{"product_id":"the-prince-isbn-9780553212785","title":"The Prince","description":"Here is the world's most famous master plan for seizing and holding power.  Astonishing in its candor \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c\/i\u003e even today remains a disturbingly realistic and prophetic work on what it takes to be a prince . . . a king . . . a president.  When, in 1512, Machiavelli was removed from his post in his beloved Florence, he resolved to set down a treatise on leadership that was practical, not idealistic.  In \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c\/i\u003e he envisioned would be unencumbered by ordinary ethical and moral values; his prince would be man and beast, fox and lion.  Today, this small sixteenth-century masterpiece has become essential reading for every student of government, and is the ultimate book on power politics.“[Machiavelli] can still engage our attention with remarkable immediacy, and this cannot be explained solely by the appeal of his ironic observations on human behaviour. Perhaps the most important thing is the way he can compel us to reflect on our own priorities and the reasoning behind them; it is this intrusion into our own defenses that makes reading him an intriguing experience. As a scientific exponent of the political art Machiavelli may have had few followers; it is as a provocative rhetorician that he has had his real impact on history.”  –from the Introduction by Dominic Baker-Smith\u003cb\u003ePeter Constantine\u003c\/b\u003e, winner of the PEN Translation Prize and a National Translation Award, has earned wide acclaim for his translation of \u003ci\u003eThe Undiscovered Chekhov\u003c\/i\u003e and of the complete works of Isaac Babel, as well as for his Modern Library translations, which include \u003ci\u003eThe Essential Writings of Machiavelli, \u003c\/i\u003eGogol’s \u003ci\u003eTaras Bulba,\u003c\/i\u003e Voltaire’s \u003ci\u003eCandide,\u003c\/i\u003e and Tolstoy’s \u003ci\u003eThe Cossacks\u003c\/i\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e  \u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003eAlbert Russell Ascoli \u003c\/b\u003eis Gladys Arata Terrill Distinguished Professor of Italian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and was awarded the Rome Prize for study at the American Academy in Rome.Chapter 1\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Prince\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Kinds of Principalities and the Means by Which They Are Acquired\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAll states and all dominions that hold and have held power over men  have been and are either republics or principalities. Principalities  are either hereditary, in which case the family of the ruler has long  been in power, or they are new. The new ones are either entirely new,  as Milan was to Francesco Sforza,1 or they are, so to speak, members  added to the hereditary possession of the prince who acquires them,  as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain.2 The dominions thus  acquired have been accustomed either to live under a prince or to be  free; and they are acquired either by fortune or by ability.3\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eChapter 2\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHereditary Principalities\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI shall exclude any discussion of republics, having discussed them at  length elsewhere.1 I shall consider principalities alone and,  following the indicated plan, shall discuss how they may be governed  and preserved.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI say, then, that hereditary states accustomed to the family of their  ruler are more easily kept than new ones, because it is sufficient if  the prince does not abandon the methods of his ancestors and proves  adaptable when unforeseen events occur. In this way a prince of  ordinary capability will always keep his state unless he is deprived  of it by an exceptional or exceedingly powerful force. If he is once  deprived of it, however, he will nevertheless regain it at the  slightest adversity that the conqueror encounters.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn Italy we have the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able to  sustain the assaults of the Venetians in 1484 and those of Pope  Julius in 1510 for no other reason than that he had been long  established in that dominion.2 The hereditary prince has less cause  and less need to offend than a new one. Hence it follows that he is  more readily loved. If unusual vices do not make him hated, it is  reasonable to suppose that his subjects will feel a natural affection  for him. Furthermore, one change always leaves dentations upon which  to build another,3 but in a long and continuous rule the recollection  of changes and of their causes tends to be forgotten.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eChapter 3\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMixed Principalities\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn a new principality, however, there are difficulties. To begin  with, if it is not entirely new, but an added member so to speak (the  old and the new together being called a mixed principality), changes  of authority come about from a natural hazard which exists in all new  principalities: that is, from the willingness of men to change one  lord for another, believing thus to improve their lot. For this  reason they take arms against their ruler; but in this they deceive  themselves, for experience will prove that they will actually have  worsened their lot. This in turn will be the result of another common  and natural necessity, for by the presence of his soldiers and by  those other innumerable offenses that follow upon conquest, the new  ruler must inevitably distress