{"product_id":"the-senate-intelligence-committee-report-on-torture-isbn-9781612194851","title":"The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture","description":"\u003cb\u003e“The most extensive review of U.S. intelligence-gathering tactics in generations.” \u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003e—Los Angeles Times\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eThis  is the Executive Summary of the “Committee Study of the Central  Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program,” a U.S.  Senate investigation -- a.k.a., The Torture Report.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBased on more  than six million pages of classified CIA documents, this report details  the establishment of a covert CIA program to secretly detain and  interrogate suspected terrorists.  Among other matters, the report  describes the evolution of the CIA program, the use of the CIA’s  so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques,\" and how the CIA  misrepresented the program to the White House, the Department of  Justice, Congress, and the American people.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOver five years in  the making, it is presented here in a meticulously formatted and highly readable edition, exactly as redacted and released by the  United States government on December 9, 2014.\u003cp\u003e\u003cu\u003eContents\u003c\/u\u003e\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e Findings and Conclusions\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e Executive Summary\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e I. Background on the Committee Study\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals   \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e C. Interrogation in Country ██ and the January 2003 Guidelines\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e D. The Detention and Interrogation of ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e E. Tensions with Country ██ Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e H. The Growth of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About “Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming” CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers as “Ongoing Problem”\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies    \u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques as Having “Saved Lives,” “Thwarted Plots,” and “Captured Terrorists”\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a “High Volume of Critical Intelligence”    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations—The Use of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques “Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots” and “Capture Additional Terrorists”    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided as Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified    \u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who Then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to “Put Out Our Story” to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA     \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice \u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah    \u003cbr\u003e B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA’s Representations to the OLC\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation Process, the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Confinement, Withdraws Draft Opinion on the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques After the U.S. Supreme Court Case of \u003ci\u003eHamdan v. Rumsfeld\u003c\/i\u003e \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress    \u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual Detained by the CIA \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No Reference to Coercive Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After the Use of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman’s Request for More Information    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials    \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Record \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA’s Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged on September 6, 2006\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14–1 for Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program  \u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002–2008\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee—April 12, 2007\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e Notes\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cb\u003eA \u003ci\u003eBoston Globe \u003c\/i\u003eBestseller\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“This massive chronicle of malfeasance concerns not only the efficacy of certain interrogation techniques, not only the perennial clash between spies and their civilian overseers, but something far more profound: the nation’s political soul.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eHarper's\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“A high-quality version of the 500-some page report.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003eJohn Hockenberry, The Takeaway\/WNYC\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e“The most extensive review of U.S. intelligence-gathering tactics in generations.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Los Angeles Times\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“The Senate intelligence committee’s report is a  landmark in accountability . . . It is one of the most shocking  documents ever produced by any modern democracy about its own abuses of  its own highest principles.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Guardian\u003c\/i\u003e (UK)\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e “Exhaustive . . . Haunting”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eWashington Post\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“The small independent publisher Melville House has done it, turning 'a    five-hundred-and-twenty-eight-page PDF with the slanted margins and    blurred resolution of a Xerox made by a myopic high-school Latin    teacher' into a more readable text.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Andrew Sullivan, The Dish\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Releasing this report is an important step to restoring our values and showing the world that we are a just society.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003eSenate Intelligence Committee chair Senator Dianne Feinstein\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e“A portrait of depravity that is hard to comprehend and even harder to stomach.” \u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003e—New York Times\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Details the use of gruesome torture techniques used by the CIA and . . . concludes that the agency misled both the White House and Congress.