{"product_id":"the-arabisraeli-wars-isbn-9781400079636","title":"The Arab-Israeli Wars","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Arab-Israeli Wars\u003c\/i\u003e is former President of Israel Chaim Herzog’s acclaimed history of Israel’s fight since 1947 to preserve her existence against repeated attacks. Revised after his death by friend and colleague General Shomo Gazit, this new edition also covers the events of the past twenty years, including the pullout from Lebanon, both \u003ci\u003eintifadas\u003c\/i\u003e, the first Gulf War, the Oslo Process, and beyond. Riveting, informative, and comprehensive, this authoritative account tells the story of Israel’s struggle to survive but gives a clear picture of the people and politics that continue to shape the destiny of this crucial region.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003ci\u003ePreface\u003cbr\u003eIntroduction to Revised Edition\u003cbr\u003ePrologue\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK I.  THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1948–1949\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1. Confrontation in Palestine\u003cbr\u003eIsraeli forces and dispositions\u003cbr\u003eArab forces and dispositions\u003cbr\u003eMilitary confrontation\u003cbr\u003eThe struggle intensifies\u003cbr\u003eOperation ‘Nachshon’\u003cbr\u003ePlan D\u003cbr\u003eThe battle for Jerusalem\u003cbr\u003eThe Mandate ends\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2.  To the First Truce 15 May to 11 June 1948\u003cbr\u003eThe northern front\u003cbr\u003eThe central front\u003cbr\u003eThe battle for Jerusalem\u003cbr\u003eThe southern front\u003cbr\u003eThe first truce\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e3.  To the Second Truce, 18 July to 15 October 1948\u003cbr\u003eThe northern front\u003cbr\u003eThe central front and Jeruslaem\u003cbr\u003eThe southern front\u003cbr\u003eThe second truce\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e4.  The Decision\u003cbr\u003eDecision in Galilee\u003cbr\u003eThe southern front:  the Faluja pocket\u003cbr\u003eThe southern front:  The ‘Horev’ offensive\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSummary: The Israeli Victory\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK II.  THE SINAI CAMPAIGN OF 1956\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNew régimes:  the rise of Nasser’s Egypt\u003cbr\u003eThe arena of war and the opposing forces\u003cbr\u003eThe war — the Mitla battle\u003cbr\u003eThe battle of Abu Agelia\u003cbr\u003eThe battle for Rafah\u003cbr\u003eThe battle for the Gaza Strip\u003cbr\u003eThe battle for the Straits of Tiran\u003cbr\u003eThe air and naval war\u003cbr\u003eBritain, France and the United Nations\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK III.  THE SIX DAY WAR, 1967\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003ePrologue\u003cbr\u003eThe Confrontation\u003cbr\u003eThe pre-emptive strike\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1.  The Second Sinai Campaign\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2.  The War with Jordan\u003cbr\u003eThe encirclement of Jerusalem\u003cbr\u003eThe West Bank:  Samaria\u003cbr\u003eThe fall of Jerusalem\u003cbr\u003eTo the Jordan Valley\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e3. The Golan Heights\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSummary:  A Vindication\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK IV.  THE WAR OF ATTRITION\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e‘Defensive rehabilitation’'\u003cbr\u003e‘Offensive defence’ and the Bar-Lev Line\u003cbr\u003eJordan and the PLO\u003cbr\u003eThe ‘liberation’ phase\u003cbr\u003e‘Flying artillery’\u003cbr\u003eSoviet and SAMs\u003cbr\u003eThe cease-fire\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSummary\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK V.  THE YOM KIPPUR WAR\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003ePrologue\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e1.  The Southern Front\u003cbr\u003eThe deception\u003cbr\u003eThe onslaught\u003cbr\u003eDefending the Bar-Lev Line\u003cbr\u003e‘Shovach Yonim’\u003cbr\u003eThe first counterattack\u003cbr\u003eThe crisis\u003cbr\u003eThe Israeli plan\u003cbr\u003eOpening the gap\u003cbr\u003eThe crossing\u003cbr\u003eThe battle for the corridor\u003cbr\u003eOn the west bank\u003cbr\u003eThe cease-fire\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2.  