{"product_id":"economic-market-design-and-planning-for-electric-power-systems-isbn-9780470472088","title":"Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems","description":"\u003cb\u003eDiscover cutting-edge developments in electric power systems\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cp\u003eStemming from cutting-edge research and education activities in the field of electric power systems, this book brings together the knowledge of a panel of experts in economics, the social sciences, and electric power systems. In ten concise and comprehensible chapters, the book provides unprecedented coverage of the operation, control, planning, and design of electric power systems. It also discusses:\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eA framework for interdisciplinary research and education\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eModeling electricity markets\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternative economic criteria and proactive planning for transmission investment in deregulated power systems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePayment cost minimization with demand bids and partial capacity cost compensations for day-ahead electricity auctions\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eDynamic oligopolistic competition in an electric power network and impacts of infrastructure disruptions\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eReliability in monopolies and duopolies\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding an efficient, reliable, and sustainable power system\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk-based power system planning integrating social and economic direct and indirect costs\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eModels for transmission expansion planning based on reconfiguration capacitor switching\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eNext-generation optimization for electric power systems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eMost chapters end with a bibliography, closing remarks, conclusions, or future work. \u003ci\u003eEconomic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems\u003c\/i\u003e is an indispensable reference for policy-makers, executives and engineers of electric utilities, university faculty members, and graduate students and researchers in control theory, electric power systems, economics, and the social sciences.\u003c\/p\u003e  Preface.  \u003cp\u003eContributors.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. A Framework for Interdisciplinary Research and Education (\u003ci\u003eJames Momoh\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 Power System Challenges.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 Solution of the EPNES Architecture.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.4 Implementation Strategies for EPNES.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.5 Test Beds for EPNES.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.6 Examples of Funded Research Work in Response to the EPNES Solicitation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.7 Future Directions of EPNES.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.8 Conclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Modeling Electricity Markets: A Brief Introduction (\u003ci\u003eAlfredo Garcia, Lamine Mili, and James Momoh\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 The Basic Structure of a Market for Electricity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 Modeling Strategic Behavior.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 The Locational Marginal Pricing System of PJM.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 LMP Calculation using Adaptive Dynamic Programming.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.6 Conclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. Alternative Economic Criteria and Proactive Planning for Transmission Investment in Deregulated Power Systems (\u003ci\u003eEnzo E. Sauma and Shmuel S. Oren\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Conflict Optimization Objectives for Network Expansions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Policy Implications.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Proactive Transmission Planning.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 Illustrative Example.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Conclusions and Future Work.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. Payment Cost Minimization with Demand Bids and Partial Capacity Cost Compensations for Day-Ahead Electricity Auctions (\u003ci\u003ePeter B. Luh, Ying Chen, Joseph H. Yan, Gary A. Stern, William E. Blankson, and Feng Zhao\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Literature Review.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 Problem Formulation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 Solution Methodology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5 Results and Insights.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6 Conclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgement.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5. Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions (\u003ci\u003eReetabrata Mookherjee, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Terry L. Friesz and Matthew A. Rigdon\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Introduction and Motivation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 Summary and Modeling Approach.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 Model Description.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Formulation of NCP.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Numerical Example.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 Conclusions and Future Work.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgement.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: Glossary of Relevant Terms form Electricity Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.  \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6. Reliability in Monopolies and Duopolies: A Comparison of Market Outcomes with Socially Optimal Levels (\u003ci\u003eGeorge Deltas and Christoforos Hadjicosti\u003c\/i\u003es).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Modeling Framework.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 Profit Maximization Outcome of a Monopolistic Generator.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Nash Equilibrium in a Duopolistic Market Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.5 Social Optimum.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.6 Comparison of Equilibria and Discussion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.7 Asymmetric Maintenance Policies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.8 Conclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgement.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7. Building an Efficient Reliable and Sustainable Power System: An Interdisciplinary Approach (\u003ci\u003eJames A. Momoh , Philip Fanara Jr., Haydar Kurban,and L. Jide Iwarere\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2 Overview of Concepts.