{"product_id":"building-the-great-society-isbn-9780143111436","title":"Building the Great Society","description":"\u003cb\u003eThe author of\u003ci\u003e Lincoln's Boys\u003c\/i\u003e takes us inside Lyndon Johnson's White House to show how the legendary Great Society programs were actually put into practice: \u003ci\u003eTeam of Rivals\u003c\/i\u003e for LBJ.  The personalities behind every burst of 1960s liberal reform - from civil rights and immigration reform, to Medicare and Head Start.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Absorbing, and astoundingly well-researched -- all good historians do their homework, but Zeitz goes above and beyond. It's a more than worthwhile addition to the canon of books about Johnson.\"--NPR\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Beautifully written...a riveting portrait of LBJ... Every officeholder in Washington would profit from reading this book.\" --Robert Dallek, Author of \u003ci\u003eAn Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eFranklin D. Roosevelt: A Political Life\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eLBJ's towering political skills and his ambitious slate of liberal legislation are the stuff of legend: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Medicare, Medicaid, Head Start, and environmental reform. But what happened after the bills passed? One man could not and did not go it alone. Joshua Zeitz reanimates the creative and contentious atmosphere inside Johnson's White House as a talented and energetic group of advisers made LBJ's vision a reality. They desegregated public and private institutions throughout one third of the United States; built Medicare and Medicaid from the ground up in one year; launched federal funding for public education; provided food support for millions of poor children and adults; and launched public television and radio, all in the space of five years, even as Vietnam strained the administration's credibility and budget.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Joe Califano, Harry McPherson and the other staff members who comprised LBJ's inner circle were men as pragmatic and ambitious as Johnson, equally skilled in the art of accumulating power or throwing a sharp elbow. \u003ci\u003eBuilding the Great Society\u003c\/i\u003e is the story of how one of the most competent White House staffs in American history - serving one of the most complicated presidents ever to occupy the Oval Office -  fundamentally changed everyday life for millions of citizens and forged a legacy of compassionate and interventionist government.\u003cb\u003ePraise for \u003ci\u003eBuilding the Great Society\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Building the Great Society\u003c\/i\u003e is endlessly absorbing, and astoundingly well-researched — all good historians do their homework, but Zeitz goes above and beyond. It's a more than worthwhile addition to the canon of books about Johnson.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—NPR, Michael Schaub \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“[A] well-researched and readable history of a vast governmental effort to make America anew.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003e—\u003ci\u003eWall Street Journal\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e“Zeitz draws creatively on memoirs and White House documents. His tales… zip along with style.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe New Republic\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Zeitz’s lively narrative foregrounds the personalities and power plays of Johnson’s White House staff…[his] lucid account yields engrossing insights into one of America’s most hopeful, productive, and tragic political eras.”\u003cbr\u003e—\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003ePublishers Weekly\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\"Zeitz presents accessible, nuanced portraits of the men behind Lyndon B. Johnson’s domestic programs...[and] effectively demonstrates how Johnson assembled one of history’s most productive White House staffs: an amalgam of committed John F. Kennedy holdovers along with new talents from academia, the newspaper world, and think tanks.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003e—Library Journal\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Joshua Zeitz’s beautifully written book is not only a riveting portrait of LBJ and the talented men around him, but also a compelling reminder of what extraordinary political skill it took to enact the body of laws that made America a more humane and admirable society. Every officeholder in Washington would profit from reading this book.”\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e—Robert Dallek, author \u003ci\u003eof An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eFranklin D. Roosevelt: A Political Life\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e“Zeitz argues convincingly that Johnson's team . . . quickly became a smoothly running and effective machine, accomplishing a great amount in a relatively short time . . . A timely reconsideration of the Johnson years.