{"product_id":"contemporary-debates-in-epistemology-isbn-9781119755449","title":"Contemporary Debates in Epistemology","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology, completely overhauled for its third edition \u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Epistemology, \u003c\/i\u003epairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today’s most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNow in its third edition, \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Epistemology\u003c\/i\u003e features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge,\u003cb\u003e \u003c\/b\u003ethe relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003ePresents a rigorous yet accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eContains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e Focuses on core areas of epistemology\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eUses a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAll-new chapters provide fully updated coverage of new and emerging topics in epistemology\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003ePart of the Wiley-Blackwell\u003ci\u003e Contemporary Debates in Philosophy\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cb\u003e \u003c\/b\u003eseries\u003cb\u003e, \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, \u003c\/i\u003eremains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNotes on Contributors vii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface to the Third Edition xiii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface to the Second Edition xiv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface to the First Edition xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction xvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowledge Comes First 1\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMona Simion\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnown Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge 7\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAidan McGlynn\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowledge Still Comes First 14\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMona Simion\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCircumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology 16\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAidan McGlynn\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? 23\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Justification Just in the Head? 23\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eClayton Littlejohn\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Possibility of Internalist Epistemology 36\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eKurt L. Sylvan\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? 55\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really 55\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMatthew McGrath\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSuspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude 66\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJane Friedman\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? 79\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere Are Practical Reasons for Belief 79\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSusanna Rinard\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere Are No Practical Reasons for Belief 81\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eThomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to and Kelly and Cohen 93\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSusanna Rinard\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Is Evidence Permissive? 103\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroductions and Stage-Setting 103\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Permissive Notion of Rationality 105\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMiriam Schoenfield\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be 110\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? 116\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMiriam Schoenfield\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Final Plea for Impermissivism 121\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSome Final Thoughts 123\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMiriam Schoenfield\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePermissivism and Metaepistemology 124\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? 127\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvidence Is Seemings 127\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael Huemer\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvidence Is Not Seemings 134\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMaria Lasonen-Aarnio\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFour Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism 142\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael Huemer\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism 146\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMaria Lasonen-Aarnio\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? 151\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowing Can Include Luck 151\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eStephen Hetherington\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge 159\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDuncan Pritchard\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOn Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question 169\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eStephen Hetherington\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Hetherington 171\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eDuncan Pritchard\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Is the A Priori\/A Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? 175\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs the A Priori\/A Posteriori Distinction Superficial? 175\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eTimothy Williamson\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Significance of A Priori Justification 183\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003ePaul Boghossian\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponse to Boghossian 191\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eTimothy Williamson\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Williamson 194\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003ePaul Boghossian\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? 201\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow to Use Thought Experiments 201\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eElijah Chudnoff\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology 209\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eWesley Buckwalter\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments 218\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eElijah Chudnoff\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions 222\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eWesley Buckwalter\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? 229\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCredences Are Degrees of Belief 229\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eRoger Clarke\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs Belief Credence 1? Depends on What You Mean! 237\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJulia Staffel\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo in the Model, One in the Head 247\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eRoger Clarke\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? 253\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEpistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals 253\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAlex Worsnip\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEpistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals 263\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eJ. Adam Carter\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief Reply to Carter 274\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAlex Worsnip\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? 279\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 279\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eElizabeth Fricker\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnti- Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 290\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSanford C. Goldberg\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComments on Sanford Goldberg’s “Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony” 300\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eElizabeth Fricker\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComments on Elizabeth Fricker’s “A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony” 301\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSanford C. Goldberg\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? 305\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSkepticism Is Common Sense 305\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAllan Hazlett\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSkepticism Is Not Common Sense 311\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eKrista Lawlor\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Lawlor 318\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eAllan Hazlett\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReply to Hazlett 323\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eKrista Lawlor\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? 329\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowledge Is the Norm of Assertion 329\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eMatthew A. Benton\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKnowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion 339\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003ePeter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 355\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Editors\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBLAKE ROEBER\u003c\/b\u003e is Thomas J. and Robert T. Rolfs Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is Associate Editor of Philosophical Studies and has published in Nous, PPR, Mind, and other leading journals.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eERNEST SOSA \u003c\/b\u003eis Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of numerous papers and books on epistemology and is the editor of Nous, Philosophical Issues, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMATTHIAS STEUP\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology and numerous articles on epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth, and Duty and the co-editor of A Companion to Epistemology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJOHN TURRI\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo, where he directs the Philosophical Science Lab. He has published research in many leading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science journals.\u003c\/p\u003e  \u003cp\u003e \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Epistemology \u003c\/i\u003eis the perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and non-specialists in epistemology. Blending accessibility and originality, this acclaimed volume contains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances. Throughout the text, readers develop a clear understanding of the current state of epistemology as they engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA timely introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, this new edition integrates the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays defend divergent perspectives on topics such as epistemic normativity, belief and credence, internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, and more. Two original chapters guide readers on the use of thought experiments in epistemology and offer best practices for students and researchers alike.  \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWith a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion, \u003ci\u003eContemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, \u003c\/i\u003eremains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, professors who are not specialists in epistemology, and epistemologists who want to keep up to date with contemporary epistemological debates.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47988981432549,"sku":"NP9781119755449","price":38.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9781119755449.jpg?v=1761782303","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/contemporary-debates-in-epistemology-isbn-9781119755449","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}