those over whom he establishes his  rule. So it happens that he makes enemies of all those whom he has  injured in occupying the new principality, and yet he cannot keep the  friendship of those who have set him up; for he cannot satisfy them  as they had expected and, since he is obligated to them, he cannot  use strong medicine against them. Even if one has a very strong army,  he will always need the good will of the inhabitants when entering a  province. For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, quickly  occupied Milan and quickly lost it. Ludovico's own forces were enough  to take it from him the first time because those people who had  opened the gates to the King, finding themselves deceived in their  opinions and in their expectations, could not endure the irritations inflicted by their new ruler.1\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIt is indeed true, however, that after one has conquered a rebellious  territory a second time, it will be less easily lost, for the ruler,  using the rebellion as his excuse, will be the less reluctant to  establish himself solidly by punishing defectors, uncovering  suspects, and strengthening his position wherever it is weak.  Therefore, to have the King of France lose Milan the first time, a  Duke Ludovico threatening the borders was sufficient; to lose it a  second time, the opposition of the whole world, together with the  defeat and the expulsion of the King's army from Italy, was needed.2  This came about for the above-mentioned reasons. Nevertheless, he did  lose it both the first and second time. The general reasons for the  first loss have been treated. It remains to speak of the second, and  to consider what remedies the King of France had and did not use, and  what remedies another in the same situation could have availed  himself of in order to keep such a conquest.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eI say, therefore, that these conquered states which are joined to a  state already long held by the conqueror may either belong to the  same region and have the same language, or they may not. When they  do, it is very easy to keep them, especially if they are not  accustomed to freedom. To hold them securely, it is enough to have  extinguished the line of princes who ruled them formerly and to  maintain the pre-existent conditions. When there is no distinction of  custom, men will live quietly, as happened in Burgundy, Brittany,  Gascony, and Normandy, which have long been a part of France. Though  there is some distinction of language among them, the customs are  nevertheless alike, and the people can easily get along with each  other. Anyone who conquers such territories and wishes to hold on to  them must do two things: the first is to extinguish the ruling  family; the second is to alter neither the laws nor the taxes. Thus  in a short time they will become one with the conqueror's original  possessions.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBut when one acquires states in a province where the language, the  customs, and the laws are different, there are difficulties; here  both fortune and great ability are needed to keep them. One of the  best and most ready solutions is for the new ruler to reside there.  This expedient would make the new possession safer and more lasting,  as it did for the Turk in the case of Greece.3 Despite all other  measures taken to hold that state, he would have been unable to keep  it unless he had gone there to live. Being on the spot, one may  observe disorders as they arise and quell them quickly; not being  present, one will learn about them only when they have assumed such  proportions that they cannot be quelled. Moreover, the new province  is not despoiled by the ruler's officials. The subjects are satisfied  that they have ready recourse to the prince. Consequently, they have  more reason to love him if they choose to be good, and more reason to  fear him if they choose to behave otherwise. A foreign enemy,  thinking of attacking such a state, would be likely to show more  respect, for a resident prince could only be defeated with great  difficulty.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe next best solution is to send colonies to one or two places which  could serve to shackle that state. It is necessary either to do this  or to keep a large force of cavalry and infantry there. Colonies do  not cost much. Without expense, or with little, they may be sent out  and maintained, and they will harm only those whose fields and houses  they appropriate for their own use-a minimal part of the population.  Those who are harmed, being dispersed and poor, can cause no trouble.  All the rest, on the one hand, will be left unharmed (and hence  should remain quiet); and, on the other hand, will be fearful lest by  some wrongdoing the same that happened to those who were deprived  should happen to them. To conclude, such colonies are not costly, are  very loyal, and do little harm; those who are hurt, as already  indicated, cannot annoy because they are poor and dispersed. At this  point one may note that men must be either pampered or annihilated.  They avenge light offenses; they cannot avenge severe ones; hence,  the harm one does to a man must be such as to obviate any fear of  revenge. In any case, by maintaining soldiers instead of colonies, a  prince will spend much more, since he will have to use the entire  revenue of the state to protect it. Thus the acquisition will become  a loss. This method is also more harmful because it annoys the entire  state as the troops are moved from one lodging to another. Everyone  will feel the disruption and become an enemy-an enemy who can be  troublesome because, though beaten, he is ever at home. From every  point of view, therefore, this kind of protection is just as useless  as colonies are useful.