{"product_id":"corporate-governance-isbn-9780470870303","title":"Corporate Governance","description":"The decade since the publication of the Cadbury Report in1992 has seen growing interest in corporate governance. This growth has recently become an explosion with major corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron in the US, the international diffusion of corporate governance codes and wider interest in researching corporate governance in different institutional contexts and through different subject lenses.  \u003cp\u003eIn view of these developments, this book will be a rigorous update and development of the editor’s earlier work, \u003ci\u003eCorporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues\u003c\/i\u003e.   Each chapter, written by an expert in the subject offers a high level review of the topic, embracing material from financial accounting, strategy and economic perspectives. \u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cb\u003eAbout the contributors\u003c\/b\u003e xi  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Introduction\u003c\/b\u003e (Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Mike Wright).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternative perspectives on corporate governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBackground to corporate governance reform.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance reforms: the early days.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew perspectives from the 1990s.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe volume’s contents.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 The Development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK\u003c\/b\u003e (Kevin Keasey, Helen Short and Mike Wright).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate governance in the UK – definitions and framework.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolution of policy recommendations – from Cadbury to Hampel.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolution of governance policy – from Combined Code I to Combined Code II.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverview of policy evolution.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Financial Structure and Corporate Governance\u003c\/b\u003e (Robert Watson and Mahmoud Ezzamel).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapital structure and financial risk.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoes capital structure matter?\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe agency costs of debt.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmployees as residual claimants.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the UK\u003c\/b\u003e (Helen Short and Kevin Keasey).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional shareholdings in the UK.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral overview of the objectives and incentives of institutions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe willingness and ability of institutions to intervene in the governance of corporations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMethods of intervention.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance by institutional shareholders: empirical evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary and conclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Boards of Directors and the Role of Non-executive Directors in the Governance of Corporations\u003c\/b\u003e (Mahmoud Ezzamel and Robert Watson).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe corporate form, governance and the board of directors.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe UK’s governance by disclosure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Executive Pay and UK Corporate Governance\u003c\/b\u003e (Alistair Bruce and Trevor Buck).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExecutive pay and corporate governance in the UK: an overview.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe empirical analysis of executive pay.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExecutive pay evolution in the UK.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerformance indicator(s).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurther discretionary elements in LTIP design.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMix of remuneration components.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDisclosure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Compensation Committees and Executive Compensation: Evidence from Publicly Traded UK Firms\u003c\/b\u003e (Rocio Bonet and Martin J. Conyon).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompensation committees and executive pay.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrior literature.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew data and results.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiscussion and conclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 The Governance Role of Takeovers\u003c\/b\u003e (Noel O’Sullivan and Pauline Wong).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTakeovers and company performance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe likelihood of takeover success.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePost-acquisition performance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagement turnover subsequent to takeover.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe consequences of takeover failure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Governance and Strategic Leadership in Entrepreneurial Firms\u003c\/b\u003e (Catherine M. Dalton, Patricia P. McDougall, Jeffrey G. Covin and Dan R. Dalton).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance and strategic leadership do matter.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEOs\/Founders.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEO duality.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTop management teams.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoards of directors.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVenture capitalists.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiscussion: an opportunity lost.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Corporate Governance: The Role of Venture Capitalists and Buy-outs\u003c\/b\u003e (Mike Wright, Steve Thompson and Andrew Burrows).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheoretical issues.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Explaining Western Securities Markets\u003c\/b\u003e (Mark J. Roe).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe argument: corporate law as propelling diffuse ownership.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate law’s limits.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eData: political variables as the strongest predictor of ownership separation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion: politics and corporate law as explanations for securities markets.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 International Corporate Governance\u003c\/b\u003e (Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst generation international corporate governance research.