{"product_id":"corporate-governance-isbn-9780470972595","title":"Corporate Governance","description":"In the wake of the recent global financial collapse the timely new edition of this successful text provides students and business professionals with a welcome update of the key issues facing managers, boards of directors, investors, and shareholders.  \u003cp\u003eIn addition to its authoritative overview of the history, the myth and the reality of corporate governance, this new edition has been updated to include:\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eanalysis of the financial crisis;\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003ethe reasons for the global scale of the recession\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003ethe failure of international risk management\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAn overview of corporate governance guidelines and codes of practice;\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003enew cases.\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003eOnce again in the new edition of their textbook, Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow show clearly the role of corporate governance in making sure the right questions are asked and the necessary checks and balances in place to protect the long-term, sustainable value of the enterprise.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFeatures 18 case studies of institutions and corporations in crisis, and analyses the reasons for their fall (Cases include Lehman Brothers, General Motors, American Express, Time Warner, IBM and Premier Oil.)\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCases in Point xiii\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Preface xvii\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Acknowledgments xxvii\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Introduction – How to Use this Book 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. What is a Corporation? 3\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefining the Corporate Structure, Purpose, and Powers 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvolution of the Corporate Structure 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Purpose of a Corporation 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSatisfying the human need for ambition, creativity, and meaning 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSocial structure 10\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEfficiency and efficacy 10\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUbiquity and flexibility 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIdentity 11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMetaphor 1: The Corporation as a “Person” 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMetaphor 2: The Corporation as a Complex Adaptive System 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre Corporate Decisions “Moral”? 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre Corporations Accountable? 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThree Key External Mechanisms for Directing Corporate Behavior: Law, the Market, and Performance Measurement 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment: legislation, regulation, enforcement 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Does “Within the Limits of the Law” Mean? 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhen and how do you punish a corporation? 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProbation of corporations 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem of serial offenders 31\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecurities analyst settlement 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat is the role of shareholders in making this system work? 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe market: too big to fail 36\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe corporation and elections 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCitizens united 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe corporation and the law 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Market Test: Measuring Performance 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong term versus short term 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate decision making: whose interests does this “person”\/adaptive creature serve? 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnother (failed) market test: NGOs 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeasuring value enhancement 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGaap 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket value 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarnings per share 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEVA ® : economic value added 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHuman capital: “It’s not what you own but what you know” 72\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “value chain” 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowledge capital 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe value of cash 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate “externalities” 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquilibrium: The Cadbury Paradigm 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG: Environment, Social Governance – A New Way to Analyze Investment Risk and Value 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuantifying Nontraditional Assets and Liabilities 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFuture Directions 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Discussion Questions 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Shareholders: Ownership 101\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefinitions 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Concepts of Ownership 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Concepts of the Corporation 107\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Dual Heritage: Individual and Corporate “Rights” 108\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Reinvention of the Corporation: Eastern Europe in the 1990s 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Evolution of the American Corporation 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Essential Elements of the Corporate Structure 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Mechanics of Shareholder Rights 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Separation of Ownership and Control, Part 1: Berle and Means 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFractionated Ownership 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Separation of Ownership and Control, Part 2: The Takeover Era 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWaking the Sleeping Giant 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Framework for Shareholder Monitoring and Response 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOwnership and Responsibility 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo innocent shareholder 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo Sell or Not to Sell: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho the Institutional Investors Are 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank trusts 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMutual funds 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInsurance companies 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUniversities and foundations 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExecutive pay from the consumer side – a leading indicator of risk 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePension plans 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Biggest Pool of Money in the World 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePension plans as investors 164\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePension plans as owners 166\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublic Pension Funds 169\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDivestment initiatives 188\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomically targeted investments 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAfscme 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFederal Employees’ Retirement System 197\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTiaa–cref 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrivate Pension Funds 201\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Sleeping Giant Awakens: Shareholder Proxy Proposals on Governance Issues 206\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocus on the Board 212\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedge Funds 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSynthesis: Hermes 221\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInvesting in Activism 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Models and New Paradigms 223\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “Ideal Owner” 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePension Funds as “Ideal Owners” 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs the “Ideal Owner” Enough? 