{"product_id":"essentials-of-biological-security-isbn-9781394189014","title":"Essentials of Biological Security","description":"\u003cb\u003eEssentials of Biological Security\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eA guide to minimizing the threat of misusing benignly intended and dual-use biological research \u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective\u003c\/i\u003e, a team of distinguished researchers delivers a fundamental resource designed to raise awareness and understanding of biological security as it pertains to the malign manipulation of benignly intended scientific research.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWritten by experts who have spent decades involved in biological security issues, the book is systematically organized to make it accessible to a wide range of life scientists likely to encounter dangerous opportunities for the deliberate misuse of their research. Readers will also find:  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA thorough introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComprehensive explorations of the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePractical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimize their risk \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExpert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organizations \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerfect for professionals working in life sciences, medicine, global health, biosafety, and biosecurity, \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective \u003c\/i\u003ewill also benefit anyone with an interest in and being responsible for biological security. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEndorsement xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Figures xvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Tables xviii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Contributors xix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeword xxi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements xxv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcronyms xxvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Biological Security After the Pandemic 1\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eLijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang, and Malcolm Dando\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 The Objective of the Book 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 The Structure of the Book 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 Overview of the Chapters 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Falling Between the Cracks and by the Sides: Can Disarmament Treaties Respond to Scientific and Technological Developments? 11\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eJean Pascal Zanders\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Introduction 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Relationship to CBW 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2.1 The Impact of Germ Theory on the ‘Poison’ Concept 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2.2 The Impact of Chemistry on the ‘Poison’ Concept 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 Capturing Evolving Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Restraining Warfare 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 Further Development of the Control of Toxic Weapons 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4.1 Confirming the Semantic Bifurcation 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4.2 Of Humanitarian Foundations and a Dual-Use Quandary 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 Implications of Evolving Concepts and S\u0026amp;T Developments for Disarmament Law 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5.1 Institutional Interests 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5.2 Semantic Shifts as Indicators of Scientific and Technological Advancements 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5.3 The Future Dimension of Disarmament 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.6 Conclusions: Responding to S\u0026amp;T Developments 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 A Multifaceted Threat 31\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eGemma Bowsher\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Introduction 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Assessing the Utility and Scope of Biological Weapons at Various Scales 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Diverse Objectives of Bioweapon Use: Past and Present 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Evolving Biotechnologies 36\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 Changing Biothreat Landscapes 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5.1 Cyber-Dependency 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5.2 Disinformation 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Conclusion 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Biological Weapons from the Ancient World to 1945 43\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eBrett Edwards\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Introduction 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Map of the Literature 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 Historical Review 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.1 Pre-history (72,000–500 BCE) 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.2 Ancient History (500 BCE–1000 AD) 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.3 Medieval and Early Modern (1000–1750 AD) 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.4 Late Modern (1750–1915 AD) 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.5 World War I (1914–1918 AD) 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.6 Inter-War Years (1918–1939 AD) 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.7 World War II 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 Conclusions 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Biological Weapons from 1946 to 2000 57\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eBrian Balmer\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Introduction 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 Overview of State BW Programmes 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 Offensive Aspects of BW Programmes 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3.1 Human Exposure and Experimentation 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Non-state Actors 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Drivers and Inhibitors of State BW Programmes 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 Conclusions 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 The Problem of Dual Use in the Twenty-first Century 69\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eKathryn Nixdorff\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Relationship of the Advances in Science and Technology to the BTWC 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Evolution of the Dual-Use Dilemma 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.1 Example 1. The Mousepox Experiment (2001) 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.2 Example 2. Synthesis of the Poliovirus Genome and Recovery of Infectious Virus (2002) 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.3 Example 3. Reconstruction of the ‘Spanish Flu’ Influenza Virus of 1918 (2005) 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.4 Example 4. Alteration of the Host Range and