The Northern Front\u003cbr\u003eThe Syrian attack\u003cbr\u003eThe Isreali break-in\u003cbr\u003eSyria’s plight\u003cbr\u003eIraqi and Jordanian counterattacks\u003cbr\u003eThe recapture of Mount Hermon\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e3.  The Air and Naval War\u003cbr\u003eSAMs vs. ‘Flying artillery’\u003cbr\u003eMissles at sea\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSummary:  A New Era\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK VI.  THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM:  ENTEBBE\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBOOK VII.  OPERATION ‘OPERA’\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cb\u003eTHE DESTRUCTION OF OSIRAK\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eIraq’s nuclear programme\u003cbr\u003eThe concerns in Israel\u003cbr\u003eThe political backdrop\u003cbr\u003ePrime Minister Begin calls for a decision\u003cbr\u003ePlanning Operation ‘Opera’\u003cbr\u003eOperation ‘Opera’\u003cbr\u003eThe international reaction\u003cbr\u003eThe UN anti-Israeli resolution\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBOOK VIII.  THE WAR IN THE LEBANON\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e1. Operation ‘Peace for Galilee’\u003cbr\u003eSummary\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2. Ending the Entanglement\u003cbr\u003eThe war for the security zone\u003cbr\u003eThe night of the hang gliders\u003cbr\u003eThe Lebanese border during the first \u003ci\u003eintifada\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003eThe Al-Naima raid\u003cbr\u003eCar bomb near Metula\u003cbr\u003eThe end of the Lebanese civil war\u003cbr\u003eOperation ‘Grapes of Wrath’\u003cbr\u003eThe Four Mothers movement\u003cbr\u003eThe Yitzhak Mordechai initiative\u003cbr\u003eChangin military conditions\u003cbr\u003eEhud’s Barak’s unilateral pledge\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSummary\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK IX.  THE FIRST PALESTINIAN UPRISING\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eA change of Government\u003cbr\u003eA new Knesset, a new government\u003cbr\u003eThe writing on the wall\u003cbr\u003eThe Palestinian uprising\u003cbr\u003eThe ‘Ship of Return’\u003cbr\u003eThe assasination of Abu Jihad\u003cbr\u003eAttacks on Israelis\u003cbr\u003eThe Temple Mount tragedy\u003cbr\u003eReassessing the \u003ci\u003eintifada\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eintifada\u003c\/i\u003e and the IDF\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSummary\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBOOK X.  ISRAEL THE FIRST GULF WAR\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eIraq occupies Kuwait\u003cbr\u003eThe Gulf War\u003cbr\u003eMilitary lessons for Israel\u003cbr\u003ePolitical Developments\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBOOK XI.  THE OSLO PROCESS\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eThe Hebron massacre\u003cbr\u003eThe abduction of Nashon Wachsman\u003cbr\u003eBeit Lid and its aftermath\u003cbr\u003eA new spell of violence\u003cbr\u003eThe tunnel incident\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eSummary\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOOK XII.  THE EL-AQSA INTIFADA\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eBackground\u003cbr\u003eCharacteristics of the El-Aqsa \u003ci\u003eintifada\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003eStages of the conflict\u003cbr\u003eThe debate over the security fence\u003cbr\u003eAfter 1,000 days:  a first balance sheet\u003cbr\u003eTowards the end of the \u003ci\u003eintifada\u003c\/i\u003e?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/b\u003eSummary\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eCONCLUSION\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Israeli military experience\u003cbr\u003eThe Arab military experience\u003cbr\u003eThe role of the superpowers\u003cbr\u003eThe Palestinians\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSelect Bibliography\u003cbr\u003eIndex\u003c\/i\u003e\"The best single-volume history of the Arab-Israeli wars.