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond generation international corporate governance research.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConvergence in corporate governance systems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion and directions for future research.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Corporate Governance in Germany\u003c\/b\u003e (Marc Goergen, Miguel C. Manjon and Luc Renneboog).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOwnership and control.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternal corporate governance mechanisms.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExternal corporate governance mechanisms.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe recent evolution of corporate governance regulation and stock exchange structures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Network Opportunities and Constraints in Japan’s Banking Industry: A Social Exchange Perspective on Governance\u003c\/b\u003e (William P. Wan, Robert E. Hoskisson, Hicheon Kim and Daphne Yiu).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJapan’s main bank system.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA social exchange approach to Japan’s banking networks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOpportunities and constraints in Japan’s banking networks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImplications and conclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Analysing Change in Corporate Governance: The Example of France\u003c\/b\u003e (Mary O’Sullivan).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnderstanding systems of corporate governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe ownership and financing of French corporations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImplications for French corporate governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of structure in corporate governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e16 Ownership and Control of Chinese Public Corporations: A State-dominated Corporate Governance System\u003c\/b\u003e (Guy S. Liu and Pei Sun).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverview of the Chinese corporate governance system.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUltimate ownership, intermediate shareholding classes, and their relation to corporate performance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolution of ownership and control and its determinants.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcluding remarks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e17 Corporate Governance in Transition Economies\u003c\/b\u003e (Mike Wright, Trevor Buck and Igor Filatotchev).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate governance and differing privatisation approaches in transition economies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorporate governance in transition economies.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePost-privatisation governance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStudies of the effects of different ownership and governance forms.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndex\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e “The closely argues material is relevant for students studying the subject on undergraduate or post-graduate programmes” (Professional Manager, July 2005)  \u003cb\u003eKevin Keasey\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Finance and the Director of the International Institute of Banking and Financial Services, Leeds University Business School, The University of Leeds. Kevin is an author of 10 books, monographs and edited volumes on small firm finance, corporate governance and financial markets, and is the author of over 75 refereed articles in leading international journals. His research covers a range of disciplinary perspectives and methodologies from the empirical to the experimental.  \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSteve Thompson\u003c\/b\u003e is currently a professor in Nottingham University Business School, having previously held positions in economics departments and business schools in the UK, the USA and Ireland.  He has published approximately 100 articles in economics and business journals that include \u003ci\u003eReview of Ecomomics and Statistics, European Economic Review, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Strategic Management Journal,\u003c\/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003eJournal of Management Studies\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMike Wright\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Financial Studies and Director of the Centre for Management Buy-out Research at Nottingham University Business School. He is a visiting professor at INSEAD, Erasmus University and University of Siena and an editor of \u003ci\u003eJournal of Management Studies\u003c\/i\u003e. He is the author of over 25 books and more than 200 papers in academic journals in the areas of corporate governance and restructuring, venture capital, management buy-outs and entrepreneurship.\u003c\/p\u003e  Through a mixture of corporate scandals, increasing concerns about the rights of various stakeholders and the emergence of new economies in the Far East, corporate governance continues to be a key issue for students of economics, finance, business and management. By commissioning acknowledged academic authorities to write in-depth summaries of the debate in their chosen specialities, this text draws together the strands of the corporate governance debate from different disciplinary and country perspectives.  \u003cp\u003eThere is no other book that covers such a range of topics in corporate governance from the perspectives of leading academics across the globe. This book will be essential reading for students studying corporate governance for undergraduate, MA or MBA degrees.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTopics covered include:\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eFinancial Structure and Corporate Governance (Robert Watson and Mahmoud Ezzamel – Durham and Cardiff)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eCompensation Committees and Executive Compensation (Rocio Bonet and Martin Conyon – The Wharton School)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eExplaining Western Securities Markets (Mark Roe – Harvard)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eInternational Corporate Governance (Diane Denis and John McConnell – Purdue)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eCorporate Governance in France (Mary O’Sullivan – INSEAD)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eCorporate Governance in China (Guy Liu and Pei Sun - Brunel and Cambridge)\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47988993851621,"sku":"NP9780470870303","price":74.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780470870303.jpg?v=1761782352","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/corporate-governance-isbn-9780470870303","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}