A Political Theory of Academic Freedom

What academic freedom means—and why it matters—when liberal democracy itself is no longer a given.

A Political Theory of Academic Freedom advances a bold thesis about academic freedom: it’s imperiled not simply by its authoritarian adversaries, Adam Sitze argues, but also by its advocates’ own diminished capacity to say what it’s for.

Recovering what he calls the “triadic principle”—the idea that the university has historically defined itself in relation to church and state—Sitze argues that the renewal of academic freedom today begins with a recognition of its kinship with its two counter-majoritarian constitutional cousins: judicial independence and religious liberty. The result is a novel theory of academic freedom: just as judicial independence safeguards the administration of justice and religious liberty safeguards the exercise of faith, academic freedom safeguards the pursuit of truth.

Through discussions of academic tenure, religious pluralism, and university autonomy, Sitze challenges the idea that academic freedom grants scholars special privileges. Instead, he contends, it’s a constitutional principle rooted in the same logic that guarantees judges their tenure and protects religious communities from state interference: the common good is best served when those who seek justice, faith, and truth remain free to follow those goods wherever they may lead.