\" --\u003ci\u003eThe New York Times\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"A volume that anyone who wants to understand what Israel has endured will have to read.\" --\u003ci\u003eThe New York Times Book Review\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Masterly and all-embracing.\" --John Keegan, \u003ci\u003eSunday Times\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Lucid, remarkably fair minded.” –\u003ci\u003eBusiness Week\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Masterly.” –\u003ci\u003eLos Angeles Times Book Review\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cp\u003eChaim Herzog was a major-general in the Israeli army and later President of Israel. He died in 1997.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eShlomo Gazit is the former head of Israeli Military Intelligence.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e1\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCONFRONTATION IN PALESTINE\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAs Britain prepared to withdraw her forces in May 1948, and as the \u003cbr\u003eJewish community in Palestine braced itself for the inevitable Arab \u003cbr\u003eonslaught, there emerged a factor that was to influence Israel’s \u003cbr\u003emilitary considerations throughout the initial part of the War of \u003cbr\u003eIndependence. The leadership of the British armed forces had expressed \u003cbr\u003eitself in unequivocably hostile terms about the struggle of the Jewish \u003cbr\u003epopulation. They controlled the country’s major arteries and \u003cbr\u003estrongpoints; their ships patrolled the eastern Mediterranean and the \u003cbr\u003ecoast; and the Royal Air Force controlled the skies above Palestine. \u003cbr\u003eFurthermore, their forces included two Arab elements, namely the Arab \u003cbr\u003eLegion and the Transjordan Frontier Force. Both these units were to \u003cbr\u003eplay no small part in favour of the Arab forces during the ensuing \u003cbr\u003ehostilities.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIsraeli forces and dispositions\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe most vulnerable aspect of the Jewish position lay in tenuous lines \u003cbr\u003eof communications between settlements, and it was inevitable that these \u003cbr\u003ewould become the first targets for Arab attacks. The Jewish population \u003cbr\u003ewas concentrated mainly in long strips of agricultural communities in \u003cbr\u003eeastern Galilee, across the valley of Jezreel and down the coastal \u003cbr\u003eplain to the south of Tel Aviv. In many towns and areas there was no \u003cbr\u003eclear dividing line between Jewish and Arab populations; the \u003cbr\u003einstitutions and offices of government and major utilities such as \u003cbr\u003eelectricity and oil refineries were common to both. Particularly \u003cbr\u003evulnerable were communications with the isolated settlements of western \u003cbr\u003eGalilee and the Negev and the links between Jerusalem’s 100,000 Jews \u003cbr\u003eand the coastal plain (not to mention those linking the outlying Jewish \u003cbr\u003eJerusalem settlements with the bulk of the Jewish population in the \u003cbr\u003ecity proper). Nor were the official frontiers secure. Controlled \u003cbr\u003eprimarily by units of the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier \u003cbr\u003eForce, the long land borders could not be closed effectively to the \u003cbr\u003epassage of Arab forces and military supplies into Palestine. The Legion \u003cbr\u003enumbered some 8,000 troops, while the Frontier Force was 3,000 strong; \u003cbr\u003ein addition, the British Palestine Police numbered some 4,000. \u003cbr\u003eNominally, the British forces were responsible for law and order in the \u003cbr\u003ecountry, but both Jewish and Arab irregulars were by now operating \u003cbr\u003efreely within the areas under their respective control.