{"product_id":"expression-and-self-knowledge-isbn-9781118908471","title":"Expression and Self-Knowledge","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProvides a timely and original contribution to the debate surrounding privileged self-knowledge\u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eContemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of \u003ci\u003eprivileged self-knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e: the ordinary and effortless ‘first-person’ knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge, \u003c\/i\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called ‘first-person privilege’. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative \u003ci\u003epluralist\u003c\/i\u003e approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind, \u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge:\u003c\/i\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003ePresents an in-depth debate between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOffers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the authors' respective views \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eFeatures two different perspectives on the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in Wittgenstein’s later writings \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eIncludes four jointly written chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the subject.\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge \u003c\/i\u003eis essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePreface and Acknowledgments ix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Privileged Access 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1.1 Privileged Access: What Is the Problem? 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1.2 The Cartesian \"Solution\" 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1.3 Language First or Thought First? 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Skepticism about the Problem 11\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.1 Rejecting the Entire Explanatory Project: Wittgenstein and the \"Default View\" 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2 Disputing the \"Data\" 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.1 Snowdon 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.2 Schwitzgebel 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.3 Carruthers 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2.2.4 Williamson 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part I: Epistemic Approaches 43\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.1 Epistemic Approaches 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.2 Epistemic Access as \"Inward Gaze\": Non-Cartesian Conceptions of Inner Sense 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.2.1 Materialist Introspectionism 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.2.2 Against an Expertise Model of First-Person Privilege 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3 Privileged Access as Outer Gaze: Transparency Views 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3.1 Gareth Evans: Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3.2 Five Limitations of Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.3.3 Alex Byrne: Transparent Inference Rules 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3.4 Christopher Peacocke on Self-Knowledge of Belief 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part II: \"High-Road\" Approaches to Self-Knowledge 73\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.1 Avowals as Expressive of Commitments: Moran and Bilgrami 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.2 Against Commissive Views 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.3 The Uniformity Constraint 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.4 Tyler Burge on Self-Knowledge and Critical Reasoning 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.5 Metaphysical Constitutivism: Resoluteness and Shoemaker 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.6 Conceptual Constitutivism: Wright and Judgment-Dependence 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4.7 Privileged Access: Diagnosis and Desiderata 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Some Initial Thoughts about Expressivist Responses to the Problem 103\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§5.1 Psychological Expressivism: Simple and Radical 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§5.2 Radical Expressivism: Some Serious Misgivings 107\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Neo-Expressivism: Speaking One's Mind 110\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1 Avowals' Distinctive Security and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Brief Overview 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1.1 Basic Self-Knowledge: Some Theses, Some Questions 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1.2 \"Language-first\" Vs. \"Thought-first\" 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.1.3 Avowals' Security: The Explanatory Task 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.2 Expressivism: Simple, Radical, and New 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.2.1 Simple Expressivism 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.2.2 \"Radical\" Expressivism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3 The Neo-Expressivist Account of Avowals' Distinctive Security 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.1 Avowals: Acts, Products, Vehicles 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.2 Neo-Expressivism: Explaining Avowals' Distinctive Security 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.3 Avowals' Security: Immunity to Error 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.4 Dual Immunity to Error and the Expressive Character of Avowals 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§6.3.5 False Avowals, Transparency, and Moore's Paradox 139\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Neo-Expressivism: Knowing One's Mind 144\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.1 Neo-Expressivism and Self-Knowledge 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2 Expression and No-\"How\" Basic Self-Knowledge 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2.1 \"Baseless\" Self-Knowledge: Warrant, Entitlement, and Grounding 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2.2 The Dual Immunity to Error of Avowals and Avowals' Default Entitlement 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.2.3 Avowals as Warranted: Baseless yet Grounded? 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3 Basic Self-Knowledge Without Avowals? 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3.1 The Objection from Unavowed Self-Knowledge 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3.2 Implicit Self-Knowledge and the \"Episodic Constraint\" 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.3.3 Is Avowing Necessary for Possessing Actual Self-Knowledge? 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.4 Neo-Expressivism: \"Grammar,\" Epistemology, and Metaphysics 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.4.1 Neo-Expressivism Vs. Other Views 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§7.4.2 Expression, Self-Knowledge, and the Nature of Mind 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: Epistemological Disjunctivism about Self-Knowledge 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 On Neo-Expressivism: Continuing Doubts 183\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.1 Introduction: Testimony, Expression, and the Program for the Chapter 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.2 Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Immunity to Error through Misascription 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.3 Immediacy and the Phenomenal 193\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.4 Is Self-Knowledge a Kind of Knowledge \"No-‘How'\"? 