100,000 jobs   each year) after China joined the WTO. There was also evidence of a   direct link between corporate investment in China in selected   industries and domestic job loss in those same industries at home. The   conclusion to the study was a sharp indictment of free-trade policies   pursued by Republican and Democratic administrations at the behest of   the business wings of their parties and U.S. multinational investors in   China: “Our research concludes that the U.S. and other countries have   moved ahead with trade policies and global economic integration based   on faulty arguments and incomplete information.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    A follow-up study, covering the period from January through March 2004,   did indeed show a sharp increase in the number of production shifts, as   well as the number of industries involved, and reported that   corporations had established a pattern of simultaneous transfers to   multiple low-wage destinations, both near shore (i.e., Mexico) and   offshore (China). No government body had collected this kind of data   on the domestic impact of overseas trade policies, and the studies   flatly refuted what many economists had argued about the benefits   brought to the United States by the “virtuous circle” of free trade. A   subsequent study, undertaken for the commission by the Economic Policy   Institute, found that the U.S.-China trade deficit was responsible for   the loss of 1.5 million American jobs from 1989 to 2003. According to   this survey, published in 2005, job displacement had doubled since   China joined the WTO, and the fastest growth was occurring in highly   skilled and technologically advanced areas, such as electronics,   computers, and telecommunications. Indeed, China now accounted for the   entire U.S. trade deficit ($32 billion) in “advanced technology   products.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    The commission’s own field hearings, conducted in Columbia, South   Carolina (September 2003), San Diego, California (February 2004),   Akron, Ohio (September 2004), and Seattle, Washington (January 2005),   generated a wealth of testimony from politicians, economists,   manufacturers, employees, and trade unionists about the debilitating   impact on U.S. industries and communities of job and capital flight to   China. The industrial sectors under investigation ranged from textiles,   apparel, and furniture in South Carolina; to steel, auto, and machine   tools in Ohio; high-tech in California; and aerospace and software in   Washington. At each hearing the commission’s findings were sharply   critical of how policies that were introduced to promote free trade   were, in practice, actively encouraging and, in some instances   (involving the Export-Import Bank), funding the transfer overseas of   manufacturing, services, and R\u0026amp;D. According to one commissioner, “We   appear to be mortgaging a broad array of assets, pieces of our   country’s economic future, in a historic stampede for short-term gains   in corporate profitability and consumer pricing.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    In the years following the onset of the recession, estimates of   domestic job loss came thick and fast from many other quarters. By\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    the end of 2003, the number most commonly cited was 3 million jobs lost   since 2000, though all such estimates had to be balanced against how   many jobs the economy would have been expected to create in\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    a normal recovery. According to one such report, over the course of\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    the actual recovery from the recession (from November 2001 to November   2003), 1.3 million jobs in manufacturing alone were lost, along with   272,000 jobs in information services, and 93,000 jobs in   professional\/technical services. These were all in sectors that paid   above-average wages. Job gains in this period were predominantly\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    in lower-wage sectors. By 2004, only 65.9 percent of employable   adults—a sixteen-year low—had jobs or were looking for work. Though the   bulk of the losses were in manufacturing, and were assumed to have   mostly migrated to China, as many as 30 percent were estimated to be in   white-collar, IT-enabled services, flowing abroad primarily to India.   If those displaced found full-time employment, by far the majority were   earning less than at their previous positions. On the whole, these   earnings losses had been increasing since the mid-1990s. Department   of Labor figures that analyzed the job downturn showed a sustained   impact on older, more experienced workers, a result that was consistent   with patterns of outsourcing.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Much of the headline-grabbing data about job loss, and projections of   future flight, came from private consultancies like Forrester Research,   the Gartner Group, Technology Partners International, the Boston   Consulting Group, and the McKinsey Global Institute. Their research   analysts played both sides of the issue. They advised their client   firms to move offshore whatever assets they could, as soon as they   could, while also issuing publicity-conscious reports that were   guaranteed to scare the living daylights out of Americans who still had   jobs in vulnerable sectors. The mainstream press followed the same   schizophrenic path. Alarmist human-interest stories about jobs lost   alternated with reassurances, often directly from the mouths of   business economists, about the beneficial impact of outsourcing “in the   long run.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    The analysts’ most alarming reports offered estimates of unprecedented   losses in white-collar services and skilled IT jobs. A much-cited   Forrester Research report in November 2002 projected that by 2015 the   United States would lose about 3.3 million such jobs. In July 2003, the   Gartner Group estimated that by the end of 2004, one in ten technology   jobs at American IT companies and one in twenty at non-IT companies   would have moved offshore. In addition, only 40 percent of those who   had lost jobs were likely to be retrained and redeployed by the firms   surveyed. Some estimates were even higher. Researchers at the Fisher   Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics predicted that as many as 14   million white-collar service employees, or 11 percent of the nation’s   total jobs, were vulnerable to offshoring.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e    Even after the U.S. economy began to add jobs in the winter of 2003–4,   the estimates continued to rise. The market-research firm Technology   Partners International reported that the second quarter of 2004 saw a   35 percent increase in the value of IT outsourcing contracts over the   previous year, indicating that companies were increasingly committed to   moving their entire IT operations out of house. In March 2004,   McKinsey reported that multinationals had moved $35 billion of   investment offshore in 2002 alone, and forecast that the rate of   offshoring would grow between 30 percent and 40 percent annually at   least through 2008. Outsourcing was no longer an option in services:   it was considered a requirement of business-process jobs in call   centers, loan processing, and back-office accounting; it was becoming   an imperative in a whole range of engineering sectors and services like   financial analysis; and it was marching steadily into the legal and   medical professions. In July 2004, Boston Consulting Group adopted a   more apocalyptic tone in warning firms that they faced extinction if   they did not move offshore: “Companies that wait will be caught in a   vicious cycle of uncompetitive costs, lost business, underutilized   capacity, and the irreversible destruction of value.”","brand":"Vintage","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46302081810661,"sku":"NP9781400095544","price":15.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781400095544.jpg?v=1767726752","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/fast-boat-to-china-isbn-9781400095544","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}