{"product_id":"every-nation-for-itself-isbn-9781591846208","title":"Every Nation for Itself","description":"\u003cb\u003eG-Zero — \\JEE-ZEER-oh\\ —\u003ci\u003en \u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eA world order in which no single country or durable alliance of countries can meet the challenges of global leadership. What happens when the G20 doesn’t work and the G7 is history.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eIf the worst threatened—a rogue nuclear state, a major health crisis, the collapse of the global financial system—where would the world look for leadership?\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eFor the first time in seven decades, there is no single power or alliance of powers ready to take on the challenges of global leadership. A generation ago, the United States, Europe, and Japan were the world’s powerhouses, the free-market democra­cies that propelled the global economy forward. But today, they struggle just to find their footing.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eAcclaimed geopolitical analyst Ian Bremmer argues that this leadership vacuum is here to stay, as power is regionalized instead of globalized. Now that so many challenges transcend borders—from the stability of the global economy and climate change to cyber-attacks and terrorism—the need for international cooperation has never been greater.“Ian Bremmer combines shrewd  analysis with colorful storytelling to reveal the risks and opportunities in a  world without leadership. This is a fascinating and important  book.” — \u003cb\u003eFAREED ZAKARIA, author of \u003ci\u003eThe Post-American World\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e“An insightful look at the relative  decline of postwar international institutions, the  must-evolve nature of American leadership, and  the growing need for long-term, multifaceted  cooperation between the United States and China.  Required reading for anyone interested in the  current state and near-term future of global  affairs.”\u003c\/p\u003e — \u003cb\u003eMUHTAR KENT, CEO, The Coca-Cola Company\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e“We have entered a new era where  challenges are increasingly stretching across  geographical borders. Every Nation for Itself is  a must-read for any global executive who aspires to  accurately assess the risks and exploit the  opportunities created by this new environment.”\u003c\/p\u003e — \u003cb\u003eDUNCAN NIEDERAUER, CEO, NYSE Euronext\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e“\u003ci\u003eEvery Nation for Itself \u003c\/i\u003eis a  provocative and important book about what comes next. Ian  Bremmer has again turned conventional wisdom  on its head.”\u003c\/p\u003e — \u003cb\u003eNOURIEL ROUBINI, chairman, Roubini Global Economics\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Bremmer’s astute assessment of how  the shifting geopolitical landscape will impact  political and economic alliances provides  essential insights for anyone conducting business at  the global level.” \u003c\/p\u003e — \u003cb\u003eDOMINIC BARTON, global managing director, McKinsey \u0026amp; Company\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Bremmer has written an essential  navigational guide for all national and corporate leaders  in the new leaderless world.”\u003c\/p\u003e — \u003cb\u003eSIR MARTIN SORRELL, CEO, WPP\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Global political  economy has no sharper or more prescient analyst than Ian Bremmer. Everyone who  cares about our collective future will need to carefully consider this book’s  impressive arguments.”\u003c\/p\u003e — \u003cb\u003eLAWRENCE SUMMERS, former U.S. Treasury Secretary\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cb\u003eIAN BREMMER \u003c\/b\u003eis the president of Eurasia Group, the world’s leading global political risk research and consulting fi rm. His eight books include the international bestseller \u003ci\u003eThe End of the Free Market \u003c\/i\u003eand \u003ci\u003eThe J Curve\u003c\/i\u003e. He lives in New York City and Washington, DC.\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eVisit www.ianbremmer.com\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEvery Nation for Itself:  Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFareed Zakaria-  \u003c\/b\u003eWhat is a G-Zero world, and how did we get  here?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIan  Bremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e The  G-Zero is a world without effective, consistent leadership. It’s not the G7  world where Western industrialized powers set the agenda. It’s not a G20 world  where developed and developing states find some way to work together on tough  transnational problems. It’s a world where no can be counted either to pay the  piper or call the tune.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI love the story in your book The Post  American World about Colin Powell making peace between Spain and Morocco  over a disputed island in time to go swimming with his grandkids. I included a  story in Every Nation for Itself about how Lyndon Johnson diverted about 20  percent of America’s wheat  crop in 1965 to help India feed its people during a  drought. The leadership capacity that these two stories illustrate isn’t what it  used to be, and Europe has too many serious  problems of its own to try to take up the slack. At the same time, we can’t  expect emerging powers like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Russia, or the wealthy Gulf  monarchies to fill this vacuum because their governments have neither the  bandwidth nor the desire to accept the risks and burdens that come with much  greater international leadership. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut Every Nation for Itself is not about  the shifting balance of international power. In fact, we can’t know what the  longer-term future holds for America, Europe, China  or any of these other countries. There are good reasons to bet on US  resilience, but that will depend on the quality of American leadership in years  to come. The rest will continue to rise, but some of them will have more staying  power than others. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c\/i\u003e forecast with great confidence,  however, that the world has entered a period of transition, one in which global  leadership will be in short supply. Every Nation for Itself is about that  historic shift and the tremendous challenges and opportunities it will  create—for the global economy, for relations between the world’s most powerful  governments, and for the world’s ability to cope with a variety of what we might  call “problems without borders.” \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eWhat do  you mean by problems without borders? \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e First, there’s the traditional  threat to regional peace and stability. US and European elected officials know  that voters tend to support costly, extended military commitments only when they  believe that vital national interests are at stake. That’s why, from  Yugoslavia to  Rwanda and from  Sudan to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, they’ve remained on the  sidelines as much as possible. Given the need for austerity on both sides of the  Atlantic, we’re likely to see both a larger  number of local conflicts around the world and an even deeper Western reluctance  to engage. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut conventional conflict is not the  only potential source of trouble. Given the market volatility of the past four  years, governments of both established and leading emerging powers are more  worried than ever about creating jobs and boosting growth, and the most  important instruments of power and influence in coming years will be economic  tools like market access, investment rules, and currency policies.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis will also be a world in which great  power competition takes place in cyberspace as state-backed industrial espionage  becomes an ever more widely used weapon in the battle for natural resources and  market share. It’s a world in which some authoritarian emerging players will  find new ways to reestablish state control over the flow of ideas, information,  people, money, goods and services. Add climate change, the risk of food price  shocks, threats to public health and other problems that flow easily across  borders and the world will be without international leadership just at the  moment when it needs it most. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eWho are  the biggest winners in this G-Zero world?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003eThe first key to success in this  period of transition is a recognition that changes to the global system will  enable an unprecedented number of governments to play by their own rules. Those  who still operate as if borders are opening, barriers are falling, and the world  is becoming a single market will find themselves reacting to events they don’t  understand. In a G-Zero world, the winners will be those players that can  develop and maintain choices. The most important option a government can have is  a choice among potential commercial and security partners.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAmong the most fortunate are the “pivot  states,” those that are able to build profitable relationships with multiple  partners without becoming overly reliant on any one of them. Then there are  “rogues with powerful friends,” states that openly flout international rules  with cover from other governments. In a world where newly cost-conscious  established powers will have to resort more often to political and economic  (rather than military) pressure to get their way, these ties will be more  important than ever. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCompanies will have new opportunities  too. Among multinationals, watch out for what I call the “adapters,” those that  understand the changing competitive landscape and are agile enough to exploit  the advantages it provides. Some companies can respond to a world with fewer  enforceable rules by exploiting arbitrage opportunities to minimize tax and  regulatory burdens. Others can transform a state-backed rival into a commercial  partner by offering something that a government-controlled enterprise can’t get  anywhere else, like access to battle-tested advanced technology or services that  demand unique expertise. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, because the G-Zero is a period  of transition, significant changes in the international balance of power stoke  both competition among would-be regional powers and anxiety among those who fear  they aren’t yet ready to compete. That’s why a group of companies we might call  “protectors” will also figure among the likeliest winners. Firms involved in  defense against conventional military strikes, cyber-attack, terrorism or  commercial piracy will prosper in a G-Zero world, particularly if they’re able  to align themselves with deep-pocketed emerging market governments.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eSay more  about this idea of pivot states?\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e Over the past 30 years, the big  winners were states that adapted to and profited from the processes of  Western-led globalization. But in a world that is more likely to have several  regional centers of gravity, one in which no single country can afford to play  the global leader, governments will have to create more of their own  opportunities. The ability to pivot will be a critical advantage.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor example, Brazil has built strong political ties and  promising commercial relations with the United  States, China and a growing number of other  emerging market countries. As a result, its economy continues to enjoy access to  American consumers, but its ties with China, now Brazil’s largest trade partner, ensure that it  isn’t overly dependent on US purchasing power for growth. A  serious downturn in the US  will still take a heavy toll on Mexico. That’s much less true for  Brazil. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe book profiles several pivot states,  from Turkey and  Vietnam to  Canada and Kazakhstan.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eWhat does  the G-Zero mean for the United States? \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e It means that America  will have to learn to do something it doesn’t do very well these days: Invest in  the future. In a country where political leaders focus so much of their energies  on winning the next news cycle, and business leaders try to maximize quarterly  profits at the expense of long-term reinvestment, Americans need to look beyond  the horizon described in this book.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAnyone who believes that American  decline is inevitable has chosen to ignore the entire history of the United  States and its people. For the moment,  America can’t lead in quite the same  way it did during the second half of the 20th century, because the  world and its balance of power have changed profoundly. But the G-Zero will  provoke a tremendous amount of trouble for a wide variety of people. It can’t  last, because tomorrow’s most important powers, whoever those powers happen to  be, can’t afford for it to continue. That’s why, if Americans can rebuild for  the future, the country’s underlying strengths—its hard power capacities and its  democratic, entrepreneurial values—will ensure that US  leadership can again prove indispensable for international security and  prosperity. I argue in the book’s final chapter that leadership of a post-G-Zero  world should be the goal that guides American foreign and domestic policies in  years to come.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eWhy do you  believe, as you say in the book, that “China is the major power least likely  to develop along a predictable path?” \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e China’s leaders have acknowledged that the  country’s growth model is “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and  unsustainable,” and they know that their ability to guide China  through the next stage of its development is far from certain.  India, Brazil, and Turkey  can continue to grow for the next ten years with the same basic formula that  triggered growth over the past ten. The United  States, Europe, and Japan  will reinvest in economic systems that have a long history of success. But  China has to undertake enormously  complex and ambitious reforms to continue its drive to become a modern,  middle-class power. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the same time, the international  environment is becoming less friendly to China’s  expansion. Higher prices for the oil, gas, metals and minerals that China  needs to power its economy will weigh on growth. The rise of many other emerging  powers will add to the upward pressure on food and other commodity prices,  undermining public confidence in government, the most important source of  China’s social stability. As  state-backed Chinese companies draw their government into the political and  economic lives of so many other countries, particularly in the developing world,  they risk the same backlash from local companies and workers that plagues so  many other foreign firms doing business far from home. And because the Chinese  government has such a direct stake in the success of these companies, Beijing will be drawn into  conflicts it has never coped with before.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria-\u003c\/b\u003e I’m  interested to see that your book is quite bullish on Africa’s political and economic future? Why is the G-Zero  world good for Africa? \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e Africa has become the world’s most  underrated growth story, in part because it has become a kind of “pivot  continent.” For many years, cash-strapped African states had to turn almost  exclusively to the IMF, World Bank and Western governments for the aid and  investment they needed to bankroll development, and the money often came with  strings attached—like demands for democratic reforms and greater openness to  Western investment. Over the past decade, however, just as we’ve seen in  Brazil and other parts of the  emerging market world, China has sharply increased its  investment in the region. But this is not a story about US-Chinese competition.  The winner here is Africa, which can now expect multinational and state-owned  companies from the established and emerging market worlds—from America, Europe,  Japan, China, India and elsewhere—to compete for access to African consumers and  favorable investment terms. The world’s largest emerging markets get this.  That’s one big reason why the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) invited South  Africa to join their club in December 2010.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Post-American World:  Release 2.0\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIan Bremmer-  \u003c\/b\u003eYou made  clear from the opening sentence of The Post-American World that you do not  believe that America faces some kind of  inevitable, irreversible decline. But how can US policymakers ensure that the  rise of the rest actually strengthens the United  States? \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFareed Zakaria\u003c\/b\u003e - If  more countries thrive in the existing global system, it means a larger world  economy – more consumers and producers, investors and inventors. That’s great  for America. As Europe boomed after  World War II,  America boomed  with it. The rise of Japan  and Korea and  Taiwan has not meant the  decline of America. But the key has been that we  have to be able to adjust and adapt. The US  economy was enormously productive in the 1950s and 1960s – leading the world in  almost every way, from technology to infrastructure to mass education. Our  problem is that we no longer lead the world on many of these dimensions – think  of infrastructure or K-12 education – and the rest of the world has been hard at  work catching up. So, the fault lies not in our competitors but in ourselves.  