{"product_id":"the-crisis-of-crowding-isbn-9781118250020","title":"The Crisis of Crowding","description":"\u003cb\u003eA rare analytical look at the financial crisis using simple analysis\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cp\u003eThe economic crisis that began in 2008 revealed the numerous problems in our financial system, from the way mortgage loans were produced to the way Wall Street banks leveraged themselves. Curiously enough, however, most of the reasons for the banking collapse are very similar to the reasons that Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the largest hedge fund to date, collapsed in 1998. \u003ci\u003eThe Crisis of Crowding\u003c\/i\u003e looks at LTCM in greater detail, with new information, for a more accurate perspective, examining how the subsequent hedge funds started by Meriwether and former partners were destroyed again by the lapse of judgement in allowing Lehman Brothers to fail.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCovering the lessons that were ignored during LTCM's collapse but eventually connected to the financial crisis of 2008, the book presents a series of lessons for hedge funds and financial markets, including touching upon the circle of greed from homeowners to real estate agents to politicians to Wall Street.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eGuides the reader through the real story of Long-Term Capital Management with accurate descriptions, previously unpublished data, and interviews\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eDescribes the lessons that hedge funds, as well as the market, should have learned from LTCM's collapse\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eExplores how the financial crisis and LTCM are a global phenomena rooted in failures to account for risk in crowded spaces with leverage\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eExplains why quantitative finance is essential for every financial institution from risk management to valuation modeling to algorithmic trading\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eIs filled with simple quantitative analysis about the financial crisis, from the Quant Crisis of 2007 to the failure of Lehman Brothers to the Flash Crash of 2010\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eA unique blend of storytelling and sound quantitative analysis, \u003ci\u003eThe Crisis of Crowding\u003c\/i\u003e is one of the first books to offer an analytical look at the financial crisis rather than just an account of what happened. Also included are a layman's guide to the Dodd-Frank rules and what it means for the future, as well as an evaluation of the Fed's reaction to the crisis, QE1, QE2, and QE3.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003eForeword xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface xix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCast of Characters xxiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 1 Introduction 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART I: THE 1998 LTCM CRISIS 5\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 2 Meriwether’s MagicMoney Tree 7\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Birth of Bond Arbitrage 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Dream Team 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Success 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 3 Risk Management 21\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe General Idea 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeverage 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeasuring Risk 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe ρ 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomics 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCopycats, Puppies, and Counterparties 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLTCM’s Actual Risk Management Practices 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiversification 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOperations 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Raw Evidence 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 4 The Trades 37\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Short U.S. Swap Trade 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe European Cross-Country Swap Trade\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e(Short UK and Long Europe) 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong U.S. Mortgage Securities Hedged 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Box Spread in Japan 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Italian Swap Spread 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFixed-Income Volatility Trades 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe On-the-Run and Off-the-Run Trade 54\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShort Longer-Term Equity Index Volatility 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk Arbitrage Trades 60\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquity Relative-Value Trades 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmerging Market Trades 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Trades 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Portfolio of Trades 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 5 The Collapse 71\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Summer 1998 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Salomon Shutdown 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Russian Default 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Phone Calls 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Meriwether Letter 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuffett’s Hostile Alaskan Offer 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Consortium Bailout 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eToo Big To Fail 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Did It Happen? 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 5.1 The John Meriwether Letter 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 5.2 The Warren Buffett Letter 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 6 The Fate of LTCM Investors 95\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 7 General Lessons from the Collapse 101\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterconnected Crowds 101\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVaR 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeverage 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClearinghouses 108\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompensation 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat’s Size Got to Do with It? 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContingency Capital 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Fed Is a Coordinator of Last Resort 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterparty Due Diligence 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpread the Love 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuantitative Theory Did Not Cause the LTCM Collapse 116\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eD´ej`a Vu 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART II: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 121\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 8 The Quant Crisis 123\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Was the Quant Crisis? 