Public Choice

The 1968 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to one of the founders of public choice theory, James Buchanan, yet many people have only the vaguest idea what public choice is. The book offers and unusually clear and accessible introduction to an important subject. McLean examines the workings of public choice from two related perspectives - collective action and the aggregation of individual preferences into social consensus.

The book highlights the paradox at the heart of collective action- that self-interest in the public domain is frequently counterproductive. National defense and clean air are things we all benefit from - they are public goods - but we tend to resist contributing to them. The first part of this book examines how government choice in such areas is shaped, and by whom- political entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, interest groups and ordinary citizens. McLean uses the idea of a public market in which politicians sell what they hope voters will buy, and further considers how and when people (and animals) co-operate to produce public goods even without government coercion. In the second part of the book the author examines the consequences of combining individual preferences, arguing that there is no straightforward way of adding them up to form a 'social ordering' and assesing the implications of this both for electoral reform and for the status of 'the will of the people'.

Part 1: Introduction to Public Choice Theory

Chapter 1: What is Public Choice?

The core principles of public choice

Distinguishing public choice from traditional political science

The economic model of political behavior

Chapter 2: Individual Choice and Voting Behavior

Rational choice theory and voter decision-making

The median voter theorem

Voter turnout and rational ignorance

Part 2: Voting Systems and Political Competition

Chapter 3: Voting Mechanisms

Simple majority rule

Plurality voting

Condorcet's paradox and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Chapter 4: Political Parties and Spatial Voting

The spatial model of political competition

Party platforms and electoral strategies

The role of ideology in voting behavior

Part 3: Collective Action and Interest Groups

Chapter 5: Collective Action Problems

The free-rider problem

The logic of collective action

Overcoming collective action challenges

Chapter 6: Interest Groups and Lobbying

The role of interest groups in the political process

Lobbying strategies and political influence

Rent-seeking behavior and its economic consequences

Part 4: Government Institutions and Bureaucracy

Chapter 7: Bureaucracy and Principal-Agent Problems

The nature of bureaucracy

Bureaucratic incentives and inefficiency

Regulatory capture and its implications

Chapter 8: Public Spending and Budgetary Processes

The political economy of public spending

Budgetary cycles and pork barrel politics

The role of fiscal institutions

Part 5: Applications and Criticisms of Public Choice

Chapter 9: Public Choice in Practice

Applications to environmental policy

Public choice analysis of healthcare systems

The political economy of trade policy

Chapter 10: Criticisms and Debates in Public Choice

The limitations of the rational choice assumption

The role of altruism and social norms

Public choice and the concept of "the public interest"

IAIN MCLEAN is Professor of Politics at Oxford University and a Fellow of Nuffield College, UK. He has worked on British politics and public policy for over 30 years. He has been a front bench councillor twice. The 1968 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to one of the founders of public choice theory, James Buchanan, yet many people have only the vaguest idea what public choice is. The book offers and unusually clear and accessible introduction to an important subject. McLean examines the workings of public choice from two related perspectives - collective action and the aggregation of individual preferences into social consensus.

The book highlights the paradox at the heart of collective action- that self-interest in the public domain is frequently counterproductive. National defense and clean air are things we all benefit from - they are public goods - but we tend to resist contributing to them. The first part of this book examines how government choice in such areas is shaped, and by whom- political entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, interest groups and ordinary citizens. McLean uses the idea of a public market in which politicians sell what they hope voters will buy, and further considers how and when people (and animals) co-operate to produce public goods even without government coercion. In the second part of the book the author examines the consequences of combining individual preferences, arguing that there is no straightforward way of adding them up to form a 'social ordering' and assesing the implications of this both for electoral reform and for the status of 'the will of the people'.