The good news is, if we can rectify these mistakes, we should still do well in  the emerging world.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e Given everything that has happened  since 2008—the financial market meltdown, the Eurozone crisis, the Arab  Spring—have you become more confident or less that the United States can  successfully transition from its previous role as global hegemon to a new role  as the most powerful among other powerful countries?  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eThere are  two distinct (though related) challenges for Washington in a Post-American World. The first  is economic, which I outline above. The second is political. Here the structural  challenge might seem daunting. Political power is not like economic power. In  economics, others can grow and that can be good for you – win, win. In politics,  power is relative. As China  and India and  Brazil and Turkey  all prosper and gain strength and confidence, whose dominant influence are they  cutting into? The US. But even here, the picture is  actually quite hopeful for America. The truth is, only  America has power along all  dimensions – economic, military, political, cultural. And that gives it great  strength, particularly as an agenda-setter. Also, the rise of these other  countries creates uncertainty and anxiety in the international system. If the  United  States plays its cards well, it can be the  crucial stabilizing force in the system. You can see that dynamic at work in  Asia where China’s rise has  unsettled many Asian countries and they look to America  to play a stabilizing role. It’s a new diplomatic challenge for America, to be more of a catalyst and  broker than hegemon and arbiter. It emphasizes brains more than brawn. Let’s  hope we’re up to it.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-  \u003c\/b\u003eHow can  policymakers overcome the polarization of American politics to get this right?   \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eThat’s the  Trillion dollar question. America’s economy and society remain  dynamic. It’s political system is broken. First, recognize the problem. Stop  mouthing slogans about how we have the world’s greatest democracy. Our system is  now highly dysfunctional and corrupt. We need to fix it.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e Among rising states, which do you  think have the most staying power and why? Will some of the rest be left  behind?\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria-\u003c\/b\u003e  China is in a  league apart from every other rising power. It has the scale – in terms of sheer  numbers—to have a huge global impact. It is also run by a competent elite,  technocrats who plan for the long term and are moving China  up the value chain. They are making huge investments in education and  infrastructure, which will pay off over the long run. I agree with you that  China continues to have a long-term  political challenge, how to combine a vigorous and open economy with a closed  and bureaucratic political system. But so far they have managed to balance it –  I think they will need to make much larger political changes in the next decade  than they have in the last decade.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003eHow well do you think  America is responding to  China’s continued rise?  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria- \u003c\/b\u003eAmerican  business has been responding well to China’s rise, helping it but also  benefitting from it. American society is more closed and parochial than American  business and so there has been little contact, which is a pity because we can  always learn from others. Washington, at a  foreign policy level, has actually done quite well in its handling of China.  It has encouraged the integration of China into the global economy, it has tried to  get China to be more rule-based and more  committed to producing (rather than consuming) global public goods. And it has  carefully and systematically shored up its alliances with key Asian countries,  from India to  Japan to South Korea to Australia, which is an important  hedge against Chinese expansion. All in all, a solid performance.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBremmer-\u003c\/b\u003e You devote a chapter to India’s  growing prominence. Are you optimistic that India’s  government will help spur the country toward the next stage of its economic  development? Or is this still a country where progress will come mainly in spite  of government?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eZakaria-\u003c\/b\u003e  China grows because of its  government, and India grows in spite of its  government. I don’t expect much improvement in India’s  public policy. The infrastructure will continue to lag, the education system  will be poor, the government will keep doling out subsidies, and tax and  regulatory policy will be uncompetitive. But Indian businesses are world class.  They manage under very difficult conditions to perform amazingly well. They  manage capital efficiently, understand global markets and brands, and have high  quality management. India has good demographics, with  lots of young consumers. India’s story is a bottom-up story, rather than  China’s top-down story. But don’t kid  yourself. Ultimately, you need good government policy to go to the next stage.  Unless there is massive and intelligent investment in human and physical  capital, India will lag  behind China substantially. Whether in  India or America, bad government will be a  huge limiting factor on a country’s success, no matter how dynamic the society  and the economy.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Portfolio","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46301877207269,"sku":"NP9781591846208","price":24.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781591846208.jpg?v=1767726439","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/every-nation-for-itself-isbn-9781591846208","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}