{"product_id":"contemporary-debates-in-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9781119637004","title":"Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eA timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field\u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind \u003c\/i\u003eprovides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWritten to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003ePresents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOffers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, and perception\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eProvides a dynamic view of contemporary thinking about fundamental and controversial issues\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eIncludes a thorough introduction providing a comprehensive background to the issues explored in each debate \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003ePart of Wiley-Blackwell’s acclaimed \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy \u003c\/i\u003eseries, \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition\u003c\/i\u003e is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNotes on Contributors ix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction to the Second Edition \u003ci\u003eJonathan Cohen\u003c\/i\u003e xiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction to the First Edition \u003ci\u003eJonathan Cohen\u003c\/i\u003e xviii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I Mental Content 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions \u003ci\u003eGabriel Segal\u003c\/i\u003e 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content \u003ci\u003eSarah Sawyer\u003c\/i\u003e 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 33\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent \u003ci\u003eAnthony Brueckner\u003c\/i\u003e 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent \u003ci\u003eMichael McKinsey\u003c\/i\u003e 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs the Intentional Essentially Normative? 63\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology \u003ci\u003eGeorges Rey\u003c\/i\u003e 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 Normativism Defended \u003ci\u003eRalph Wedgwood\u003c\/i\u003e 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs There Non-conceptual Content? 97\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7 The Revenge of the Given \u003ci\u003eJerry Fodor\u003c\/i\u003e 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? \u003ci\u003eRichard Kimberly Heck\u003c\/i\u003e 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II Physicalism 131\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 133\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism \u003ci\u003eLouise Antony\u003c\/i\u003e 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism \u003ci\u003ePaul M. Churchland\u003c\/i\u003e 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eShould Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 173\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11 A Priori Physicalism \u003ci\u003eFrank Jackson\u003c\/i\u003e 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism \u003ci\u003eBrian P. McLaughlin\u003c\/i\u003e 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 213\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13 Causation and Mental Causation \u003ci\u003eJaegwon Kim\u003c\/i\u003e 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough \u003ci\u003eBarry Loewer\u003c\/i\u003e 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 253\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15 Dualist Emergentism Martine \u003ci\u003eNida-Rümelin\u003c\/i\u003e 255\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness \u003ci\u003eDavid Braddon-Mitchell\u003c\/i\u003e 272\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAre Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 285\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak \u003ci\u003eMichael Tye\u003c\/i\u003e 287\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18 A Case for Qualia \u003ci\u003eSydney Shoemaker\u003c\/i\u003e 303\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 317\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual \u003ci\u003eJesse Prinz\u003c\/i\u003e 319\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) \u003ci\u003eChristopher Peacocke\u003c\/i\u003e 341\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eShould Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 361\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e21 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science \u003ci\u003eCraig French and Ian Phillips\u003c\/i\u003e 363\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e22 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science \u003ci\u003eAdam Pautz\u003c\/i\u003e 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e23 Capacities-First Philosophy \u003ci\u003eSusanna Schellenberg\u003c\/i\u003e 406\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 431\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e24 Perceiving Particulars \u003ci\u003eChristopher S. Hill\u003c\/i\u003e 433\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e25 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories \u003ci\u003eHeather Logue\u003c\/i\u003e 449\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHow Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 467\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e26 The Perception–Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? \u003ci\u003eE. J. Green\u003c\/i\u003e 469\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e27 Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File \u003ci\u003eNed Block\u003c\/i\u003e 494\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIs Pain a Natural Kind? 517\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e28 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain \u003ci\u003eJennifer Corns\u003c\/i\u003e 519\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e29 Pain Is a Natural Kind \u003ci\u003eMatthew Fulkerson\u003c\/i\u003e 535\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDo We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 551\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e30 Against Imagination \u003ci\u003eBence Nanay\u003c\/i\u003e 553\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e31 Why We Need Imagination \u003ci\u003eAmy Kind\u003c\/i\u003e 570\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 588\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBRIAN P. M\u003csmall\u003eC\u003c\/small\u003eLAUGHLIN\u003c\/b\u003e is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in fields including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He co-authored (with Vann McGee) \u003ci\u003eTerrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth \u003c\/i\u003e(forthcoming, Oxford)\u003ci\u003e.\u003c\/i\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJONATHAN COHEN\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of \u003ci\u003eThe Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.\u003c\/i\u003e   \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in the discipline. More than 30 influential thinkers go head-to-head as they debate a series of contested questions about mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOpening with a thorough introduction to the issues explored in each debate, this timely volume offers a dynamic presentation of the conceptual background, contentious issues, and current thinking in philosophy of mind. The lively and engaging essays showcase divergent perspectives on consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, perception, and more. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis newly expanded second edition features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWritten for non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition\u003c\/i\u003e is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, scholars, and general readers with an interest in the subject.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47988981694693,"sku":"NP9781119637004","price":39.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781119637004.jpg?v=1761782305","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/products\/contemporary-debates-in-philosophy-of-mind-isbn-9781119637004","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}