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3 Theoretical Foundations: Theoretical Support for Handling Contingencies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4 Design Methodologies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.5 Implementation Approach.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.6 Implementation Results.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.7 Conclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8. Risk-Based Power System Planning Integrating Social and Economic Direct and Indirect Costs (\u003ci\u003eLamine Mili and Kevin Dooley\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.2 The Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.3 Partitioned Mutiobjective Risk Method Applied to Power System Planning.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.4 Integrating the Social and Economic Impacts in Power System Planning.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.5 Energy Crises and Public Crises.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.6 Conclusions and Future Work.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9. Models for Transmission Expansion Planning based on Reconfigurable Capacitor Switching (\u003ci\u003eJames McCalley, Ratnesh Kumar, V. Ajjarapu, Oscar Volij, H. Liu, L. Jin, and Wen Shang\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.2 Planning Processes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3 Transmission Limits.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.4 Decision Support Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.5 Market Efficiency and Transmission Investment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.6 Summary.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10. Next Generation Optimization for Electric Power Systems (James \u003ci\u003eA. Momoh\u003c\/i\u003e).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.1 Introduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.2 Structure of the Next Generation of Optimization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.3 Foundation of the Next Generation Optimization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.4 Application of Next Generation Optimization to Power Systems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.5 Grant Challenges in Next Generation Optimization and Research Needs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.6 Concluding Remarks and Benchmarks Problems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBibliography.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex. \u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cb\u003eJames Momoh\u003c\/b\u003e was chair of the Electrical Engineering Department at Howard University and director of the Center for Energy Systems and Control. In 1987, Momoh received a National Science Foundation (NSF) Presidential Young Investigator Award. He is a Fellow of the IEEE, a Distinguished Fellow of the Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE), and a Fellow of the Nigerian Academy of Engineering (NAE). His current research activities for utility firms and government agencies span several areas in systems engineering, optimization, and energy systems' control of terrestrial, space, and naval complex and dynamic networks. He has authored more than 225 technical papers in refereed journals, transactions, or proceedings, as well as several textbooks.  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLAMINE MILI\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Virginia Tech. An IEEE Senior Member, Dr. Mili is also a member of the Institute of Mathematical Statistics and the American Statistical Association. He is a recipient of a 1990 NSF Research Initiation Award and a 1992 NSF Young Investigator Award. His research interests include risk assessment and management of critical infrastructures, cascading failure modeling, power system planning, power system analysis and control, electric load forecasting, bifurcation theory and chaos, nonlinear optimization, and robust statistics as applied to engineering problems. Dr. Mili is the cofounder and coeditor of the \u003ci\u003eInternational Journal of Critical Infrastructures\u003c\/i\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cb\u003eDiscover cutting-edge developments in electric power systems\u003c\/b\u003e  \u003cp\u003eStemming from cutting-edge research and education activities in the field of electric power systems, this book brings together the knowledge of a panel of experts in economics, the social sciences, and electric power systems. In ten concise and comprehensible chapters, the book provides unprecedented coverage of the operation, control, planning, and design of electric power systems. It also discusses:\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eA framework for interdisciplinary research and education\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eModeling electricity markets\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternative economic criteria and proactive planning for transmission investment in deregulated power systems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePayment cost minimization with demand bids and partial capacity cost compensations for day-ahead electricity auctions\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eDynamic oligopolistic competition in an electric power network and impacts of infrastructure disruptions\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eReliability in monopolies and duopolies\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding an efficient, reliable, and sustainable power system\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk-based power system planning integrating social and economic direct and indirect costs\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eModels for transmission expansion planning based on reconfiguration capacitor switching\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eNext-generation optimization for electric power systems\u003c\/p\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eMost chapters end with a bibliography, closing remarks, conclusions, or future work. \u003ci\u003eEconomic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems\u003c\/i\u003e is an indispensable reference for policy-makers, executives and engineers of electric utilities, university faculty members, and graduate students and researchers in control theory, electric power systems, economics, and the social sciences.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-IEEE Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47989101560037,"sku":"NP9780470472088","price":179.95,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470472088.jpg?v=1761782801","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/economic-market-design-and-planning-for-electric-power-systems-isbn-9780470472088","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}