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e—\u003ci\u003eBooklist\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePraise for Joshua Zeitz and \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cb\u003eLincoln's Boys\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/i\u003e“A century before Harry Hopkins, Clark Clifford, or Ted Sorensen, John Hay and John Nicolay performed the duties of presidential aide, adviser, political operative, and confidant. Even the great Abraham Lincoln needed support, and Joshua Zeitz captures perfectly the intimate, interior world of the White House.”\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e—David Plouffe, former White House Senior Adviser\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e ‟What a wonderful, welcome book. Zeitz has pulled off a difficult task—revealing how the myth of Lincoln came to be without distorting the true greatness of our extraordinary sixteenth president.ˮ\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e—Ken Burns (filmmaker)\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e “Joshua Zeitz’s delightful study of John Hay and John Nicolay interweaves intimate biography, political drama, and the shaping of historical memory to produce an arresting and original narrative. Above all, it reminds us that, thanks to Lincoln’s secretaries, the moral dimensions of the emancipationist Civil War could not be bleached from the historical record by an increasingly fashionable understanding of the struggle as a romantic ‘brothers’ conflict.’”\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e—Richard Carwardine, author of \u003ci\u003eLincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e “Abraham Lincoln was blessed with truly first-rate biographers in John Nicolay and John Hay, so it is ‘altogether fitting and proper’ that Nicolay and Hay have now attracted a terrific chronicler of their own life and times in Joshua Zeitz. This fine book traces the extraordinary evolution of Lincoln’s two private secretaries from clerks into tireless historians and rabid keepers of the flame. Historians have long remembered their roles as canny observers of the White House during the Civil War, but this study adds much fascinating new material about their peerless role in crafting and preserving the Lincoln image.”\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e—Harold Holzer, author of \u003ci\u003eThe Civil War in 50 Objects\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e “Beautifully researched and written, it restores to full stature two figures who might have been young, but left a deep mark upon history. Highly recommended.”\u003cbr\u003e \u003cb\u003e—Ted Widmer, former presidential speechwriter and author of \u003ci\u003eYoung America: The Flowering of Democracy in New York City\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cb\u003eJoshua Zeitz\u003c\/b\u003e has taught American history and politics at Cambridge University, Harvard University, and Princeton University. He is the author of several books on American political and social history and has written for the \u003ci\u003eNew York Times, \u003c\/i\u003ethe\u003ci\u003e Washington Post,\u003c\/i\u003e \u003ci\u003eNew Republic\u003c\/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Atlantic\u003c\/i\u003e,\u003ci\u003e Dissent,\u003c\/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eAmerican Heritage\u003c\/i\u003e. He lives with his wife and two daughters in Hoboken, New Jersey.Chapter 1\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Put the Ball Through the Hoop\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Seated behind his desk in the Oval Office, Lyndon Johnson appeared      pensive and subdued when, on the evening of Thursday, November 28,      1963, he delivered brief remarks to the nation. It was 6:15, and      LBJ was only in the sixth full day of his presidency. \"Tonight, on      this Thanksgiving, I come before you to ask your help, to ask your      strength, to ask your prayers that God may guard this Republic and      guide my every labor,\" he began. \"All of us have lived through 7      days that none of us will ever forget. We are not given the divine      wisdom to answer why this has been, but we are given the human      duty of determining what is to be, what is to be for America, for      the world, for the cause we lead, for all the hopes that live in      our hearts.\" Reading with deliberate care from a prepared text,      the president acknowledged what was surely on every American's      mind: \"A great leader is dead; a great Nation must move on.      Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or      to lose.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The day before, LBJ had delivered his first speech before a joint      session of Congress-a solemn and widely acclaimed address in which      the new president pledged to pick up the mantle from John F.      Kennedy and secure passage of the New Frontier's sweeping but      stalled policy agenda, including a major tax cut that Kennedy's      advisers believed would stimulate the economy; aid to primary and      secondary education; and hospital care for seniors. Dozens of      LBJ's former colleagues from Dixie sat in stone-cold silence as      Johnson affirmed to stirring applause that \"no memorial oration or      eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than      the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which      he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this country      about equal rights. We have talked for one hundred years or more.      