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Discussion Questions 236\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Directors: Monitoring 251\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief History of Anglo-American Boards 255\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Are They? 256\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSize 256\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTerm 256\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInside\/outside mix 257\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualifications 261\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Leads the Board? Splitting the Chairman and CEO and the Rise of the Lead Director 261\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgenda 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMinutes 263\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiversity 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeetings 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCommunicating with Shareholders 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpecial Obligations of Audit Committees 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOwnership\/Compensation 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePost-Sarbanes–Oxley Changes 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoard Duties: The Legal Framework 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Board’s Agenda 281\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Evolution of Board Responsibilities: The Takeover Era 283\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Fiduciary Standard and the Delaware Factor 284\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow did boards respond? 287\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGreenmail 287\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Poison pills” 288\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther anti-takeover devices 290\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Director’s Role in Crisis 291\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimits and Obstacles to Board Oversight of Managers 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformation Flow 295\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePractical Limits: Time and Money 301\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Years of Corporate Scandals – Boards Begin to Ask for More 302\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirector Information Checklist 303\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho Runs the Board? 304\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCatch 22: The Ex-CEO as Director 306\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirector Resignation 308\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEO Succession 308\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirector Nomination 309\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimits and Obstacles to Effective Board Oversight by Shareholders 318\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCarrots: Director Compensation and Incentives 319\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSticks, Part 1: Can Investors Ensure or Improve Board Independence by Replacing Directors who Perform Badly or Suing Directors who Fail to Act as Fiduciaries? 324\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCan Directors be Held Accountable through the Election Process? 324\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStaggered boards 327\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfidential voting 328\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSticks, Part 2: Suing for Failure to Protect the Interests of Shareholders – Are the Duties of Care and Loyalty Enforceable? 331\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFuture Directions 331\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMajority voting and proxy access 331\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImproving director compensation 333\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncreasing the authority of independent directors 333\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“A market for independent directors” 335\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Designated director” 336\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoard evaluation 336\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExecutive session meetings 336\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSuccession planning and strategic planning 337\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaking directors genuinely “independent” 337\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInvolvement by the federal government 338\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInvolvement by shareholders 339\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Discussion Questions 339\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 340\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Management: Performance 347\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction 348\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Do We Want from the CEO? 354\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Biggest Challenge 359\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk Management 363\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExecutive Compensation 363\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe pay Czar 370\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePost-meltdown pay 370\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Council of Institutional Investors 371\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStock Options 374\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRestricted Stock 379\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes, We Have Good Examples 380\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShareholder Concerns: Several Ways to Pay Day 380\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “guaranteed bonus” – the ultimate oxymoron 380\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeliberate obfuscation 381\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Christmas tree 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompensation plans that are all upside and no downside 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLoans 382\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccelerated vesting of options 383\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManipulation of earnings to support bonuses 383\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManipulation of peer groups 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHuge disparity between CEO and other top executives 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImputed years of service 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExcessive departure packages 384\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackdating, bullet-dodging, and spring-loading options 385\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhony cuts 386\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGolden hellos 386\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTransaction bonuses 386\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGross-ups and other perquisites 387\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRetirement benefits 387\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObstacles to restitution when CEOs are overpaid 387\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFuture Directions for Executive Compensation 388\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEO Employment Contracts 389\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCause 390\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChange of control 391\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHalf now, half later 391\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEO Succession Planning 391\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSarbanes–Oxley 392\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCreation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 392\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSection 404 393\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther changes 394\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDodd–Frank 394\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmployees: Compensation and Ownership 395\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmployee Stock Ownership Plans 399\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMondragón and Symmetry: Integration of Employees, Owners, and Directors 403\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 409\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and Discussion Questions 410\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 411\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. International Corporate Governance 415\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Institutional Investor as Proxy for the Public Interest 429\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNorway in the driver’s seat 431\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe International Corporate Governance Network 433\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eICGN: Statement of Principles on Institutional Shareholder Responsibilities 433\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Global Corporate Governance Forum 435\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSweden 435\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCanada 437\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSingapore 438\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRussia 441\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGermany 442\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChina 443\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJapan 444\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernanceMetrics International (GMI) 445\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWorld Bank and G7 Response 458\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAzerbaijan 459\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSlovakia 460\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJordan 460\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThailand 461\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePoland 461\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Global Carbon Project (GCP) 464\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Common Framework for Sustainability Reporting 465\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTowards a Common Language 468\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVision 470\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary And Discussion Questions 471\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 473\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6. Afterword: Final Thoughts and Future Directions 475\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond the Nation State 477\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment as Shareholder: The Institutional Investor as Proxy for the Public Interest 484\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes 486\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Index 489\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cb\u003eRobert A.G. Monks\u003c\/b\u003e and \u003cb\u003eNell Minow\u003c\/b\u003e are founders of GovernanceMetrics International, the leading independent research firm dedicated to corporate governance. Formerly principals of the Lens Fund and officers of Institutional Shareholder Services, Monks \u0026amp; Minow have also collaborated on two other books: Power and Accountability and Watching the Watchers.  In a business environment that is increasingly volatile, it is essential for business students to understand the relationships between managers, boards of directors, shareholders, and investors.  \u003cp\u003eThe new edition of this acclaimed text offers an indispensable guide to the key concepts of corporate governance every student and business professional should know. It includes more exercises and student questions, penetrating analysis of the latest examples of corporate failure and controversy, and the lively \"cases in point\" which have characterized previous editions. The fully revised, web-based Instructor Manual is available to adopters, together with a web link to The Corporate Library, the leading independent research firm in the field.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Monks and Minow have produced a trove that defines a field. Their fifth edition of Corporate Governance unpacks and exposes the intricacies, conflicts and misalignments that too often characterize today’s global capital market. And they do it in a readable format that is bound to remain the essential, encyclopedic resource for anyone probing the way public companies really work.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eStephen Davis,\u003c\/b\u003e Executive Director, Millstein Center for Corporate Governance-\u0026amp; Performance Yale School of Management\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Robert Monks and Nell Minow have been key contributors to corporate governance debates and developments for many years. This widely used textbook, now in its fifth edition, provides readers with the benefit of the insights and wisdom they have accumulated in the process.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eProfessor Lucian A. Bebchuk,\u003c\/b\u003e Harvard Law School\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Monks \u0026amp; Minow has become the authoritative teaching text book in corporate governance.  There is no real rival.  It has long been a must read for any serious student of corporate governance and has been a required purchase in my corporate governance seminar since it first appeared in 1995.  No corporate governance library would be complete without a copy.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eCharles M. Elson ,\u003c\/b\u003e John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, Alfred Lerner College of Business \u0026amp; Economics, University of Delaware\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Monks and Minow are acknowledged pioneers in the corporate governance movement; articulate, honest, and constructive activists, of which we need more.  They will make managers, boards, shareholders and regulators, and all of us, \"think\" hard about personal values and objectives, let alone those of the corporation. No one else has undertaken this task as comprehensively, using text and case examples.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eIra Millstein,\u003c\/b\u003e Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal \u0026amp; Manges LLP., Theodore Nierenberg Adjunct Professor of Corporate Governance at the Yale School of Management\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“The fifth edition of Monks and Minow's classic adds to their already rich study of corporate governance a timely reflection on the challenges presented by the recent financial crisis. From this important book, students, academics, practitioners, politicians and the general public will receive a wealth of insight and analysis derived from the vast knowledge and experience of the book's distinguished authors.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eProfessor Andrew T. Williams,\u003c\/b\u003e Co-Author of The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism Associate, The Elfenworks Center for the Study of Fiduciary Capitalism, Saint Mary’s College of California.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Corporate governance defines the system of checks and balances required to keep corporations vital, focused and poised to take advantage of change. In this book, Monks and Minow lucidly describe the structures and processes of governance and illuminate their text with relevant and up-to-date case studies. This is the one volume you need in order to understand the fundamental issues currently facing the corporate world and those it serves; I cannot commend it too highly.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eAdrian Cadbury\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“In the 5\u003csup\u003eth\u003c\/sup\u003e edition of ‘Corporate Governance’, Bob Monks and Nell Minow provide an interesting, exciting and thought-provoking exposition of the state of corporate governance across the world today.  Key areas of particular interest are discussed with a deep and discerning insight whilst a rich tapestry of case studies provides the reader with real world illustrations of the issues which may arise.  The book is comprehensive in its coverage and with its extensive use of topical examples is a ‘must buy’ for everyone with an interest in corporate governance.”\u003cbr\u003e — \u003cb\u003eChris Mallin,\u003c\/b\u003e Professor of Corporate Governance and Finance, Director Centre for Corporate Governance Research, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47988994113765,"sku":"NP9780470972595","price":59.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470972595.jpg?v=1761782352","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/corporate-governance-isbn-9780470972595","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}