Increase in the Transmissibility of the H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus (2012) 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 DURC Criteria with Examples in Each Case of Published Research Reports of Work That Has DURC Character 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Problems in Dealing with Dual Use: Debates About What Should Be Done 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Key Cutting-Edge Biotechnologies Today 83\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eXinyu Song and Weiwen Zhang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.1 Introduction 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2 Development and Application of Synthetic Biology 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.1 Landmark Achievement in Synthetic Biology 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.2 Opportunities for Medical Application 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.3 Benefits to Agricultural Development 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.4 Changing the Future of Foods 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.5 Creation of Sustainable Energy 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.6 Approaches for New Materials 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3 Development and Application of Genome Editing 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3.1 Landmark Progress in Genome Editing 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3.2 Potential in Curing Diseases 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3.3 Supporting Sustainable Agriculture 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4 Main Biosafety and Biosecurity Concerns Associated with Key Cutting-Edge Biotechnologies 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4.1 The Increasing Accessibility of Biotechnology Tools and Techniques Exacerbates Safety and Security Risks 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4.2 Emerging\/Re-emerging Infectious Diseases Aggravate the Misuse and Abuse Risk of Cutting-Edge Biotechnologies 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4.3 Integration and Innovation in the Field of Cutting-Edge Technologies Aggravate Safety and Security Risk 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.5 Conclusions 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Convergence of Science and Technology 95\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eRalf Trapp\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.1 Introduction 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.2 Convergence of Science and Technology in the Life Sciences 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.3 Convergence and Arms Control and Security 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.4 Technologies of Particular Relevance for Possible Misuse of Biology for Nefarious Purposes 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.5 Mitigation of the Evolving Misuse Potential Resulting from Convergence 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Role of the Life Science Community in Strengthening the Web of Prevention for Biosafety and Biosecurity 107\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eTatyana Novossiolova\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1 Introduction 108\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.2 Integrating Biosafety with Biosecurity: The Web of Prevention as a Model Concept 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3 Addressing the Threat of Deliberate Biological Events and Life Science Misuse 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3.1 Multi-layered Framework for Response to Deliberate Biological Events 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3.2 An Integrated Approach for Biological Risk Management in Life Science Research and Innovation 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3.3 Biosecurity Risk Communication and Public Engagement 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.4 Implications for the Governance of Biotechnology in the Twenty-first Century 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 The 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC 121\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eJez Littlewood\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.1 Introduction 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.2 The Origins and Evolution of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.3 The Review Conferences of the BTWC and Their Outcomes: 1980–2022 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.4 Biological Disarmament as It Is: Strengths and Weakness of the BTWC and the Geneva Protocol in the Twenty-first Century 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.5 The BTWC Beyond 50 and the Geneva Protocol Beyond 100: Can They Prevent Biological Warfare? 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.6 Conclusion 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Constraining the Weaponisation of Pathogens and Toxic Chemicals Through International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law 133\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael Crowley\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.1 Introduction 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2 International Humanitarian Law 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.1 Introduction 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2 Over-arching IHL Obligations Constraining Weaponisation of Toxic Chemicals and Pathogens 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.1 The Prohibition of Deliberate Attacks on Civilians, the Prohibition of Indiscriminate Weapons and of Attacks That Do Not Discriminate Between Civilians and Military Objectives 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.2 The Prohibition of the Employment of Means and Methods of Warfare of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering (SIRUS) 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.3 The Protection of Persons Considered Hors de Combat 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.4 Requirement to Respect and Ensure Respect of International Humanitarian Law 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.5 Prohibition of Methods or Means of Warfare Intended to Cause Widespread, Long-term and Severe Damage to the Natural Environment; Prohibition on the Deliberate Destruction of the Natural Environment as a Form of Weapon 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.6 Obligations to Review ‘New’ Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3 International Human Rights Law 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.1 Introduction 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.2 Protection of the Right to Life and Restrictions on the Use of Force 139\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.2.1 Application to Riot Control Agents (RCAs) 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.2.2 Application to CNS-Acting Chemical Agent Weapons 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.3 Prohibition Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.3.1 Application to Psychoactive (CNS)-Acting Chemical Agents 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.3.2 Application to Riot Control Agents 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.4 Obligations to Review and Monitor the Use of ‘Less Lethal’ Weapons 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.4 Conclusions 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 The Role of International