{"product_id":"international-finance-regulation-isbn-9781118829592","title":"International Finance Regulation","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAs the global market expands, the need for international regulation becomes urgent\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSince World War II, financial crises have been the result of macroeconomic instability until the fatidic week end of September 15 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. The financial system had become the source of its own instability through a combination of greed, lousy underwriting, fake ratings and regulatory negligence. From that date, governments tried to put together a new regulatory framework that would avoid using taxpayer money for bailout of banks. In an uncoordinated effort, they produced a series of vertical regulations that are disconnected from one another. That will not be sufficient to stop finance from being instable and the need for international and horizontal regulation is urgent. This challenge is the focus of Georges Ugeux’s book.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eInternational Finance Regulation: The Quest for Financial Stability\u003c\/i\u003e focuses on the inspirations behind regulation, and examines the risks and consequences of fragmentation on a global scale. Author Georges Ugeux has four decades of experience in the legal and economic aspects of international business operations. He created and run the New York Stock Exchange’sinternational group in charge of developing the NYSE’s reach to non-US companies, including relationships with regulators and governments.  Ugeux teaches European Banking and Finance of the Columbia University School of Law. Ugeux is uniquely positioned to provide recommendations and suggestions from the perspective of a top global authority. In the book, he explores international regulation with topics such as:\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e• Laws, regulations, and risks of overregulation\u003cbr\u003e • Transformation of the U.S. market and creation of the Eurozone\u003cbr\u003e • Development of a global framework and stability of the banking system\u003cbr\u003e • In-depth examination of Basel III, the Dodd-Frank Act, the European Banking Union, and the Volcker Rule\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe book also contains case studies from real-world scenarios like Lehman, CDS, Greece, the London Whale, and Libor to illustrate the concepts presented. Finance consistently operates within an increasingly global paradigm, and an overarching regulation scheme is becoming more and more necessary for sustainable growth. \u003ci\u003eInternational Finance Regulation: The Quest for Financial Stability\u003c\/i\u003e presents an argument for collaboration toward a comprehensive global regulation strategy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePreface xiii\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Finance in a Stage of Permanent Crisis? xiv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlobal Markets Are Interconnected xvi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulating Finance in a World in Crisis xviii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Web of Institutional Complexity xix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWill Global Financial Regulation Become Lex America? xx\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApplying Global Regulatory Convergence xxii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulator and Regulated: The Infernal Couple xxiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinance Cannot Be Left Unregulated xxiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFive Years after Lehman, Regulation Could Not Change the Culture xxiv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Culture of Outlaws xxv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eI Will Never Give Up xxvi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes xxvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 1 The Multiple Objectives of Financial Regulation 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStop (Ab)using Taxpayer Money 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProtect Retail and Small Investors and Depositors 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnsure Transparency of Markets and Institutions 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImplement a Truly Risk-Adjusted Remuneration System 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProtect Deposits from Trading 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 2 A Quarter Century of Banking Crises and the Evolution of Financial Institutions 11\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBanking Crises Are Not Exactly a Recent Phenomenon 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Two Main Emerging-Market Crises 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubprime Crisis 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehman Crisis 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Sovereign Debt Crisis 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Banking Crisis 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLIBOR Manipulation 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWill the Foreign Exchange Market Be Next? 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 3 The Lessons of the Recent Financial Crises: The Explosion of Balance Sheets 27\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStructural Overbanking of Europe 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLack of Transparency of the Derivative Markets 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) Market 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Regulatory Landscape Is Not Global but Largely National 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 35\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 4 Global Financial Regulation: The Institutional Complexities 37\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGroup of 20 (G20) 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Stability Board (FSB) 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Basel Committee (BCBS) 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) 43\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternational Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternational Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternational Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 5 Capital Adequacy, Liquidity, and Leverage Ratios: Sailing toward the Basel III Rules 53\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart I: Capital Adequacy 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart II: Liquidity 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart III: Leverage 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 6 Assessing Likely Impacts of Regulation on the Real Economy 69\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 7 Regulating the Derivatives Market 75\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOrigin of the Derivatives Market 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSize of the Derivatives Markets 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eU.S. Regulation: Dodd-Frank Act 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTransatlantic Divergences 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShort Selling Is a Form of Derivative 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJPMorgan Chase London Trading Losses 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 8 The Structure of Banking: How Many Degrees of Separation? 87\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSystemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUniversal Banking Model 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeparation Models 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited Kingdom 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited States 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Union 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSw+itzerland 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVolcker Rule and Proprietary Trading 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eToo Big to Fail (TBTF): Is Size the Problem? 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProhibit the Trading of Commodities by Banks 97\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 9 Banking Resolution and Recovery 101\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoral Hazard 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCan the Bail-In Concept Avoid Taxpayers’ Bailout? 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLessons from the Financial Crisis 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLiving Will, or How Banks Want to Be Treated if They Are Close to Collapsing 104\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited States 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Citi Recovery Plan 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRole of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the United States 107\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited Kingdom 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory Technical Standards 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCan Resolution Rules Be Effective? 