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Erratic Behavior of Quant Factors 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStandard Factors 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuantitative Portfolio Factors 133\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCauses of the Quant Crisis 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Shed Show 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 9 The Bear Stearns Collapse 141\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief History of the Bear 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShadow Banking 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWindow Dressing 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRepo Power 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Unexpected Hibernation 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Polar Spring 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 10 Money for Nothing and Fannie and Freddie for Free 155\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Basic Business 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhere’s the Risk? 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCDO and CDO2 159\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Gigantic Hedge Fund 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBig-Time Profits 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe U.S. Housing Bubble 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Circle of Greed 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReal Estate Agents and Mortgage Lender Tricks 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHome Owners 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProfits and Politicians 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Media and Regulators 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGrade Inflation 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCommercial Banks 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFreddie and Fannie’s Foreclosure 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Save Freddie and Fannie? 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDid Anyone Know? 188\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 11 The Lehman Bankruptcy 191\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Wall Street Club 191\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Was Lehman Next? 193\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBusiness Exposure 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Chronology of the Gorilla’s Death 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDouble Down in Real Estate 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMildly Seeking Capital 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Final Days 213\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Classic Run on the Bank 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Let Lehman Fail? 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Was at Fault? 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehman Brothers 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Counterparties 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Government and Market Structure 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Legal Opinion on the Lehman Bankruptcy 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Would Have Been Next? 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Spoils of Having Friends in High Places 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 12 The Absurdity of Imbalance 233\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Long-Dated Swap Imbalance 236\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Repo Imbalance 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe 228 Wasted Resources and the Global Run on Banks 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 13 Asleep in Basel 245\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasel I 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Concept 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problems 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasel II 248\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Concept 248\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problems 249\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasel and the Financial Crisis 250\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 14 The LTCM Spinoffs 253\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJWM Partners LLC 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlatinum Grove Asset Management 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Others 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Copycat Funds 262\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 15 The End of LTCM’s Legacy 265\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Bear and the Gorilla Attack 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNovember Rain 271\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Went Wrong? 274\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket Insanity 275\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBigger Shocks 281\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket Imbalance 282\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeleveraging 285\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCoup de Grace 286\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 16 New and Old Lessons from the Financial Crisis 289\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterconnectedness and Crowds 289\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeverage 291\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSystemic Risk and Too Big to Fail 293\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDerivatives: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 294\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConflicts of Interest 297\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicy Lessons 298\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk Management 301\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCounterparty Interaction 302\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedge Funds 304\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Importance of Arbitrage 306\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART III: THE AFTERMATH 309\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 17 The Flash Crash 311\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackground 312\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFlash Crash Theories 313\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFat Finger Theory 314\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh-Frequency Trader Theory 314\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJittery Markets 315\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Real Cause of the Flash Crash 315\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Waddell-Reed Trade 316\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Computer Glitch 317\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGone Fishing 319\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Aftermath 321\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 18 Getting Greeked 323\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMembers Only 324\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Conditions 324\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Benefits of Membership 328\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Drawbacks of Membership 328\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Club’s Early Years 330\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGetting Greeked 332\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGreek Choices 333\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRemain a Club Member and Order Finances 333\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDitch the Club and Keep the Debt 334\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDitch the Club and Ditch the Debt 334\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe IMF and Euro Packages 335\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe EU’s Future 335\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAPTER 19 The Fairy-Tale Decade 339\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eI Hate Wall Street 340\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Real Costs of the Financial Crisis 344\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Avatar’s