{"product_id":"economics-isbn-9780631220022","title":"Economics","description":"This innovative text ushers in a new way of examining basic economic issues. It teaches economics from a different standpoint, based on specialization and the division of labor. Resource allocation for a given level of division of labor is shown as not the only determination for demand and supply. Levels of division of labor are shown as a major factors as well.  \u003cb\u003ePart I: Economic Environment: Introduction:\u003c\/b\u003e. \u003cp\u003e1. What is Economics?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalytical Framework of Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Economics vs. New Classical Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStructure of the Text and Different Ways to Use it.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Preference and Utility Function.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eScientific Approach to Studies of Human Behavior.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreference and Utility Function.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConvex Preference Relation, Quasi-concave Utility Function, Diminishing Marginal Rates of Substitution, and Desire for Diverse Consumption.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOrdinal vs. Cardinal Theory of Utility and Diminishing Marginal Rate of Substitution vs. Diminishing Marginal Utility.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. Production Conditions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Framework vs. New Classical Framework.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Environment of Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Classical Production Environment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous cum Exogenous Comparative Advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Neoclassical Framework:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. Neoclassical Decision Problems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBudget Constraint and Dichotomy Between Pure Consumers and Firms.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Pure Consumer's Constrained Utility Maximization Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Statistics of the Pure Consumer's Utility Maximization Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Pure Consumer's Expenditure Minimization Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecovering Utility Function from a Demand System.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRevealed Preference.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Producer's Decision Problem in a Walrasian Regime.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5. General Equilibrium in the Neoclassical Frameworks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Equilibrium in a Walrasian Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical General Equilibrium Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Statistics of Neoclassical General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWelfare Implications of the Neoclassical General Equilibrium\u003cbr\u003e Equilibrium in Neoclassical Game models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: New Classical Framework:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6. Consumer-producers' Decisions to Choose Optimum Level and Pattern of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe New Classical Framework and Transaction Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfigurations and Corner Solutions in the New Classical Framework.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Optimum Resource Allocation for a Given Level and Pattern of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Optimum Level and Pattern of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical and New Classical Laws of Supply and Elasticity of Substitution.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7. New Classical General Equilibrium and Its Welfare Implications.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical vs. New Classical General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Does the Market Coordinate the Division of Labor and Utilize Network Effects.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInframarginal Comparative Statistics of New Classical General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEfficiency of the Invisible Hand.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8. Trade Pattern and Professional Middlemen.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Professional Middleman Make Money? What Are Determinants for Business Success.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Model with Trading Activities and Heterogeneous Parameters.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecisions to Be a Professional Middleman.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket Structures and Corner Equilibria.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Equilibrium Size of the Network of Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of Professional Middlemen and a Hierarchical Structure of Economic Organization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeterminants of Trade Pattern and Successful Business.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: Institution of the Firm and Pricing through Bargaining and Contracting:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9. Labor Market and Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat is the Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs It Fair to Have Asymmetric Relationship Between Boss and Employees.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStory behind the Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of the Firm from the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Distinction Between ex ante and ex post Production Functions and the New Classical Analysis of Demand and Supply.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomies of Division of Labor, Economies of the Firm, and Coase Theorem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10. Pricing Mechanism Based on Bargaining.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBargaining Game, Strategic Behavior, Opportunistic Behavior.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNash Bargaining Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Transaction Costs caused by Information Asymmetry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternating Offer Bargaining Games.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDynamic Bargaining Game and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Does Competition for a Greater Share of Gains from the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGenerate Endogenous Transaction Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Can Endogenous Transaction Costs be Eliminated by Consideration of Reputation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNon-credible Commitment and Soft Budget Constraint.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11. Endogenous Transaction Costs and Theory of Contract, Ownership, and Residual Rights.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Transaction Costs and Moral Hazard.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Principal-agent Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical General Equilibrium Model of Principal-agent.