{"product_id":"this-is-ethics-isbn-9781118479858","title":"This Is Ethics","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThis is Ethics\u003c\/i\u003e presents an accessible and engaging introduction to a variety of issues relating to contemporary moral philosophy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eCovers a wide range of topics which are actively debated in contemporary moral philosophy\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAddresses the nature of happiness, well-being, and the meaning of life, the role of moral principles in moral thinking, moral motivation, and moral responsibility\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eCovers timely ethical issues such as population growth and climate change\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eOffers additional resources at \u003ca href=\"https:\/\/thisisphilosoph.wordpress.com\/ethics\/\"\u003ehttps:\/\/thisisphilosoph.wordpress.com\/ethics\/\u003c\/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"https:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/thisisphilosophy\/thisisethicsanintroduction\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/a\u003e\n\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eFeatures extensive annotated bibliographies, summaries, and study questions for further investigation\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWritten in an accessible, jargon-free manner using  helpful illustrative examples\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePreface xv\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eAcknowledgments xix\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart One What’s in Our Interests? 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Pleasure 3\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThree Questions about Pleasure 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Is Pleasure? 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe sensation view 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe attitude view 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe desire view 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhysiology of pleasure* 10\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValue of Pleasure 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedonism 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArgument in favor of hedonism 1: Discernible differences 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArgument in favor of hedonism 2: Motivation 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigher pleasures 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePluralism about prudential value 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNozick’s experience machine argument 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo responses to Nozick 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePessimism about the value of pleasure* 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life 25\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedonism, Again 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Trivial pleasures 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: The role of happiness in deliberation 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSatisfaction Theories 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDesire satisfaction theories of well-being 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to desire satisfaction theories 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Which desires count? 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Expensive tastes 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLife satisfaction theories of happiness 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn objection to life satisfaction theories 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjective List Theories 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to the objective list theories 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Capability Approach* 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHappiness and the Meaning of Life 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotional state theory of happiness* 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe question of the meaning of life 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSusan Wolf ’s fitting fulfillment theory 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 43\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart Two Normative Ethics 51\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Egoism and Altruism 53\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferent Forms of Egoism and Altruism 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFeldman’s objection to ethical egoism 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Arguments for Ethical Egoism 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “ought implies can” argument 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe practical reasons argument 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Objections to Psychological Egoism 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe everyday objection 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolutionary objection 60\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoore’s Argument against Ethical Egoism* 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of Moore’s argument* 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGauthier’s Contractarianism 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paradox of social cooperation 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContractarianism as a solution 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe compliance problem 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason one: Risk of exclusion 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason two: Risk of revealing your true motives 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems with Gauthier’s Theory 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Scope of moral concern 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Deception 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 3: Acting for right reasons 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 79\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConsequentialism 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeliberation procedure vs. criterion of rightness 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirect vs. indirect forms of consequentialism 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism vs. richer conceptions of value 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eActual vs. expected value 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaximizing vs. satisficing 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMill’s Argument for Utilitarianism 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problems with Mill’s argument 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSaving Mill’s argument 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKantian Ethics 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe good will 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe universalization test 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDuties, right and wrong 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy do the right thing? 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason 1: Exceptions 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReason 2: Freedom 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples and Convergence 97\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples to utilitarianism 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples to the Categorical Imperative 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilitarian and consequentialist responses to the counterexamples* 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKantian responses to the counterexamples* 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConvergence* 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Intuitionism, Particularism, and Virtue Ethics 113\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRoss’s Objection to Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntuitionism in Normative Ethics 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrima facie duties 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow do you know? 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrima facie duties and actual duties 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticularism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrima facie duties and holism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHolism and particularism* 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowing what is right* 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirtue Ethics 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFlourishing 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirtue acquisition 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eActing virtuously 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRight and wrong acts 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Objections to Virtue Ethics 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCircularity 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImproving yourself 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirtue ethics and moral sensibility 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 133\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart Three Metaethics 139\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Divine Commands 141\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubjectivism 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of subjectivism 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to subjectivism 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Experience 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Infallibility 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 3: Disagreement 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRelativism 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of relativism 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of relativism 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 1: Disagreement 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 2: Moral fallibility 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 3: Tolerance 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 4: Multiculturalism 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivine Command Theory 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivine command theory and moral words 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivine command theory and moral properties 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of divine command theory 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Euthyphro Dilemma* 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat is right explains what God commands* 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGod’s commands explain what is right* 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 1: God’s goodness 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 2: Anything could be wrong 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblem 3: The reasons for God’s commands 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 159\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Naturalism and the Open Question Argument 167\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoral Realism 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNaturalism vs. non-naturalism 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePros and cons of non-naturalism 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Open Question Argument 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 1: Words and properties 172\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 2: Moral words and moral properties 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 3: The open question test 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 4: Moral words and open questions 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStage 5: Putting the argument together 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to the Open Question Argument 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 1: Begging the question 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 2: Making know-how explicit 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 3: The sense\/reference distinction 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntuitionism in Metaethics* 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem of knowledge* 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFoundationalism to the rescue* 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisconceptions and objections* 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisconception 1: The role of experience and emotions 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisconception 2: What seems self-evident to you 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: People who understand but don’t agree 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Dogmatism 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Moral Motivation and Expressivism 195\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Argument from Motivation 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Humean Theory of Motivation 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirections of fit 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of beliefs and desires 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoral Judgment Internalism 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVery Strong Internalism 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWeakness of will 201\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrong Internalism 201\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterexamples to Strong Internalism 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAmoralists 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBad people 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA case of depression 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpressivism 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe core claims of expressivism 206\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClaim 1: Moral judgments 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClaim 2: Moral language 208\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClaim 3: Moral properties 210\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to two common objections 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Truths and facts 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: Mere attitudes 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Frege–Geach Problem 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmbedded claims 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValid inferences* 213\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe negation problem* 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart Four Ethical Questions 223\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Moral Responsibility 225\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Is Moral Responsibility? 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCausal responsibility and attributability 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe agency condition 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFreedom and real selves 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Freedom Principle: A Threat for Moral Responsibility 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe consequence argument 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem of luck 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGalen Strawson’s argument against moral responsibility 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Frankfurt Cases 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections and responses* 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 1: Flicker of freedom 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjection 2: A dilemma 235\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 1: Mele and Robb 236\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse 2: Dennett 236\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Deep Attributability Principle 237\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrankfurt’s higher-order desire theory 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Real Self 239\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWatson’s theory of the real self 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe time-slice problem 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponsiveness to reasons 242\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 244\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Population Growth and Climate Change 249\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Non-Identity Effect 251\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Repugnant Conclusion 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe average utility principle 256\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCritical-level utilitarianism* 257\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable value view and intuitions* 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Change and Personal Obligations 260\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCarbon off setting 261\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Change and Governments 262\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe discount rate* 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe social action problem 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Change and Uncertainty 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaximizing expected value* 268\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Questions 269\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 271\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnline Resources 272\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlossary of Terms 275\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 293\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJussi Suikkanen\u003c\/b\u003e is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham, UK. He has contributed numerous articles on metaethics and normative ethics in journals such as \u003ci\u003eThe Philosophical Quarterly\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eOxford Studies in Metaethics\u003c\/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ePacific Philosophical Quarterly\u003c\/i\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003eWhat makes you happy? Should you always do what is best for you, or what is best for everyone? What is the meaning of life—and how are we supposed to think about it? Should sacrifices be made to help future generations? \u003ci\u003eThis is Ethics\u003c\/i\u003e presents an accessible and engaging introduction to a variety of issues relating to contemporary moral philosophy. It reveals the intimate connection between timeless philosophical problems about right and wrong and offers timely and thought-provoking insights on everyday practical concerns. Initial chapters focus on how philosophy can help us to think more clearly about how we can live happy and meaningful lives. Subsequent chapters address general ethical theories about what is right and wrong, followed by metaethical questions such as whether morality is relative and how we are motivated to do the right thing. A final series of chapters discuss moral responsibility, population growth, and climate change. Lively and engaging, \u003ci\u003eThis is Ethics\u003c\/i\u003e provides a solid foundation for making informed ethical decisions in today’s increasingly complex world.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e“Jussi Suikkanen is one of the world’s best young moral philosophers, and in this clear and wide-ranging text, he provides an excellent introduction to the philosophical investigation of morality, spanning applied ethics, normative ethics and metaethics. Highly recommended for students and teachers of philosophical ethics.”\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlexander Miller, University of Otago\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e \"Suikkanen's ethics textbook is one of the very best — and most useful — in existence. The book insightfully discusses the main positions in contemporary normative theory, as well as the leading metaethical theories.\u003cbr\u003e The weblinks and glossary will prove invaluable to students.\"\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e Brad Hooker, University of Reading\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990387933413,"sku":"NP9781118479858","price":30.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781118479858.jpg?v=1761787623","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/this-is-ethics-isbn-9781118479858","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}