It is time now to write the next chapter, and to write it in the      books of law.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Now, on Thanksgiving, Johnson doubled down, asking his countrymen      to join him in prayer \"for His divine wisdom in banishing from our      land any injustice or intolerance or oppression to any of our      fellow Americans whatever their opinion, whatever the color of      their skins—for God made all of us, not some of us, in His image.      All of us, not just some of us, are His children.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e For most Americans, Thanksgiving week marked the start of the      holiday season. For Lyndon Johnson, it signaled the beginning of      an intense, yearlong sprint to prove that \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c\/i\u003e could break the      logjam, achieve the New Frontier, and surpass it beyond even the      wildest expectations of John Kennedy's supporters. It would be no      easy lift.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \"I think the Congress looks more powerful sitting here than it did      when I was there in the Congress,\" Kennedy remarked roughly a year      before his death. For well over two decades, a coalition of      conservative southern Democrats and northern Republicans had      stymied the expansion of domestic policies first established      during the New Deal era. In the Senate, an institution that the      journalist William White once dubbed \"the South's unending revenge      upon the North for Gettysburg,\" conservatives made frequent use of      the filibuster to prevent social welfare and civil rights      legislation from coming to a vote, while in the House powerful      southerners kept such measures forever bottled up in committee.      Now, in a sharp rebuke to Kennedy's promise of dynamic action and      national rejuvenation, the conservative coalition had all but      ground the government to a halt. Not only did the House and the      Senate refuse to take up key New Frontier measures. They \u003ci\u003ealso\u003c\/i\u003e refused to pass eight of twelve routine appropriations bills, thus      leaving whole parts of the government unfunded and operating on a      continuing resolution that set spending at the previous year's      levels.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eCongressional Quarterly\u003c\/i\u003e deemed the state of affairs      \"unprecedented,\" while Walter Lippmann, the dean of American      journalism, bemoaned the \"scandal of drift and inefficiency\" that      had beset Washington. \"This Congress has gone further than any      other within memory to replace debate and decision by delay and      stultification. This is one of those moments when there is reason      to wonder whether the congressional system as it now operates is      not a grave danger to the Republic.\" Yet as Harry Truman famously      asserted, the buck stopped with the president. A week before      Kennedy's assassination, the columnist James Reston noted \"a vague      feeling of doubt and disappointment about President Kennedy's      first term. . . . He has touched the intellect of the country, but      not its heart. He has informed but not inspired the nation. He is      the most popular figure, but he has been lucky in his competition.      . . . [H]is problem is probably not how to get elected but how to      govern.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Such was the state of affairs when Lyndon Johnson entered the      White House.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e LBJ first came to Washington as a young congressional staff member      in the early 1930s before returning to Texas in 1935 to serve as      state director of the National Youth Administration (NYA), a      marquee New Deal jobs project. Two years later, and against all      odds, he won a special election to Congress at age twenty-eight.      An ardent supporter of Franklin Roosevelt, Johnson established a      more liberal voting record than most southern Democrats with whom      he served in the House. Though he consistently opposed legislation      to abolish the poll tax and to make lynching a federal crime, he      joined northern Democrats in supporting expanded rights for      organized labor, greater administrative oversight of business and      industry, and funding for public works. Notably, he continued to      do so long after most of his southern Democratic colleagues forged      an informal alliance with northern Republicans to oppose the      Roosevelt administration. On the strength of his New Deal      credentials, FDR strongly backed Johnson in a special election to      fill an unexpired Senate seat in 1941. LBJ most likely won the      primary (in Texas, as throughout the South, the only vote that      mattered), but party rivals stole it from him in a brazen display      of election-night ballot fraud. Though in the coming years he      aligned himself more closely with his state's oil and gas      interests, when he ran a second time