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Trade off Between Endogenous Transaction Costs caused by Moral Hazard and Monitoring Cost.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Grossman-Hart-Moore Model of Optimal Ownership Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart V: Trade Theory and More General New Classical Models:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12. Emergence of International Trade from Domestic Trade and Emergence of New Products.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Trade Theory and Endogenous Number of Consumer Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Trade Model with Fixed Learning Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow are Demand and Supply Functions Determined by Individuals' Levels of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInframarginal Comparative Statistics of the Optimum Decisions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow is the Level of Division of Labor in Society Determined in the Market.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInframarginal Comparative Statistics of General Equilibrium and Many Concurrent Economic Phenomena.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of International Trade from Domestic Trade.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComovement of Division of Labor and Consumption Variety.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrade off Between Economies of Specialization and Coordination Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Neoclassical Model Endogenizing the Number of Consumption Goods on the Basis of the Trade off Between Economies of Scale and Consumption Variety.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Extended Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny Model with Compatibility between Economies of Scale and Competitive Market.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13. Exogenous and Endogenous Comparative Advantages, Division of Labor, and Trade.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous vs. Exogenous Comparative Advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Ricardian Model with Exogenous Comparative Technological Advantage and Transaction Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalysis of Decisions vs. Analysis of Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomic Development and Trade Policy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Endowment Advantage and Transaction Efficiency.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14. More General New Classical Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheoretical Foundation of New Classical Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA General New Classical Model with ex ante Different Consumer-producers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Existence of General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquilibrium Organism and Efficiency of the Invisible Hand in Coordinating Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Smithian Model with Dual Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrade Pattern and Income Distribution.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VI: Urbanization, Population, the Trade off Between Working and Leisure:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15. Urbanization, Dual Structure Between Urban and Rural Areas, and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy and How Cities Emerge from the Division of Labor?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of Cities and of the Dual Structure Between Urban and Rural Areas.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Geographical Concentration of Transactions Improve Transaction Efficiency.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimultaneous Endogenization of Level of Division of Labor, Location Pattern of Residences, Geographical Pattern of Transactions, and Land Prices.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFujita-Krugman Model of Urbanization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16. The Trade off Between Work and Leisure and Impacts of the Resource Endowment and Population on the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Division of Labor Enlarge the Scope for the Efficient Trade off Between Work and Leisure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Leisure Time and Per capita Consumption of Each Goods Increase as Division of Labor Develops.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Crisis of Resource Shortage Promote Evolution in Division of Labor and Productivity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImplications of High Population Density for Evolution in Division of Labor through Its Effect on Per capita Investment Cost of Infrastructure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VII: Trade off Between Economies of Division of Labor and Coordination Reliability of the Network of Division of Labor:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17. Economics of Property Rights and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncertainties in Transactions and Economics of Property Rights.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrade offs among Economies of Division of Labor, Coordination Reliability, and Benefit of Competition.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenization of Coordination Reliability in Each Transaction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubstitution between Precision in Specifying and Enforcing Property Rights and Competition.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18. Insurance and Risk of Coordination Failure of the Network of Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncertainty and Risk Aversion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Model with Insurance and Endogenous Specialization in the Absence of Moral Hazard.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Division of Labor and Endogenous Transaction Costs caused by Complete Insurance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VIII: Hierarchical Structure of Division of Labor:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19. The Division of Labor in Roundabout Production and Emergence of New Machines and Related New Technology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Classical View vs. Neoclassical View on the Emergence of New Producer Goods and Related New Technology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Model with Endogenous Technical Progress, Endogenous Number of Producer Goods, and Endogenous Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Efficient Number of Producer Goods and Level of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Corner Equilibria in 9 Structures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcurrent Changes in the Level of Division of Labor, Productivity, and Input Diversity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEx post Production Function, Emergence of New Machines, and Endogenous Technical Progress.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in Economic Structure and Topological Properties of Economic Organism.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvolution in the Number of Producer Goods and Economic Development.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20. Industrialization and the Division of Labor in Roundabout Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Features of Industrialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA General Equilibrium Model Endogenizing Production Roundaboutness.