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOver the years, the Jewish armed forces or militia had grown, sometimes \u003cbr\u003ewith the connivance and assistance of the British and sometimes \u003cbr\u003e‘underground’, despite the British. At the outset, locally organized \u003cbr\u003edefence units had been established throughout the country in order to \u003cbr\u003edefend Jewish settlements, but these had gradually been amalgamated \u003cbr\u003einto a national organization, the ‘Haganah’. The Arab revolt of 1936—39 \u003cbr\u003ebrought into existence the field companies of the Haganah, which were \u003cbr\u003ethe first units activated on a national country-wide basis, to counter \u003cbr\u003ethe effects of the uprising and to protect the oil pipeline crossing \u003cbr\u003ethe valley of Jezreel on its way from Iraq to a terminal at Haifa. They \u003cbr\u003ewere inspired by a British Army Captain, Orde Wingate (later to become \u003cbr\u003efamous as leader of the ‘Chindits’ in Burma during the Second World \u003cbr\u003eWar), who set up ‘Special Night Squads’ to fight against the Arab \u003cbr\u003eguerrillas bent on sabotaging the pipeline. There also existed \u003cbr\u003eauxiliary forces known as the ‘Jewish Settlement Police’, who assisted \u003cbr\u003ein the defence of Jewish settlements and the maintenance of the lines \u003cbr\u003eof communications between them. Numbering some 2,000 men, officered by \u003cbr\u003ethe British and financed by the Jewish Agency, they were organized in \u003cbr\u003esections and armed only with small-arms.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn May 1941, the Haganah created a full-time military force known as \u003cbr\u003ethe ‘Palmach’ (from ‘Plugot Mahatz’ or ‘shock troops’). This force was \u003cbr\u003eunder the exclusive control of the Haganah, and was led initially by \u003cbr\u003eYitzhak Sadeh, a large and flamboyant Haganah leader who, by \u003cbr\u003epersonality and example, was a major driving force in its creation. \u003cbr\u003e(Later, with the establishment of the Israel Defence Forces, his record \u003cbr\u003eas a military leader in conventional operations did not live up to the \u003cbr\u003epromise of these early years.) He gathered around him a group of \u003cbr\u003eyoungsters destined to be the leaders of Israel’s armed forces–indeed, \u003cbr\u003emany of the men who were later to lead Israel’s army into battle \u003cbr\u003ereceived their first training in the ranks of the Palmach–men such as \u003cbr\u003eYitzhak Rabin (later Chief of Staff and Prime Minister), Chaim Bar-Lev \u003cbr\u003e(later Chief of Staff and a minister in the Israeli Government), David \u003cbr\u003eElazar (Chief of Staff in the 1973 Yom Kippur War) and many others. It \u003cbr\u003ewas in one of the first operations of the force, acting with the \u003cbr\u003eBritish to oust the Vichy French from Syria, that Moshe Dayan (later to \u003cbr\u003ebecome Chief of Staff, Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign \u003cbr\u003eAffairs in various Israeli Governments, and to command Israel’s army in \u003cbr\u003ethe 1956 Sinai Campaign) lost an eye. In command of one of two select \u003cbr\u003ereconnaissance units of the Palmach sent to secure a bridge across the \u003cbr\u003eRiver Litani, his binoculars were hit by a French sniper’s bullet as he \u003cbr\u003ewas surveying the bridge. In command of the second unit that day was \u003cbr\u003eYigal Allon, later to become commander of the Palmach and subsequently \u003cbr\u003eDeputy Prime Minister and a minister in several Israeli Governments.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDuring the Second World War, many Jews had volunteered for service in \u003cbr\u003ethe British armed forces, either as individuals or in Palestinian \u003cbr\u003eunits. In 1944, a Jewish Brigade Group was established and saw action \u003cbr\u003ein Italy against the Germans. The wartime experience acquired by some \u003cbr\u003e30,000 volunteers, in all arms of the British forces, later proved to \u003cbr\u003ebe invaluable in the creation of the Israel Defence Forces, providing \u003cbr\u003eas it did much of the organizational, training and technical background \u003cbr\u003ethat hitherto had been absent in the Haganah. By the time that Rommel’s \u003cbr\u003earmy–which had threatened to overrun Egypt and enter Palestine–had been \u003cbr\u003edefeated by the British in 1942, the Palmach under Yitzhak Sadeh \u003cbr\u003ecomprised a force of over 3,000, including some 2,000 reserves. In \u003cbr\u003e1947, at the time of the United Nations Partition Resolution, the \u003cbr\u003ePalmach numbered over 3,000 men and women with approximately 1,000 on \u003cbr\u003eactive reserve who could be called up at a moment’s notice. (In 1944, a \u003cbr\u003enaval company, ‘Pal Yam’, and an air platoon had been established \u003cbr\u003ewithin the Palmach organization.)