Organisations in Biosecurity and the Prevention of Biological Warfare 147\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eLouison Mazeaud, James Revill, Jaroslav Krasny, and Vivienne Zhang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.1 Introduction 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.2 The Role of IOs in Fostering the Norm Against Biological Weapons 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3 IOs in the Genesis of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3.1 Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3.2 The UN Secretary-General’s CBW Report 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3.3 The WHO Report on Health Aspects of CBW 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4 IOs and the Evolution of Biosecurity Governance 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.1 UNSC Resolution 1540 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.2 UN Secretary General’s Mechanism (Authoritative and Objective Assessment) 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.3 Tending the BWC: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and the Work of Unoda 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.4 WHO, Biosecurity and the Governance of Dual-Use Research 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.5 Combatting Biological Crimes: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.6 Unidir 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.5 The Strengths of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.6 The Limits of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.7 Conclusions 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Laboratory Biorisk Management as a Key Tool for Scientists to Understand Future Biological Threats and Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 161\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eMayra Ameneiros\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.1 History, Context and Current International Guidance 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.2 Biosafety and Biosecurity Awareness 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.3 The Role of Scientists: Tailored Biorisk Management Practices 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.4 Case Scenarios: Practical Examples 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.5 An Ongoing Cycle to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Examples of Biorisk Management National Regulatory Frameworks 173\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eDana Perkins and Lela Bakanidze\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.1 Introduction 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.2 Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity in the US 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.3 Import–Export and Transportation of Infectious Substances in the US 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.4 Genetic Engineering and Dual-Use Oversight in the US 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.5 The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Responsible Conduct in the US 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.6 The Biorisk Management National Regulatory Framework of Georgia 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.7 Conclusion 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Lessons from ePPP Research and the COVID-19 Pandemic 189\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eNariyoshi Shinomiya\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.1 Advances in Life Science and Technology and the Emergence of ‘So-Called GOF Studies’ to Create ePPPs 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.2 Controversy Surrounding GOF Studies on H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.3 COVID-19 and GOF Studies on SARS-like Viruses 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.4 Ongoing Discussions at the NSABB and Governance by HHS 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.5 Future Governance of GOF Research and Prospects 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e16 The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines 201\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eYang Xue\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1 Relations Between the Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1.1 Commonality in International Soft Law 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1.2 Commonality in Global Public Goods 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1.3 Effective Multilateralism 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2 BTWC Advances the Formulation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Responsible Scientific Research 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2.1 Institutional Basis of BTWC for Responsible Scientific Research 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2.2 BTWC Advances the Development of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Scientific Research 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3 Constitution of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines: Ideas, Principles, Elements and Path Formation 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3.1 Ideas 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3.2 Principles 208\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3.3 Path Formation 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.4 Future Discussion 210\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e17 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management 213\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eYuhan Bao and Alonso Flores\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.1 Introduction: Scientists Engagement and Biorisk Management 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management at International Level: Case from IWG Assessment Framework 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2.1 Building the Culture of Responsibility: The Key Elements and Approaches of Engaging Scientist in Biorisk Management 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2.2 Improving the Culture of Responsibility: Engaging Scientist in the Assessment of Biorisk Management Systems 218\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.3 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in National Institutional Oversight: Case from the Netherlands 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in Community: Case from iGEM 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4.1 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Safety Rules Checklist and Safety Screening System 221\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4.2 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Human Practices Programme 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.5 Conclusion: How to Engage Scientists in Management of Biorisk and Other Emerging Fields 223\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 223\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e18 The Role of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use 225\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eLeifan Wang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.1 The Dual-Use Concept and Concerns 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2 Ethics as an Instrument on Dual-Use Governance 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2.1 Ethics Promote Responsible Practices on Dual Use 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2.2 Limitation of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.3 Existing and Complementary Ethical Guidelines on Dual Use 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4 Recent Dual-Use Scenarios 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.1 Synthetic Biology 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.2 Gene Editing 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.3 Neuroscience 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.4 Digital Biological Data 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.5 Ethical Education for Future Dual Use 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e19 Where Is the Governance of Dual-Use Science Going? 