{"product_id":"wittgenstein-isbn-9781405102421","title":"Wittgenstein","description":"In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies. \u003cbr\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli style=\"list-style: none\"\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eA compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality.\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOffers an important and original reading of Wittgenstein’s key texts.\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eBased upon a unifying theme in Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophies.\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e  \u003cp\u003ePreface vii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbbreviations ix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Wittgenstein’s Master Argument 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 Introduction 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 Animating Signs 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 The Platonist Source of Grammar 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.4 The Cartesian Source of Grammar 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.5 The Community Source of Grammar 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.6 The Negative and Positive Phases – First Statement 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Realism, Language and Self 21\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Introduction 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 Logic Takes Care of Itself 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 The Need for Grammar 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 The Metaphysical Options 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 The Self 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 This is How We Play the Game 48\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Introduction 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Two Kinds of ‘Hidden’ 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Meaning and Use 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Use and Self 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 Use and Augustine’s Mistake 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Is ‘Slab!’ a Shortening of ‘Bring Me a Slab!’or is the Latter a Lengthening of the Former? 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.7 This and Similar Things are called ‘Games’ 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.8 Spontaneity in Particular Circumstances 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Rules and Other People 93\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Introduction 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 The Structure of an Argument 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 The Bipartite Account of Meaning 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 Practice 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5 What You See\/Hear is not Normless 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6 Seeing the Similarity in Particular Cases 119\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Putting Your Self in the Picture 124\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Introduction 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 The Standard Treatments 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 What’s Special about Sensations? 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 The Need for Calibration 133\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Calibration in Subjectivity 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 Agreement in Forms of Life 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.7 ‘Inner’ Life Out There 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.8 Now I Understand 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Seeing Things Aright 152\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Introduction 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Two Uses of the Word ‘See’ 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 See What I Mean 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Paying Attention 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.5 The Place of Judgement 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.6 What Comes Natural 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 182\u003c\/p\u003e  \"The largely moribund state of current Wittgenstein scholarship ought to be radically changed for the better by this conspicuously interesting and insightful book.\" \u003ci\u003eAlan Thomas, Philosophical Books\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"Michael Luntley offers a striking interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, one aimed at displaying and defending Wittgenstein's positive contribution in the later work. The result is a theory of the conditions for the possibility of intentionality, a theory that identifies the subject as agent in the world with that condition. Powerfully argued, this interesting and original treatment of Wittgenstein's later philosophy raises a challenge for all of us who find a social dimension in Wittgenstein's account of intentionality and normativity.\" \u003ci\u003eMeredith Williams, The Johns Hopkins University\u003c\/i\u003e \u003c!--end--\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"Luntley provides an intriguing discussion of Wittgenstein's early work, arbitrating judiciously between realist readings that emphasise the place of reference in its account of language, and non-realist readings that emphasise inference.\" \u003ci\u003eDaniel Whiting,\u003c\/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eUniversity\u003c\/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eof\u003c\/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eReading\u003c\/i\u003e\u003ci\u003e, Philosophical Investigations 28\/4, October 2005\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003eMichael Luntley\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His previous publications include \u003ci\u003eLanguage, Logic and Experience\u003c\/i\u003e (1988), \u003ci\u003eReason, Truth and Self\u003c\/i\u003e (1995) and \u003ci\u003eContemporary Philosophy of Thought\u003c\/i\u003e (Blackwell, 1999).  In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies. \u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003e Rejecting readings which see a complete break between the Philosophical Investigations and the Tractatus, as well as views of Wittgenstein’s mature work which either lament or champion his anti-philosophical ‘quietism’, Luntley argues that Wittgenstein’s abiding concern was to show that the conditions for the possibility of intentionality consist not in a body of theoretical knowledge, but in perceptual knowledge, in our active capacity to ‘see things aright’.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990500524261,"sku":"NP9781405102421","price":51.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781405102421.jpg?v=1761788077","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/wittgenstein-isbn-9781405102421","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}