for the Senate in 1948,      Johnson was once again recognized as the liberal option. After      achieving a razor-thin primary victory over the conservative      former governor Coke Stevenson-this time, it was likely LBJs      allies who stole the election-Johnson drifted rightward during his      two terms in the Senate, in part out of recognition that Texas was      moving strongly in that direction and in part to curry favor with      the chamber's powerful southern chairmen, most notably Richard      Brevard Russell of Georgia. Johnson delivered his maiden floor      speech in opposition to civil rights, turned against former New      Deal allies who now stood accused of communist loyalty, and, in      his time as Democratic leader after 1953, cooperated closely with      the Eisenhower administration. Many of the liberals in his caucus      came to despise LBJ, particularly after he neutered their civil      rights bill in 1957. They correctly perceived that he wanted to      pass a weak bill in order to make his prospective presidential      candidacy in 1960 palatable to northern Democrats but      unobjectionable to his fellow southerners. On the day that he      assumed office, very few people knew what to make of Lyndon      Johnson. Was he simply a pragmatist who, deep in his heart,      remained an ardent New Dealer? Or was he a southern conservative      who would betray John Kennedy's unfinished legacy?\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e If Johnson's belief system was a matter of wide speculation, few      observers doubted his keen understanding of Congress. LBJ knew      that conservative Democrats, in loose cooperation with      Republicans, had willfully manufactured a bottleneck of important      legislation to form a bulwark against Kennedy's civil rights bill.      Only when liberals capitulated and withdrew the Civil Rights Act      would southern Democrats consent to bring Kennedy's tax stimulus      to a vote and fund the many government initiatives-including      bridges, highways, post offices, and defense projects-that their      more liberal and moderate colleagues hoped to deliver to hometown      constituents. Johnson knew the playbook because, as a freshman      senator, he had helped to write it. As long as conservatives could      hold the government hostage, much as they had in 1949, when they      successfully fought back Harry Truman's civil rights agenda, they      could forestall consideration of Kennedy's New Frontier agenda,      including civil rights legislation that lay dying on the Hill.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e It took LBJ less than a day to spring into action. In a series of      phone calls before and after Thanksgiving 1963, the new president      highlighted the imperative of using his political capital to clear      the logjam; then, and only then, would members of Congress feel at      liberty to bring civil rights and other New Frontier measures to a      vote. In the meantime, however, he would keep up the pressure. On      Saturday, November 30—just over a week after assuming the      presidency—LBJ asked the former Treasury secretary Robert      Anderson, a Republican and outspoken fiscal conservative, to      intervene with Howard Smith, the chairman of the Rules Committee,      which had broad authority to prevent legislation from proceeding      to the House floor. Johnson reminded Anderson that \"this country      is not in any condition to take that kind of stuff . . . and      that's going to hurt our people. And it's going to hurt the      conservatives.\" Anderson agreed to speak with Smith and to convey      the president's willingness to support a seldom-used measure—a      discharge petition—to bypass Smith's committee altogether and      bring the legislation directly to the full House.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Playing the other side just as artfully, Johnson placed a call to      Dave McDonald, the president of the United Steelworkers of America      (USWA) and a member in good standing of the liberal coalition.      \"They've got to petition it out,\" the president instructed. \"That      means we got to get 219. We'll start at about 150 Democrats; that      means we got to get 60, 70 Republicans.\" The president spoke with      the passion of a true believer (\"we've been talking about this for      \u003ci\u003e100\u003c\/i\u003e years. And they won't give us a hearing on this thing, so we      got to do something about it\") and implored McDonald to fire up      his union's formidable lobbying operation—not only to support the      discharge petition in the House, but also to move the tax and      appropriations bills through committee.