237\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eNancy Connell and Gigi Gronvall\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.1 Background: Genetic Technologies and Their Applications 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.2 Dual-Use Science: Evolving Story of a Dualistic Term 239\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3 Begin with the Experts: Models of Self-regulation 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.1 From Asilomar to Napa 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.2 Tools for Self-regulation: Risk and Benefit Analyses: Useful Frameworks 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.3 A Patchwork of Layered Oversight, from Global to Local 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.4 Self-regulation: The Basis of Scientific Enterprise 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.5 Oversight Along the Life Cycle of Research: Universities Are Sites of Layered Governance 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.6 Toward an International Model: International Collaboration in Science and Technology (ICST) 244\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.7 International Standards for Biosafety and Biosecurity 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4 Alternative Governance Structures 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4.1 Hybrid Governance Models 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4.2 Network-Based Governance 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4.3 Transnational Governance 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.5 Conclusion 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 248\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e20 Towards an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) 251\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eKathryn Millett and Lijun Shang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.1 Introduction 252\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.2 The Need for Biosecurity Education, Awareness-Raising and a Culture of Responsibility in the Life Sciences 252\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.3 Past Efforts in Educating Life Scientists and Establishing a Culture of Responsibility 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.4 Challenges Faced by Biosecurity Education and Awareness-Raising 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5 Comparable Approaches Implemented in Analogous Frameworks in the Nuclear and Chemistry Fields 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.1 IAEA Nuclear Security Culture and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) 260\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.2 Chemical Weapons Convention and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) 262\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3 Key Lessons from the INSEN and ABEO for an International Biosecurity Educational Network (IBSEN) 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.1 Comprehensive Understanding Learned from Related Initiatives 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.2 A Biosecurity Education Network Must Be Underpinned by Firm and Sustained Commitment from States and the Future Network’s Host Body (Such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.3 Sustained Financial Support Observed and Maintained 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.4 Strategic Vision and Clear Pathways Are Required for Communication and Collaboration Between a Network and Treaty Bodies\/States 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.5 Diversity of Memberships and Engagement with a Wide Range of Stakeholders 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.6 Conclusion 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 268\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix A: The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists 269\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 273\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLijun Shang, PhD, \u003c\/b\u003eis Professor of Biomedical Sciences in the School of Human Sciences at London Metropolitan University, UK. He is the founding Director of the Biological Security Research Centre. His research focuses primarily on ion channels in the fields of health and disease.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWeiwen Zhang, PhD, \u003c\/b\u003eis Baiyang Chair Professor of Microbiology and Biochemical Engineering at Tianjin University of China, China. His recent research is focused on synthetic biology and governance of dual-use issues, and he currently serves as Chief Scientist of the National Key Research and Development Program of Synthetic Biology in China.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMalcolm Dando, PhD, \u003c\/b\u003eis a Fellow of the UK Royal Society of Biology. He is Emeritus Professor at the University of Bradford, UK and is the author of \u003ci\u003eNeuroscience and the Problem of Dual Use: Neuroethics in New Brain Projects.\u003c\/i\u003e   \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eA guide to minimizing the threat of misusing benignly intended and dual-use biological research \u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective\u003c\/i\u003e, a team of distinguished researchers delivers a fundamental resource designed to raise awareness and understanding of biological security as it pertains to the malign manipulation of benignly intended scientific research.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWritten by experts who have spent decades involved in biological security issues, the book is systematically organized to make it accessible to a wide range of life scientists likely to encounter dangerous opportunities for the deliberate misuse of their research. Readers will also find:  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA thorough introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComprehensive explorations of the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePractical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimize their risk \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExpert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organizations \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerfect for professionals working in life sciences, medicine, global health, biosafety, and biosecurity, \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective \u003c\/i\u003ewill also benefit anyone with an interest in and being responsible for biological security.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989159198949,"sku":"NP9781394189014","price":125.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781394189014.jpg?v=1761783033","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/essentials-of-biological-security-isbn-9781394189014","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}