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMoreover, a prince who occupies a province which, as previously  described, differs from his own, must become the leader and defender  of the less powerful neighboring states and seek to weaken the more  powerful among them. He must also be on guard lest by any chance some  foreigner equal to him in power should enter them. Such an event  always comes about through the help of discontented inhabitants who  willingly admit a foreign power either through excessive ambition or  through fear, as was the case with the Etolians, who admitted the  Romans into Greece.4 So it was also with every province that the  Romans entered: they were brought in by the inhabitants themselves.  It is in the nature of things that as soon as a powerful foreigner  enters a province, all the weaker powers in it will become his allies  through envy of those who have been ruling over them. This is so true  that, with respect to minor powers, the invader need do nothing at  all to win them, for they will all willingly merge in the state which  he has acquired. He has but to see to it that they do not gain too  much strength and authority. With his own forces and their support,  he can very early reduce the stronger powers and then become arbiter  of the entire province. Any ruler who does not succeed in doing this  will soon lose what he has won, or so long as he does manage to hold  it, will have a host of difficulties and annoyances. The Romans very  carefully observed this policy in the provinces they conquered. They  sent out colonies; they protected the lesser powers without  increasing their strength; they reduced those who were strong, and  they did not permit powerful foreigners to gain a footing. Their  conduct in Greece will suffice as an example: there the Romans  protected the Achaeans and the Etolians, reduced the kingdom of the  Macedonians, and expelled Antiochus. Nor did they ever reward the  Achaeans and the Etolians by allowing them to enlarge their states,  or allow Philip to persuade them to become his friends until they had  weakened him.5 Nor did the power of Antiochus ever induce them to  permit his keeping any part of Greece. In this instance the Romans  did everything that wise princes should do who must have regard not  only for existing disorders but for future ones as well, avoiding  them with all possible diligence. By making provision in advance,  princes may easily avoid such difficulties; but if they wait until  they are near at hand, the medicine will not be in time, for by then  the malady will have become incurable. In this matter the situation  is the same as physicians report concerning hectic fever: in the  beginning the disease is easy to cure but hard to diagnose; with the  passage of time, having gone unrecognized and unmedicated, it becomes  easy to diagnose but hard to cure. So it is with a state: when ills  are recognized in advance (and only the prudent can do this), they  are quickly cured. But when, having gone unrecognized, they are  allowed to increase until everyone may recognize them, then remedy is  no longer possible.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThus the Romans, foreseeing difficulties, always remedied them. And  they never allowed them to persist in order to avoid a war, for they  knew that wars cannot be avoided and can only be deferred to the  advantage of others. Therefore they chose to go to war against Philip  and Antiochus in Greece in order to avoid having to deal with them in  Italy. For the time, they could have avoided both dangers, but they  chose not to. Nor were they ever pleased with the sort of advice that  is always on the lips of our present-day wise men: that is, to enjoy  the benefits of time.6 Instead, they were pleased to use their  strength and prudence. For time bears all things out and may produce  good as readily as evil, evil as readily as good.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBut let us turn to France and consider whether she has done any of  the things mentioned; and I will speak not of Charles but of Louis.7  Since Louis held possessions in Italy for a longer time, it is easier  to examine his proceedings; and you will see that he did the contrary  of what one should do in order to hold power in a state different  from one's own.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eKing Louis was brought into Italy through the ambitions of the  Venetians, who hoped by his coming to gain half of Lombardy.8 I do  not mean to censure King Louis's decision in this matter, for having  chosen to set foot in Italy and having no friends here-indeed, all  gates being closed against him because of King Charles's conduct9-he  was compelled to accept what friendship he could. This wise plan  would have succeeded if he had not made errors in other matters.  Having taken Lombardy, he quickly regained all the influence which  Charles had lost: Genoa submitted, the Florentines became his allies;  the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, the  Countess of Forlì, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and  Piombino, the Lucchese, Pisans, and Sienese-all came forward to offer  their friendship. The Venetians could then wonder at the rashness of  their decision. To acquire a couple of towns in Lombardy, they had  made King Louis master over a third of Italy.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e--  PrePress Department Westchester Book 7 Finance Drive Danbury CT 06810 Voice: 1-203-791-0080 Fax:   1-203-791-9286 e-mail: prepress@wbrt.com","brand":"Bantam Classics","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46304837927141,"sku":"NP9780553212785","price":6.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780553212785.jpg?v=1767741067","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/the-prince-isbn-9780553212785","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}