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eChristian Science Monitor\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e“I believe the American people have a right—indeed, a responsibility—to know what was done in their name; how these practices did or did not serve our interests; and how they comported with our most important values. I commend Chairman Feinstein and her staff for their diligence in seeking a truthful accounting of policies I hope we will never resort to again.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Senator John McCain\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Melville House is betting that there's enough interest in the Torture Report that people will want to have it in book form.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Rachel Maddow, MSNBC\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e“The  book business in 2015 is pretty much a crapshoot, but it's hard to  believe that even the canniest insider could've predicted the sales  success that indie publisher Melville House has had with the \u003ci\u003eSenate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture\u003c\/i\u003e.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Vulture\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e“A  tiny Brooklyn publishing house printed a 50,000-copy run of the Senate  torture report—and it’s flying off shelves faster than \u003ci\u003eThe Goldfinch\u003c\/i\u003e.\"\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Entertainment Weekly\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Given the swift and harsh condemnations of CIA interrogation tactics, the \u003ci\u003eTorture Report\u003c\/i\u003e is sure to top nonfiction charts for months to come — mark my words.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Bustle\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“If you were wondering why it's important that indie presses exist, HERE, THIS IS WHY.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003ePortland Mercury\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“A watershed moment in contemporary publishing.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003eFlavorwire\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“It’s quite the important and powerful idea: that simply repackaging material can make it more accessible and can perhaps make it last—truly last—in the way we need to know and remember it.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003ePloughshares\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“[Melville House is] continuing the critical work of publishing important documents.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eShelf Awareness\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Small but conscientious Melville [House]…is rushing to get the report out promptly.\"\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eLibrary Journal\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eThe United States \u003cb\u003eSenate Select Committee on Intelligence \u003c\/b\u003ewas created by the U.S. Senate in  1976 as a bipartisan committee responsible for overseeing federal intelligence activities.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIt is the committee's responsibility to “oversee and make continuing studies of the  intelligence activities and  programs of the United States Government,”  to “submit to the Senate appropriate  proposals for legislation and  report to the Senate concerning such intelligence  activities and  programs,” and to “provide vigilant legislative oversight over  the  intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such  activities  are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the  United States.”\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFOREWORD\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eOn April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted\u003cbr\u003eto send the Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary\u003cbr\u003eof its final Study on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program\u003cbr\u003eto the President for declassification and subsequent public\u003cbr\u003erelease.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis action marked the culmination of a monumental effort\u003cbr\u003ethat officially began with the Committee’s decision to initiate the\u003cbr\u003eStudy in March 2009, but which had its roots in an investigation into\u003cbr\u003ethe CIA’s destruction of videotapes of CIA detainee interrogations\u003cbr\u003ethat began in December 2007.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages,\u003cbr\u003eremains classified but is now an official Senate report. The full report\u003cbr\u003ehas been provided to the White House, the CIA, the Department of\u003cbr\u003eJustice, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and\u003cbr\u003ethe Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the hopes that\u003cbr\u003eit will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the\u003cbr\u003emanagement of other covert action programs.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAs the Chairman of the Committee since 2009, I write to offer\u003cbr\u003esome additional views, context, and history.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in\u003cbr\u003eJanuary 2001. I remember testimony that summer from George Tenet,\u003cbr\u003ethe Director of Central Intelligence, that warned of a possible\u003cbr\u003emajor terrorist event against the United States, but without specifics\u003cbr\u003eon the time, location, or method of attack. On September 11, 2001, the\u003cbr\u003eworld learned the answers to those questions that had consumed the\u003cbr\u003eCIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.*\u003cbr\u003e* For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11, 2001, see the Final\u003cbr\u003eReport of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9\/11\u003cbr\u003eCommission) and Office of the Inspector General Report on Accountability With Respect\u003cbr\u003eto the 9\/11 Attacks.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the\u003cbr\u003etelevision footage of innocent men and women jumping out of the\u003cbr\u003eWorld Trade Center towers to escape the fire. The images, and\u003cbr\u003ethe sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below, will remain\u003cbr\u003ewith me for the rest of my life.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIt is against that backdrop—the largest attack against the\u003cbr\u003eAmerican homeland in our history—that the events described in this\u003cbr\u003ereport were undertaken.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNearly thirteen years later, the Executive Summary and Findings\u003cbr\u003eand Conclusions of this report are being released. They are highly\u003cbr\u003ecritical of the CIA’s actions, and rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy\u003cbr\u003eto forget the context in which the program began—not that the context\u003cbr\u003eshould serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for the future.