Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires. Preface.

Introduction.

1. Problems and Preliminaries.

2. The Temptations to Dualism.

3. Eliminativism: Philosophical Issues.

4. Eliminativism: Empirical Issues.

5. Mentalism: Pre-Functionalist Views.

6. Functionalism: Commonalities.

7. Functionalism: Differences.

8. CRTT: Computation (Meeting Descartes' Challenge).

9. CRTT: Representation (Meeting Brentano's Challenge).

Replies to Common Objectives.

Further Capacities (Meeting Levine's Challenge).

"This is an excellent introduction to contemporary issues in the metaphysics of mind, covering all the major twentieth century theories of mind and most of the questions and arguments that have occupied us for the past few decades. It is clearly and engagingly written, full of illuminating examples, wise warnings, and provocative arguments." William G. Lycan, University of North Carolina

"By covering a wide range of topics in a lively and entertaining style, Rey has written a book that is ideal for student use." Kenneth Taylor, Stanford University

Georges Rey is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. In addition to publishing numerous articles in the philosophy of mind, he is co-editor (with Barry Loewer) of Meaning and Mind (Blackwell, 1992). This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.