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn mid-1947, David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency for \u003cbr\u003ePalestine (which was, in effect, the government of the Jewish \u003cbr\u003epopulation in Palestine), began preparing the Haganah for the expected \u003cbr\u003ewar. By six months before the outbreak of hostilities, he had created \u003cbr\u003emilitary districts or commands astride the possible invasion routes of \u003cbr\u003ethe Arab armies, established brigades on a territorial basis and set \u003cbr\u003eout the guidelines for the acquisition of arms and the training of \u003cbr\u003eforces. Thus, by February 1948, the ‘Golani’ Brigade was operating in \u003cbr\u003ethe Jordan valley and eastern Galilee; the ‘Carmeli’ Brigade covered \u003cbr\u003eHaifa and western Galilee; the ‘Givati’ Brigade the southern lowlands; \u003cbr\u003ethe ‘Alexandroni’ Brigade the Sharon central area; the ‘Etzioni’ \u003cbr\u003eBrigade the Jerusalem area; and the ‘Kiryati’ Brigade covered the city \u003cbr\u003eof Tel Aviv and its environs. In the course of the following months, \u003cbr\u003ethree other Palmach brigades were created out of the independent \u003cbr\u003ePalmach battalions: the ‘Negev’ Brigade in the southern lowlands and \u003cbr\u003ethe northern Negev; the ‘Yiftach’ Brigade in Galilee; and the ‘Harel’ \u003cbr\u003eBrigade in the Jerusalem area.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIt is well to recall that, when one talks about brigades and military \u003cbr\u003eunits, one is not depicting a normal military line-up. The entire \u003cbr\u003eHaganah operation was an underground one, and its military organization \u003cbr\u003eand deployment had to be carried out under the vigilant eyes of British \u003cbr\u003etroops and police in the full knowledge that the possession of weapons \u003cbr\u003ewas a crime punishable by death. Moreover, British soldiers carried out \u003cbr\u003eraids on Jewish villages and towns from time to time, revealing secret \u003cbr\u003estorage dumps of weapons. Ingenious, devious means of transporting and \u003cbr\u003estoring weapons were an essential facet of Haganah skills. The Arabs \u003cbr\u003edid not suffer from this disability, because they were less in \u003cbr\u003econfrontation with the British forces and often moved around freely in \u003cbr\u003ethe areas under their control openly armed. In this respect, they \u003cbr\u003ebenefited considerably from the active support of the units of the Arab \u003cbr\u003eLegion, which were part of the British forces. A modest domestic war \u003cbr\u003eindustry was created in which small-arms such as Sten guns and hand \u003cbr\u003egrenades were manufactured, but the disadvantage with which the Jewish \u003cbr\u003eforces set out to do battle is emphasized by the fact that the total \u003cbr\u003earmament at the Haganah’s disposal in 1947 consisted of 900 rifles, 700 \u003cbr\u003elight machine-guns and 200 medium machine-guns with sufficient \u003cbr\u003eammunition for only three days’ fighting–even the standing force, the \u003cbr\u003ePalmach, could only arm two out of every three of its active members. \u003cbr\u003eAt this stage, heavy machine-guns, anti-tank guns and artillery were \u003cbr\u003ebut a dream: not one existed in the Jewish forces.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe total Jewish force that could be mobilized from an overall Jewish \u003cbr\u003epopulation of 650,000 was some 45,000, but these included some 30,000 \u003cbr\u003emen and women whose functions were limited to local defence, \u003cbr\u003eparticularly in the villages throughout the country–they could at no \u003cbr\u003etime be included in the field forces. The effective force that the \u003cbr\u003eJewish population could field on a national basis on the outbreak of \u003cbr\u003ehostilities therefore numbered approximately 15,000. The air platoon of \u003cbr\u003ethe Palmach consisted of eleven single-engined light aircraft manned by \u003cbr\u003etwenty Piper Cub pilots plus some twenty fighter pilots with Royal Air \u003cbr\u003eForce experience. These civilian aircraft were the nucleus of the \u003cbr\u003eIsraeli Air Force. No airport or landing strip was at their exclusive \u003cbr\u003edisposal, and only two airfields in the country, Haifa and Lod (Lydda), \u003cbr\u003ecould be used by civilian aircraft. The naval company numbered some 350 \u003cbr\u003esailors with Royal Navy and ‘illegal’ immigrant-running experience, \u003cbr\u003ewith a few motor boats and a number of frogmen.