{"product_id":"the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-mortgage-and-credit-markets-isbn-9780470477243","title":"The Rise and Fall of the US Mortgage and Credit Markets","description":"\u003cp\u003eThe mortgage meltdown: what went wrong and how do we fix it?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOwning a home can bestow a sense of security and independence. But today, in a cruel twist, many Americans now regard their homes as a source of worry and dashed expectations. How did everything go haywire? And what can we do about it now?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eThe Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets,\u003c\/i\u003e renowned finance expert James Barth offers a comprehensive examination of the mortgage meltdown. Together with a team of economists at the Milken Institute, he explores the shock waves that have rippled through the entire financial sector and the real economy. Deploying an incredibly detailed and extensive set of data, the book offers in-depth analysis of the mortgage meltdown and the resulting worldwide financial crisis. This authoritative volume explores what went wrong in every critical area, including securitization, loan origination practices, regulation and supervision, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, leverage and accounting practices, and of course, the rating agencies. The authors explain the steps the government has taken to address the crisis thus far, arguing that we have yet to address the larger issues.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eOffers a comprehensive examination of the mortgage market meltdown and its reverberations throughout the financial sector and the real economy\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eExplores several important issues that policymakers must address in any future reshaping of financial market regulations\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAddresses how we can begin to move forward and prevent similar crises from shaking the foundations of our financial system\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets\u003c\/i\u003e analyzes the factors that should drive reform and explores the issues that policymakers must confront in any future reshaping of financial market regulations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Illustrations xi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Tables xxv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments xxxiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 1 Overleveraged, from Main Street to Wall Street 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 2 Overview of the Housing and Mortgage Markets 9\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHousing Units, Mortgage Debt, and Household Wealth 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTypes of Home Mortgages 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Housing Finance Models: Originate-to-Hold vs. Originate-to-Distribute 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow Interest Rates Contribute to Credit Boom and Record Homeownership Rates 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMortgage Originations, Home Prices, and Sales Skyrocket 36\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 3 Buildup and Meltdown of the Mortgage and Credit Markets 41\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Is a Subprime Mortgage and Who Is a Subprime Borrower? 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubprime Lending Grows Rapidly and New Products Gain Acceptance 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubprime Mortgages Enable More Widespread Homeownership 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecuritization Facilitates the Funding of Subprime Mortgages 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Housing Bubble Reaches the Breaking Point 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Collapse Begins 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 4 When Will the Crisis End? 101\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Is the Damage Scorecard to Date? 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Pain Spreads throughout the Financial Sector and Beyond 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhen Will We Hit Bottom? 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 5 What Went Wrong \u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003e? 143\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith Origination Practices and New Financial Products? 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith Securitization and Rating Agencies? 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith Leverage and Accounting Practices? 160\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? 172\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith Tax Benefits for Homeownership? 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith Regulation and Supervision? 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e. . . \u003c\/i\u003ewith the Greed Factor? 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAssessing the Role of Various Factors to Explain Foreclosures 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 6 So Far, Only Piecemeal Fixes 219\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Landscape Shifts for Lenders 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Federal Reserve Intervenes to Provide Liquidity and Higher-Quality Collateral 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCongress and the White House Take Steps to Contain the Damage 249\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe FDIC Takes Steps to Instill Greater Confidence in Depository Institutions 269\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Government’s Actions Drive up the Deficit 274\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 7 Where Should We Go from Here? 287\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKey Factors That Should Drive Reform 289\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIssues for Policymakers 293\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcluding Thoughts 319\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 321\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndnotes 445\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlossary 451\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 479\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbout the Milken Institute and General Disclaimer 507\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbout the Authors 509\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 513\u003c\/p\u003e   \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJAMES R. BARTH\u003c\/b\u003e is a Senior Fellow at the Milken Institute and the Lowder Eminent Scholar in Finance at Auburn University. His research focuses on financial institutions and capital markets, both domestic and global, with special emphasis on regulatory issues. Barth was an appointee of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush as chief economist of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and later of the Office of Thrift Supervision. He has authored more than 200 articles in professional journals and has written and edited several books, including \u003ci\u003eThe Great Savings and Loan Debacle\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance\u003c\/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eRethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern\u003c\/i\u003e. Barth has been quoted in publications ranging from the \u003ci\u003eNew York Times\u003c\/i\u003e to the \u003ci\u003eWall Street Journal\u003c\/i\u003e and has appeared on broadcast programs including \u003ci\u003eThe McNeil\/Lehrer NewsHour\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eGood Morning America\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eMoneyline\u003c\/i\u003e, and CNBC's \u003ci\u003eClosing Bell\u003c\/i\u003e.    \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor decades, the home mortgage market successfully extended credit to more and more families, enabling millions of Americans to own their own homes. In recent years, however, it became ever more apparent that credit was expanding too rapidly and too many market participants were becoming dangerously leveraged. What began as healthy growth in mortgage originations and housing starts swiftly became a home price bubble. When home prices did come plunging back to earth, the damage quickly spread far beyond the scope of the actual mortgage defaults and foreclosures. Even solid companies with no connection to the real estate and finance sectors were affected as credit markets seized up. How did this happen—and what can we do about it now? \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eThe Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets,\u003c\/i\u003e James Barth, with the assistance of his colleagues at the Milken Institute, analyzes in detail the mortgage meltdown and the resulting worldwide financial crisis. He explains how Main Street and Wall Street alike took on too much risk and too much debt in their quest for gains, setting the crisis in motion. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn straightforward terms, he tells what subprime mortgages are, who subprime borrowers are, and how securitization—packaging loans into complex securities and selling them in the secondary market—expanded the mortgage market, but also opened the door to a shifting of risk. Barth also assesses what went wrong in every other critical area, including loan origination practices, regulation and supervision, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, leverage and accounting practices, and, of course, the rating agencies. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe author explains the steps the government has taken thus far and suggests that those actions have been piecemeal—and largely reactive, rather than proactive. He argues that we have yet to address the bigger and more long-term issue of how to reform the structure of regulation and supervision to prevent a similar crisis from happening again. Barth also offers his own thoughts on the factors that should drive reform and explores several important issues that policymakers must address in any future reshaping of financial market regulations.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990331343077,"sku":"NP9780470477243","price":60.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470477243.jpg?v=1761787388","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-mortgage-and-credit-markets-isbn-9780470477243","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}