\u003cbr\u003eIt is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how\u003cbr\u003eimmediate the threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks,\u003cbr\u003epowdered anthrax was sent to various news organizations and to two\u003cbr\u003eU.S. Senators. The American public was shocked by news of new\u003cbr\u003eterrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat level of the\u003cbr\u003eHomeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks\u003cbr\u003eagainst the nation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the\u003cbr\u003enation and to the CIA workforce from the attacks of September 11,\u003cbr\u003e2001. I can understand the CIA’s impulse to consider the use of every\u003cbr\u003epossible tool to gather intelligence and remove terrorists from the\u003cbr\u003ebattlefield,* and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and the public\u003cbr\u003eto do whatever it could to prevent another attack.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence\u003cbr\u003eagencies to act quickly in response to threats and world events.\u003cbr\u003eNevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist\u003cbr\u003eplots do not justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken\u003cbr\u003eby individuals or organizations in the name of national security. The\u003cbr\u003emajor lesson of this report is that regardless of the pressures and the\u003cbr\u003eneed to act, the Intelligence Community’s actions must always reflect\u003cbr\u003ewho we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is\u003cbr\u003eprecisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be\u003cbr\u003eguided by the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal\u003cbr\u003eand external review.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eInstead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided\u003cbr\u003eto initiate a program of indefinite secret detention and the use\u003cbr\u003e* It is worth repeating that covert action authorities approved by the President in September 2001 did not provide any authorization or contemplate coercive interrogations.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis Committee Study documents the abuses and countless\u003cbr\u003emistakes made between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive\u003cbr\u003eSummary of the Study provides a significant amount of new information,\u003cbr\u003ebased on CIA and other documents, to what has already\u003cbr\u003ebeen made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations, as well\u003cbr\u003eas non-governmental organizations and the press.\u003cbr\u003eThe Committee’s full Study is more than ten times the length\u003cbr\u003eof the Executive Summary and includes comprehensive and excruciating\u003cbr\u003edetail. The Study describes the history of the CIA’s Detention\u003cbr\u003eand Interrogation Program from its inception to its termination, including\u003cbr\u003ea review of each of the 119 known individuals who were held\u003cbr\u003ein CIA custody.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe full Committee Study also provides substantially more detail\u003cbr\u003ethan what is included in the Executive Summary on the CIA’s\u003cbr\u003ejustification and defense of its interrogation program on the basis\u003cbr\u003ethat it was necessary and critical to the disruption of specific terrorist\u003cbr\u003eplots and the capture of specific terrorists. While the Executive\u003cbr\u003eSummary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies\u003cbr\u003eof each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study\u003cbr\u003eis far more extensive.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI chose not to seek declassification of the full Committee Study\u003cbr\u003eat this time. I believe that the Executive Summary includes enough\u003cbr\u003einformation to adequately describe the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation\u003cbr\u003eProgram, and the Committee’s Findings and Conclusions\u003cbr\u003ecover the entirety of the program. Seeking declassification of\u003cbr\u003ethe more than six thousand page report would have significantly\u003cbr\u003edelayed the release of the Executive Summary. Decisions will be\u003cbr\u003emade later on the declassification and release of the full 6,700-page\u003cbr\u003eStudy.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn 2009, when this effort began, I stated (in a press release coauthored\u003cbr\u003ewith the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit\u003cbr\u003eBond) that “the purpose is to review the program and to shape detention\u003cbr\u003eand interrogation policies in the future.” The review is now\u003cbr\u003edone. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of these\u003cbr\u003eFindings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy\u003cbr\u003ewill never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of\u003cbr\u003ecoercive interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to the attacks of\u003cbr\u003eSeptember 2001, the CIA itself determined from its own experience\u003cbr\u003ewith coercive interrogations, that such techniques “do not produce\u003cbr\u003ex intelligence,” “will probably result in false answers,” and had historically\u003cbr\u003eproven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions were ignored. We\u003cbr\u003ecannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past mistakes\u003cbr\u003eto be repeated.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003ePresident Obama signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009\u003cbr\u003eto prohibit the CIA from holding detainees other than on a “shortterm,\u003cbr\u003etransitory basis” and to limit interrogation techniques to those\u003cbr\u003eincluded in the Army Field Manual. However, these limitations are\u003cbr\u003enot part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a future president\u003cbr\u003ewith the stroke of a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation.\u003cbr\u003eEven so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have\u003cbr\u003eprevented many of the abuses and mistakes made during this program.\u003cbr\u003eWhile the Office of Legal Counsel found otherwise between\u003cbr\u003e2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion that, under any common\u003cbr\u003emeaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also believe\u003cbr\u003ethat the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and\u003cbr\u003eunauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel,\u003cbr\u003einhuman, and degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming\u003cbr\u003eand incontrovertible.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhile the Committee did not make specific recommendations,\u003cbr\u003eseveral emerge from the Committee’s review. The CIA, in its June\u003cbr\u003e2013 response to the Committee’s Study from December 2012, has\u003cbr\u003ealso already made and begun to implement its own recommendations.\u003cbr\u003eI intend to work with Senate colleagues to produce recommendations\u003cbr\u003eand to solicit views from the readers of the Committee Study.