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn addition to the Haganah, there existed in Palestine the two Jewish \u003cbr\u003edissident organizations, who did not accept the authority of the Jewish \u003cbr\u003eCommand. The 2,000—4,000 members of the Irgun, under the command of \u003cbr\u003eMenachem Begin, continued with militant anti-British activity even when \u003cbr\u003ethe official Jewish policy was not to engage in such activity. Pursuing \u003cbr\u003ea policy of constant attack on British police posts, government and \u003cbr\u003earmy installations, it was trained primarily to carry out small-unit, \u003cbr\u003ecommando-type raids, but had very little experience in large-scale, \u003cbr\u003eopen fighting. The 500—800 member Lehi, or Stern Group, was even more \u003cbr\u003eextreme in its dissident policy, and remained consistently anti-British \u003cbr\u003ethroughout the war. The ultimate integration of these two units into a \u003cbr\u003eunified Israeli Army was not to be accomplished without severe problems \u003cbr\u003eand some internecine bloodshed.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eArab forces and dispositions\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe bulk of the Arab population in Palestine was led by Haj Amin \u003cbr\u003eel-Husseini, exiled Mufti of Jerusalem. His openly-declared purpose was \u003cbr\u003eto destroy the entire Jewish community of Palestine or to drive it into \u003cbr\u003ethe sea. Born in Jerusalem in 1893, his active participation in the \u003cbr\u003eArab nationalist movement dates from about 1919, and he led the \u003cbr\u003eanti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem in April of the following year, for \u003cbr\u003ewhich he was jailed by the British authorities. But the British High \u003cbr\u003eCommissioner at the time, Sir Herbert Samuel, attempted to appease the \u003cbr\u003enationalists and to improve the balance of power between the rival Arab \u003cbr\u003efamilies by appointing him Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921. Husseini, \u003cbr\u003ehowever, made use of his new power to encourage an extreme policy: he \u003cbr\u003etook an active part in organizing the anti-Jewish riots in 1929, and \u003cbr\u003eheaded the Arab Higher Committee that directed the 1936 rebellion. In \u003cbr\u003e1937, the British dismissed him and outlawed his Committee, but he \u003cbr\u003eescaped to Damascus, from where he led the rebellion. In 1940, he moved \u003cbr\u003eto Iraq, where he took part in the pro-German coup of 1941, after the \u003cbr\u003efailure of which he escaped to Germany. At the end of the war, he made \u003cbr\u003ehis way to Cairo, from where he began to organize the Arabs in \u003cbr\u003ePalestine once more. (After the Arab defeat in 1948, he was to remain \u003cbr\u003ein exile, primarily in Egypt and Lebanon, his influence waning rapidly \u003cbr\u003euntil his death in exile in his late seventies.)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMost Arab villagers carried weapons and could be mobilized by the \u003cbr\u003eFaza’a, an Arab alarm system whereby each sheikh could call up the \u003cbr\u003emales in his district for an operation, whether for defence or attack, \u003cbr\u003eon a purely guerrilla basis. The Palestinian Arabs had two paramilitary \u003cbr\u003eorganizations, the Najada and the Futuwa, which operated openly as \u003cbr\u003escout movements. Within their framework, a certain amount of urban \u003cbr\u003eguerrilla training was given to their members, but they were to be no \u003cbr\u003ematch for the Haganah. They could, of course, rely on the backing of \u003cbr\u003ethe local Arab population and benefited also from a loose co-operation \u003cbr\u003ewith the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force. From time to \u003cbr\u003etime, the