{"product_id":"contemporary-debates-in-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9781405117609","title":"Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eComprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWritten by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eA thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOrganized into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental content, and the nature of consciousness\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes on Contributors ix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJonathan Cohen\u003c\/i\u003e xii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART I MENTAL CONTENT 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eGabriel Segal\u003c\/i\u003e 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSarah Sawyer\u003c\/i\u003e 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAnthony Brueckner\u003c\/i\u003e 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael McKinsey\u003c\/i\u003e 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eGeorges Rey\u003c\/i\u003e 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 Normativism Defended\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eRalph Wedgwood\u003c\/i\u003e 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs There Non-Conceptual Content? 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7 The Revenge of the Given\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJerry Fodor\u003c\/i\u003e 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8 Are There Different Kinds of Content?\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eRichard G. Heck Jr\u003c\/i\u003e 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART II PHYSICALISM 139\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eLouise Antony\u003c\/i\u003e 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003ePaul M. Churchland\u003c\/i\u003e 160\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShould Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11 A Priori Physicalism\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eFrank Jackson\u003c\/i\u003e 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eBrian P. McLaughlin\u003c\/i\u003e 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13 Causation and Mental Causation\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJaegwon Kim\u003c\/i\u003e 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eBarry Loewer\u003c\/i\u003e 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART III THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE 265\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15 Dualist Emergentism\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMartine Nida-Rümelin\u003c\/i\u003e 269\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDavid Braddon-Mitchell\u003c\/i\u003e 287\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael Tye\u003c\/i\u003e 303\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18 A Case for Qualia\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSydney Shoemaker\u003c\/i\u003e 319\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJesse Prinz\u003c\/i\u003e 335\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eChristopher Peacocke\u003c\/i\u003e 358\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 377\u003c\/p\u003e  \"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentious issues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape and identifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that is thoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind.\" (Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e   \u003cp\u003e\"This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy of mind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide an excellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness, intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of the chapters make important contributions to the subject in their own right.\"\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eDavid Chalmers, Australian National University\u003c!--end--\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cb\u003eBrian P. McLaughlin\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, \u003ci\u003eActions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson\u003c\/i\u003e (Blackwell, 1988), editor of \u003ci\u003eDretske and His Critics\u003c\/i\u003e (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming \u003ci\u003eOxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJonathan Cohen\u003c\/b\u003e is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Ten pairs of specially written essays present substantially opposed perspectives on topics including narrow content, externalism and privileged access, normativity, mental causation, consciousness, qualia and emergentism.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, the essays provide an engaging and dynamic presentation of the contemporary contours of philosophy of mind, ideal for undergraduate and graduate course use.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47988981956837,"sku":"NP9781405117609","price":116.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781405117609.jpg?v=1761782304","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/contemporary-debates-in-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9781405117609","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}