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Impossible European Institutional Challenge 113\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Will Decide to Put Companies\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnder Resolution Surveillance? 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 10 Banking and Shadow Banking 125\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedge Funds 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited States 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEurope 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Types of Shadow Banking 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapital Markets and Securitization 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 11 Rating Agencies and Auditors 131\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart I: The Rating Agencies 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart II: External Auditors 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart III: The Limits of Accountability 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 12 Central Banks as Lenders of Last Resort Have a Conflict of Interest with Their Regulatory Role 139\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Stability 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited States: Quantitative Easing 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Central Bank: The Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited Kingdom 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJapan and Abenomics 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre Central Banks Balance Sheets Eternally Expandable? Have They Become Hedge Funds? 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs This Novation of Central Banks Legitimate or Legal? 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 13 Financial Institution Governance (or Lack Thereof) 149\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk Management 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDysfunctional Boards of Directors 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShould the Chairperson Also Be the CEO? 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRemuneration and Risks 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePersonal or Institutional Accountability 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 14 Was It a Global Crisis? The Asian Perspective 157\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJapan 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChina 160\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia 161\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAssessing the Asian Risk 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 15 The Challenges of Global Regulation 165\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulation, Policies, and Politics 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulators and Sovereign Financing 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Central Bank Supervision: The E.U. Governance Challenges 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Risks of Regulatory Fragmentation 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank Resolution: The Legal Nightmare 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasel III 172\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReemergence of Capital Markets 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRestructuring Finance 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShould Financial Communication Be Regulated? 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShould Financial Media Respect a Code of Conduct? 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Education Is Key 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChapter 16 Regulation and Ethics 181\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagement Integrity 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccountability 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTransparency Is Key 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Principled Regulatory System Is Needed 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoing the Right Thing 184\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConclusion What Can We Expect? 189\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Few Books I Read and Found Helpful . . . 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbout the Author 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Georges Ugeux draws on his experience as well as his training as an economist and lawyer to tackle a daunting topic: International Finance regulation: The Quest for Financial Stability (Wiley, 2014). (…) Backward-looking rules are only one problem with current financial regulation. Another is its fragmentation, especially across national borders. (…) Ugeux is not especially hopeful that we can resolve the problems that stand in the way of global financial stability. In fact, if the volcano model is apt, stability itself is a chimera.”—Brenda Jubin, Reading the markets, Investing.com\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGEORGES UGEUX,\u003c\/b\u003e a lawyer and economist by training, is the Chairman and CEO of Galileo Global Advisors. Prior to founding Galileo, Ugeux joined the New York Stock Exchange as Group Executive Vice President, International and Research. He created and ran the New York Stock Exchange's international group in charge of developing the NYSE's reach to non-US companies, including relationships with regulators and governments. Ugeux teaches European Banking and Finance at the Columbia University School of Law and has been publishing, speaking, and blogging on these issues, namely for Le Monde (France) and the Huffington Post.    \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eInternational Finance Regulation\u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSince World War II, financial crises have been the result of macroeconomic instability until the fatidic day of September 15, 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. The financial system had become the source of its own instability through a combination of greed, lousy underwriting, fake ratings, and regulatory negligence. From that date, governments tried to put together a new regulatory framework that would avoid using taxpayer money for bailout of banks. In an uncoordinated effort, they produced a series of vertical regulations that are disconnected from one another. That will not be sufficient to stop finance from being unstable, and the need for international and horizontal regulation is urgent. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEffective financial regulation inspires market confidence, stability, consumer protection, and a reduction in financial misconduct and crime. International finance expert Georges Ugeux explains that while individual nations have reformed domestic regulations, these combined measures are still insufficient to prevent future financial crises. \u003ci\u003eInternational Finance Regulation: The Quest for Financial Stability\u003c\/i\u003e demonstrates that global financial stability is managed in a fragmented and incoherent manner, and offers a model for strategic international regulation. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eInternational Finance Regulation\u003c\/i\u003e provides recommendations and suggestions from the perspective of a leading global authority with more than 40 years' experience in the financial arena. Ugeux offers insights into the lessons learned from the recent financial crises, and shows why the current financial laws, rules, and risks are often seemingly overbearing. He also includes information on the transformation of the United States marketplace and the creation of the Euro, and histories of Latin American and Asian economic crises. Ugeux points to some of the complexities and inconsistencies of recent regulations—Basel III, the Dodd Frank Act, the European Banking Union—and their limited ability to ensure financial stability. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHe also addresses some of the controversies surrounding the Volcker Rule, too big to fail, shadow banking, credit default swaps, securitization, and hedge funds. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe book is filled with illustrative case studies from real-world financial disasters such as the implosion of Lehman Brothers, the breakdown of the Greek economy, the enormous \"London Whale\" trading, and Libor interest rate scandal. These studies and other examples demonstrate how the global economic framework developed, and the inability (and unwillingness) of the international financial and banking systems to protect our economy. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe proposals and recommendations outlined in \u003ci\u003eInternational Finance Regulation\u003c\/i\u003e offer the international financial community a new model for the transfor-mation of our global economy.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989446934757,"sku":"NP9781118829592","price":75.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781118829592.jpg?v=1761784133","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/international-finance-regulation-isbn-9781118829592","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}