Arab forces were able to make use of a number of deserters \u003cbr\u003efrom British units: posing as British regular troops on duty and \u003cbr\u003etravelling around in stolen British Army vehicles, these were used to \u003cbr\u003ecross into heavily-populated Jewish areas in the cities, particularly \u003cbr\u003eJerusalem, and introduce bombs, which created considerable damage and \u003cbr\u003eheavy casualties. Thus, of the three major attacks that succeeded in \u003cbr\u003eJerusalem, two–the blowing-up of the Palestine Post building and the \u003cbr\u003eattack in Ben Yehuda Street in which some fifty people were killed and \u003cbr\u003emost of the area destroyed–were carried out by such deserters. The \u003cbr\u003ethird attack was perpetrated at the Jewish Agency Headquarters by the \u003cbr\u003euse of a United States consular car, which was driven into the \u003cbr\u003ecourtyard. (On the other side, when the war developed, a small number \u003cbr\u003eof deserters from the British forces joined the Haganah, in one case \u003cbr\u003ebringing the first tank, a Cromwell, to join Israel’s armed forces.)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe Mufti’s two guerrilla forces, known as ‘The Army of Salvation’, \u003cbr\u003eeach about 1,000 men strong, were led by his cousin, Abd el Kader \u003cbr\u003eel-Husseini, and Hassan Salameh, who had undergone a certain degree of \u003cbr\u003emilitary training with the Germans during the war. Arriving in \u003cbr\u003ePalestine to begin the ‘jihad’ (‘holy war’), Abd el Kader began \u003cbr\u003eoperations in the area of Jerusalem while Salameh became active in the \u003cbr\u003eLod-Ramle district. To complicate the Arab military picture further, \u003cbr\u003ethere existed in southern Palestine a radical and somewhat disorderly \u003cbr\u003egroup of guerrillas organized by the extreme fanatical Moslem \u003cbr\u003eBrotherhood of Egypt, who maintained but a tenuous liaison with the \u003cbr\u003eother Arab parties. Backing these Arab forces was the military \u003cbr\u003epotential of the Arab world, which numbered several hundred aircraft in \u003cbr\u003ethe air forces of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, plus British and French \u003cbr\u003eartillery and armour. In addition, they had ready access to arms, \u003cbr\u003eammunition and spares, in contrast to the embargo that affected the \u003cbr\u003eJewish forces.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAs the date of the British withdrawal from Palestine drew near, the \u003cbr\u003edecision was taken by the Arab League that its member states would \u003cbr\u003eintervene militarily in Palestine. But the preparation for war against \u003cbr\u003ethe infant Israeli state took place against a background of the \u003cbr\u003einevitable inter-Arab differences, intrigues and manoeuvrings of the \u003cbr\u003evarious rulers against each other. In April 1948, they appointed King \u003cbr\u003eAbdullah of Transjordan to be Commander-in-Chief of the invading \u003cbr\u003earmies: not only did he control the most effective of the Arab armies, \u003cbr\u003ethe Arab Legion, but he also enjoyed the initial advantage of having \u003cbr\u003epart of his forces already in Palestine, within the framework of the \u003cbr\u003eBritish Army. This served to increase the other leaders’ suspicions of \u003cbr\u003ehis motives, for there was little doubt of his desire to reunite the \u003cbr\u003ewest and east banks of the River Jordan and create a \u003cbr\u003ePalestinian-Jordanian kingdom. There was always the possibility that he \u003cbr\u003ewould enter into active co-operation with the Mufti of Jerusalem. In \u003cbr\u003esum, the various Arab countries were more divided than united, their \u003cbr\u003ecommon cause being limited to opposing Jewish settlement in Palestine, \u003cbr\u003eand the creation of a Jewish state. It was a pattern that was to \u003cbr\u003econtinue over the years.","brand":"Vintage","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46305140474085,"sku":"NP9781400079636","price":21.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781400079636.jpg?v=1767738116","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/the-arabisraeli-wars-isbn-9781400079636","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}