Life Force 346\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomic System Choices 349\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Crisis of Crowds 350\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Wine Arbitrage 351\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAPPENDIXES: 353\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX A  The Mathematics of LTCM’s Risk-Management Framework 355\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA General Framework 355\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Numerical Example 357\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeasuring Risk 357\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX B The Mechanics of the Swap Spread Trade 361\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Long Swap Spread Trade 361\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Short Swap Spread Trade 362\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX C Derivation of Approximate Swap Spread Returns 365\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX D Methodology to Compute Zero-Coupon Daily Returns 369\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX E Methodology to Compute Swap Spread Returns from Zero-Coupon Returns 373\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX F The Mechanics of the On-the-Run and Off-the-Run Trade 375\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX G The Correlations between LTCM Strategies Before and During the Crisis 377\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX H The Basics of CreativeMortgage Accounting 379\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX I The Business of an Investment Bank 381\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInvestment Banking 381\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapital Markets 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquities 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquity Cash 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquity Derivatives 383\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquity Finance 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArbitrage (Proprietary Trading) 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFixed Income 385\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment and Agency Obligations 385\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate Debt Securities and Loans 385\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh-Yield Securities and Leveraged Bank Loans 386\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoney Market Products 386\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMortgage- and Asset-Backed Securities 386\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMunicipal and Tax-Exempt Securities 387\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancing 387\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFixed-Income Derivatives 388\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehman Brothers Bank 388\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign Exchange 388\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlobal Distribution (Global Sales) 389\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResearch 389\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClient Services 389\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrivate Client Services (Private Wealth Management) 389\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrivate Equity 390\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTechnology 390\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate and Risk Management 390\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary 391\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPENDIX J The Calculation of the BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio 393\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe General Calculation 393\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Example 395\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 397\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlossary 443\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography 451\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbout the Author 465\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 467\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, CFA, PHD,\u003c\/b\u003e is a Professor of Finance in the School of Management at the University of San Francisco and Director of Quantitative Strategies for United States Commodity Funds, with over fifteen years of experience in the financial industry specializing in portfolio management, quantitative equity management, and derivatives. Prior to this, he was creative advisor to Index IQ. He was also Director of Research at Rydex Global Advisors, where he co-developed the S\u0026amp;P 500 equal-weight index and helped launch the Rydex ETF program. He helped build an internet brokerage firm, FOLIO\u003ci\u003efn\u003c\/i\u003e, designing its innovative basket trading and portfolio management platform. He also worked at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Schroders. He is the coauthor of \u003ci\u003eQuantitative Equity Portfolio Management\u003c\/i\u003e. He received a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a BA from the University of California at Berkeley.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003eThe financial markets are dangerously over-crowded. Investors follow popular trends or latch onto profitable new strategies with herd-like single-mindedness, and an increasingly globalized and interconnected world has only exacerbated the problem. \u003ci\u003eThe Crisis of Crowding: Quant Copycats, Ugly Models, and the New Crash Normal\u003c\/i\u003e explores how the dramatic overcrowding we’ve seen over the last quarter century has yielded terrifying results, including the 2008 financial crisis that continues to reverberate around the globe.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The story of overcrowding as we know it now began in 1998, with the failure of the profoundly successful Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund. Exploring how this seemingly isolated event signaled a much larger problem within the financial industry, \u003ci\u003eThe Crisis of Crowding\u003c\/i\u003e traces the story of LTCM and the subsequent hedge funds started by its founder, John Meriwether and his former partners, through the events of 2008, and up to the ongoing European debt crisis.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePart narrative, part quantitative analysis, the book is filled with firsthand recollections from those on the front lines of the crowding crisis, including several LTCM partners. Featuring insights from key banking and hedge fund authorities, it brings the events that led to the current crisis vividly to life, showing how and why the market has evolved in new and dangerous ways, and what can be done about it.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMuch that should have been obvious after the fall of LTCM could have prevented the crises that followed. Instead, the problems of overcrowding went unchecked so that when the next economic disaster hit, increased leverage, policy mishaps, and an even more crowded trading space resulted in a far bigger collapse. We failed to learn our lesson the first time around, but that doesn’t mean it’s too late. Future economic crises are all but guaranteed, and \u003ci\u003eThe Crisis of Crowding\u003c\/i\u003e reveals exactly what we need to know so we’re prepared for next time.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Bloomberg Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47990201123045,"sku":"NP9781118250020","price":40.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781118250020.jpg?v=1761786882","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/the-crisis-of-crowding-isbn-9781118250020","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}