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorner Equilibria and Emergence of New Industry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorner Equilibria and Emergence of New Industry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Equilibrium and Industrialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in the Income Shares of the Industrial and Agricultural Sectors.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Number of Possible Structures of Transactions Increases More Than Proportionally as Division of Labor Evolves in Roundabout Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e21. Hierarchical Structure of the Network of Division of Labor and Related Transactions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Theory of Hierarchy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne Way Centralized Hierarchy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Decentralized Hierarchy of Transactions and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfigurations and Market Structures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe General Equilibrium and Its Inframarginal Comparative Statistics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNetwork Hierarchy of Cities and Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart IX: Economic Development and Economic Growth:.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e22. Neoclassical Models of Economic Growth.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical vs. New Classical Growth Model and Exogenous vs. Endogenous Growth Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Ramsey Model and the AK Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eR\u0026amp;D Based Endogenous Growth Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e23. Economic Growth Generated by Endogenous Evolution in Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomies of Specialized Learning by Doing and Endogenous Evolution in Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Dynamic Model with Learning by Doing.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimum Speed of Learning by Doing and Evolution of Endogenous Comparative Advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Evolution of the Extent of the Market, Trade Dependence, Endogenous Comparative Advantages, and Economic Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical Evidences and Rethinking Development Economics and Endogenous Growth Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Relationship between the Control Theory and Calculus of Variations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e24. Concurrent Endogenous Evolution in Division of Labor, in the Number of Goods, and in the Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Can We Simultaneously Endogenize Evolution in Division of Labor and in the Number of Producer Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Dynamic Equilibrium Model with Learning by Doing and an Endogenous Number of Producer Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDynamic Equilibrium Level of Specialization and Input Variety.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcurrent Evolution of Specialization, Variety of Producer Goods, and the Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix. 24.1. Proof of Lemma 24.1.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 24.2. Proof of Proposition 24.1.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 24.3. Proof of Proposition 24.2.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e25. Experiments with Structures of Division of Labor and Evolution in Organization Information Acquired by Society.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Does Organization Knowledge Acquired by Society Determine the Level of Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Static Model with Endogenous Length of Roundabout Production Chain and Endogenous Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInteractions Between Dynamic Decisions and Evolution in Organization Information.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWalrasian Sequential Equilibrium and Concurrent Evolution in Organization Information and Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart X: Macroeconomic Phenomena and Endogenous Size of Network of Division of Labor:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e26. Theory of Capital and Saving.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Theory of Capital.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Classical Theory of Capital and Savings.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapital and Division of Labor in Roundabout Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e27. Money and Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical vs. New Classical Theories of Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Model of Endogenous Monetary Regime.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePossible Structures and Monetary Regimes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e28. New Classical Theory of Business Cycles and Unemployment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRethinking Macroeconomics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong-run Regular Efficient Business Cycles, Cyclical Unemployment, Long-run Economic Growth, and Division of Labor in Producing Durable Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Business Cycles and Unemployment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCyclical vs. non-cyclical Corner Equilibria.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Price Level, Business Cycles, and Unemployment Rate.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of Firms and Fiat Money from the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003eXiaokai Yang\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor in the Department of Economics at Monash University and an affiliated Fellow in the Center for International Development, Harvard University. His research papers have appeared in \u003ci\u003eThe American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy,\u003c\/i\u003e and other refereed journals. He is the author of eight books, and is co-author, with Jeffrey Sachs, of \u003ci\u003eDevelopment Economics\u003c\/i\u003e (Blackwell, 2001).  This innovative text ushers in a new way of examining basic economic issues. It teaches economics from a different standpoint, using a division-of-labor theme to eliminate the need for a dichotomy between microeconomics and macroeconomics. This text shows how resource allocation and levels of division of labor are determining factors for demand and supply. It also illustrates the ways that unemployment and business cycles are seen as features of the network of division of labor. \u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile innovative in content, this book keeps the continuity of mainstream economics through a synthesis of existing and emerging branches of economics. It is an exceptional work that will encourage both creative and critical thinking.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989102477541,"sku":"NP9780631220022","price":78.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780631220022.jpg?v=1761782805","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/economics-isbn-9780631220022","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}