\u003cbr\u003eI would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process\u003cbr\u003eof this study.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAs noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of\u003cbr\u003eReference for the Study in March 2009 and began requesting information\u003cbr\u003efrom the CIA and other federal departments. The Committee,\u003cbr\u003ethrough its staff, had already reviewed in 2008 thousands\u003cbr\u003eof CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees\u003cbr\u003eAbu Zubaydah and ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations\u003cbr\u003ewere the subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA\u003cbr\u003ein 2005.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department\u003cbr\u003eof Justice investigation, opened by Attorney General Michael\u003cbr\u003eMukasey, into the destruction of the videotapes and expanded by Attorney\u003cbr\u003eGeneral Holder in August 2009. In particular, CIA employees\u003cbr\u003eand contractors who would otherwise have been interviewed by the\u003cbr\u003eCommittee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and therefore\u003cbr\u003ethe CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee.\u003cbr\u003eThis constraint lasted until the Committee’s research and\u003cbr\u003edocumentary review were completed and the Committee Study had\u003cbr\u003elargely been finalized.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFurthermore, given the volume and internal nature of relevant\u003cbr\u003eCIA documents, the CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an\u003cbr\u003earrangement where our staff would review documents and conduct\u003cbr\u003eresearch at a CIA-leased facility rather than at the\u003cbr\u003eCommittee’s offices on Capitol Hill.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFrom early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staff\u003cbr\u003ereviewed the more than six million pages of CIA materials, to include\u003cbr\u003eoperational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and\u003cbr\u003eemails, briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts, and other\u003cbr\u003erecords. Draft sections of the Study were prepared and distributed to\u003cbr\u003ethe full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this\u003cbr\u003eprocess continued through to the Committee’s vote to approve the\u003cbr\u003efull Committee Study on December 13, 2012.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe breadth of documentary material on which the Study relied\u003cbr\u003eand which the Committee Study cites is unprecedented. While\u003cbr\u003ethe Committee did not interview CIA officials in the context of\u003cbr\u003ethe Committee Study, it had access to and drew from the interviews\u003cbr\u003eof numerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA’s Inspector\u003cbr\u003eGeneral and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at\u003cbr\u003ethe heart of the Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the\u003cbr\u003eCommittee.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFollowing the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was\u003cbr\u003esent to the President and appropriate parts of the Executive Branch\u003cbr\u003efor comments by February 15, 2013. The CIA responded in late June\u003cbr\u003e2013 with extensive comments on the Findings and Conclusions,\u003cbr\u003ebased in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the program.\u003cbr\u003eAt my direction, the Committee staff met with CIA representatives\u003cbr\u003ein order to fully understand the CIA’s comments, and then\u003cbr\u003eincorporated suggested edits or comments as appropriate.\u003cbr\u003eThe Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive\u003cbr\u003eSummary and Findings and Conclusions, as updated is now final\u003cbr\u003eand represents the official views of the Committee. This and future\u003cbr\u003eAdministrations should use this Study to guide future programs, correct\u003cbr\u003epast mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations to policymakers,\u003cbr\u003eand ensure coercive interrogation practices are not used by\u003cbr\u003eour government again.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFinally, I want to recognize the members of the staff who have\u003cbr\u003eendured years of long hours poring through the difficult details of\u003cbr\u003eone of the lowest points in our nation’s history. They have produced\u003cbr\u003ethe most significant and comprehensive oversight report in the Committee’s\u003cbr\u003ehistory, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate, and their\u003cbr\u003econtributions should be recognized and praised.\u003cbr\u003eDaniel Jones has managed and led the Committee’s review\u003cbr\u003eeffort from its inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to\u003cbr\u003ethis effort, has personally written thousands of its pages, and has\u003cbr\u003ebeen integrally involved in every Study decision. Evan Gottesman,\u003cbr\u003eChad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played integral roles in the\u003cbr\u003eCommittee Study and have spent considerable years researching and\u003cbr\u003edrafting specific sections of the Committee Study.\u003cbr\u003eOther Committee staff members have also assisted in the review\u003cbr\u003eand provided valuable contributions at the direction of our\u003cbr\u003eCommittee Members. They include, among others, Jennifer Barrett,\u003cbr\u003eNick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella, Eric Chapman, John\u003cbr\u003eDickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete Johnson,\u003cbr\u003eMichael Noblet, Michael Pevzner, Tommy Ross, Caroline Tess,\u003cbr\u003eand James Wolfe. The Committee’s Staff Director throughout the\u003cbr\u003ereview, David Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and\u003cbr\u003eguiding the Committee through this entire process. Without the expertise,\u003cbr\u003epatience, and work ethic of our able staff, our Members would\u003cbr\u003enot have been able to complete this most important work.\u003cbr\u003eDianne Feinstein\u003cbr\u003eChairman\u003cbr\u003eSenate Select Committee on Intelligence\u003cbr\u003eCOMMIT TEE S TUDY O F THE C ENTRAL\u003cbr\u003eINTELLIGENCE AGENCY ’ S DETENTION\u003cbr\u003eAND INTERROGATION PROGRAM\u003cbr\u003eSENATE S ELECT\u003cbr\u003eCOMMIT TEE\u003cbr\u003eON INTELLIGENCE\u003cbr\u003eFINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS\u003cbr\u003eApproved: December 13, 2012\u003cbr\u003eUpdated for Release: April 3, 2014\u003cbr\u003eDeclassification Revisions: December 3, 2014\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Melville House","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46300394193125,"sku":"NP9781612194851","price":17.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781612194851.jpg?v=1767741445","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/the-senate-intelligence-committee-report-on-torture-isbn-9781612194851","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}