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Before and after the Thanksgiving holiday, Johnson repeated these      conversations time and again, at once lining up support for a      discharge petition in the House while affirming the need to clear      the logjam of tax and spending bills \u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c\/i\u003e making a final push on      civil rights in the Senate. Among those who understood the      president's strategy was Senator George Smathers, a conservative      Democrat from Florida who ultimately opposed the Civil Rights Act      of 1964 but who represented a faction of the southern caucus that      was disinclined to grind all government to a halt indefinitely      over civil rights. The \"sooner we can get a civil rights bill over      with,\" he told Johnson, \"get that part of it ended and out of the      way, the better off the South's going to be, and the better off      the North's going to be, and the better off everybody's going to      be. And they wouldn't hide behind the tax bill—and hide behind a      lot of other bills, just on the pretense of being against them      when the real fact is they're against the civil rights bill.\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Without prompting—and without the knowledge that LBJ had been      making a similar case to his economic advisers for several      days—Smathers suggested that the president make a concerted effort      to woo Harry F. Byrd, the deeply conservative chairman of the      Senate Finance Committee. If Johnson were willing to indulge      Byrd's obsession with fiscal discipline and bring the 1964-1965      federal budget under $100 billion, then the chairman \u003ci\u003emight\u003c\/i\u003e allow      the tax cut to clear through his committee. \"Wish you'd feel Byrd      out,\" LBJ agreed, \"and give me a pretty good, full report.\"      Unknowingly, George Smathers would help set in motion a chain of      events whose consequences would be far reaching.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e The strategy that Lyndon Johnson developed in the first week of      his presidency had a profound but highly calculated effect. The      pressure that his supporters placed on Howard Smith—and the      chairman's realization that a discharge petition, if successful,      would permanently undermine his authority—persuaded the      cantankerous Virginian to allow the Civil Rights Act to reach the      House floor. Beginning with outreach from Smathers, LBJ      simultaneously courted Harry Byrd until the patrician senator      effectively agreed to swap budget cuts for a tax stimulus. With      major economic legislation now cleared through Congress, the      president had paved the way for passage of long-awaited civil      rights legislation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Just before the Thanksgiving holiday, some of Johnson's advisers      cautioned him that presidents should not spend valuable capital on      hopeless causes. \"Well,\" he purportedly replied, \"what the hell's      the presidency for?\"\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e LBJ ultimately brought his budget under $100 billion, pushed      Kennedy's tax cut through Congress, and secured passage of the      Civil Rights Act-all by late June 1964. He accomplished these      measures while also declaring an \"unconditional war on poverty\"      and creating the blueprint for the Great Society—the most      ambitious domestic agenda since the New Deal. Though LBJ's early      success owed in part to his mastery of legislative strategy,      equally fundamental were efforts by advocacy groups-religious and      lay alike-on behalf of civil rights and social justice      legislation. Above all, Johnson benefited from a deep well of      public support in the wake of Kennedy's assassination. The      president's approval ratings, which fluctuated between 70 percent      and 77 percent throughout the spring, owed at least as much to the      country's determination to lock arms with its new leader as to      LBJ's policy and political triumphs.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e Unlike most of his predecessors, LBJ did not enjoy the benefit of      a transition period to build the team that would help him, in      turn, build his vision. Instead, he had little choice but to      improvise on the spot—to pull a trusted friend like Jack Valenti      along with him to the White House or entreat old hands from his      House and Senate days to join him on a new and unfamiliar journey.      These handicaps notwithstanding, in that first year of seemingly      unrestrained activity and accomplishment—from the time of      Kennedy's death to his own election to the presidency in late      1964—Johnson assembled an ad hoc staff that defied the      expectations of even the most cynical Washington hands. They were      a \"coalition government\" of Kennedy and Johnson men—a \"strange      amalgam of Austin and Boston, of cool, brainy Easterners and      shrewd, folksy Texans, of men who had always been fiercely loyal      to him and men who had fought and belittled him before the 1960      Los Angeles Democratic convention,\" according to Charles Roberts,      who covered the White House for \u003ci\u003eNewsweek\u003c\/i\u003e. \"It is some kind of      tribute to Isaiah and the LBJ Way that the transition went as      smoothly as it did.\"","brand":"Penguin Books","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46299764097253,"sku":"NP9780143111436","price":18.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/1842\/7735\/files\/9780143111436.jpg?v=1767723173","url":"https:\/\/k12savings.com\/es\/products\/building-the-great-society-isbn-9780143111436","provider":"K12savings","version":"1.0","type":"link"}