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.5 Bar-On's Marginalization of Salience 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.6 \"Speaking From\" and Authority 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.7 On Neo-Expressivism's Account of Self-Knowledge 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.8 Neo-Expressivism and Barn Façades 218\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§8.9 Resumé of Objections Raised 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Speaking One's Mind: Authority, Testimony, and Expression 224\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.1 Introduction: Where Are We? 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.2 Avowals' Immunity to Error, Security, and Authority 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.3 Avowals: Testimony, and \"Evidential Force\" 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4 Arguments for the Routine Testimonial Model Debunked 237\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4.1 The Argument from Deliberate Expression 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4.2 The Argument from Intentional Communication 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.4.3 The Argument from Linguistic Application 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.5 \"Evidential Force\" and \"Performance Equivalence\" 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.6 The Insufficiency of RTM 249\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.7 Wright's Knowledge \"How\" and the Immediacy of the Phenomenal 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.8 Avowals' Expressive Character and Speaking One's Mind 255\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§9.9 What about Salience? 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: On Immunities to Error and Skeptical Scenarios 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§1 Expressive Character and Non-Recognitionality 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§2 Non-Recognitionality and IEM\/A 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§3 Non-Recognitionality and Brute Error 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§4 Mental State Façade Country? 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Divide and Conquer: A Prospectus for Progress? 270\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eCrispin Wright\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.1 Some Points about Belief and Judgment 271\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.2 Varieties of Awareness and of Judgment-Dependence 274\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.3 Avowals as Initiative? 279\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.4 Self-Interpreting 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.5 Self-Knowledge of Intentionally Directed Affective States 287\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.6 Common-sense Psychological Explanation and the Trifecta 292\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§10.7 Summary of the Prospectus 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Expression, Mediating Beliefs, and the Judgment-Independence of Mental States 298\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDorit Bar-On\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.1 Expression, Action, and Belief 299\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.1.1 Wright's Argument from Intentional Action Debunked 301\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.1.2 Expressive Acts and Intentional Actions 303\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.2 \"Initiative\" Avowals 306\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.3 (Non-Phenomenal) Attitudinal Avowals 310\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4 Avowals of \"Pure Phenomenal\" States and \"Directed Affective\" States: \"S-awareness\" and \"C-awareness\" 313\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4.1 Pure Phenomenal States (\"PPSs\"): Hypothesis 1 314\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4.2 Directed Affective States (\"DASs\"): Hypothesis 2 315\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.4.3 Difficulties with Hypotheses 1 and 2 317\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.5 Some Remaining Cases 322\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.5.1 \"Negative Avowals\" 323\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.5.2 Self-Ascriptions of Psychological Change 325\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e§11.6 Uniformity and the Trifecta 328\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography 334\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 344\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDORIT BAR-ON\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut and Director of the Expression, Communication, and the Origins of Meaning Research Group which she established in 2010, while at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. She specializes in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and metaethics, and has published on topics such as translation, conceptual relativism, expression and expressivism, and origins of meaning.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCRISPIN WRIGHT\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling. Specializing in epistemology, the philosophies of language and mathematics and the later Wittgenstein's philosophy, he has taught at leading universities including Oxford, Columbia, Princeton, and St. Andrews, where he founded the philosophical research center, \u003ci\u003eArché\u003c\/i\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to debate the perplexing nature of our apparently privileged psychological self-knowledge — the special, first-personal knowledge we are routinely taken to have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, memories, perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, and intentional actions. In \u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright engage in a sustained critical debate concerning the best approach for achieving a philosophical understanding of this type of knowledge. Their debate focuses pre-eminently on the expressivist idea that a satisfactory explanation will need to assign a leading role to our capacity to manifest our mental states in expressive behaviour and speech.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the first part of the book, the authors join to provide a penetrating critical overview of other existing approaches to privileged self-knowledge, before going on to present and debate their own contrasting views of its provenance. The discussion develops and addresses new criticisms of the expressivist approach, engaging broad issues in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, and offering divergent perspectives on the remarks on the issues in Wittgenstein's \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Investigations\u003c\/i\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eExpression and Self-Knowledge\u003c\/i\u003e incorporates cutting-edge research and offers invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy. It is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of language and mind, psychologists with an interest in introspection, and all advanced students working in the area.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989189509349,"sku":"NP9781118908471","price":22.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781118908471.jpg?v=1761783145","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/expression-and-self-knowledge-isbn-9781118908471","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}